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Edited by

E. A. PEEL
A. M. WILKINSON
W. CURR

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This special issue of *Educational Review* is concerned with current trends in sociology of education and their implications for teaching. It is hoped to include papers by Michael F. D. Young on the sociology of knowledge and teaching, Edith King on the teacher's presentation of self, Martin Shipman on structural functional approaches, G. Esland and R. Dale on phenomenological approaches to the sociology of the school, Gerald Cortis on links between sociology/social psychology and teaching; and so on. The issue is edited, with an introductory paper on the applications of sociology in teaching, by Roland Meighan.

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   by E. A. PEEL 63p.

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EDUCATIONAL REVIEW

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SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

LISTENING AND THE STUDY OF SPOKEN LANGUAGE

by ANDREW WILKINSON *and* LESLIE STRATTA
Oracy Research Unit, University of Birmingham

I. LISTENING

(a) *How well do we listen?*

Research suggests that people listen very badly. Students listening to lectures have been found to comprehend half or less than half the basic matter (Nichols, 1949; Brown, 1950; Irvin, 1953). Of course some lectures are so long, so indescribably boring, so unrelated to the listener's frame of reference, that it is necessary in sheer self-defence to turn away into daydreams of money, sex or power. But the passive role required of the listener is also to blame. It seems that one of the situations in which we listen best is when we have to do something immediately with the information we receive. For instance we may have to remember it and act upon it, as in following out sheer directions. Or we may have to reply to it, as in a conversation. To keep saying *You what?* or *I didn't er quite er understand* on such an occasion smacks of idiocy. Our attention is limited; it comes in bursts, not continually: in conversation it is constantly stimulated. In listening to longer utterances the attention holds longer for say narrative than exposition. This has implications for teaching by lecture. Certainly one should be able to follow a continuous exposition for a reasonable period from a lecturer or teacher immediately present, or on radio or television. We are not arguing for the abolition of all lectures; only for the abolition of long, bad lectures.

(b) *Some reasons for poor listening*

The longer people listen the less they are able to listen. In many educational institutions far too much time is taken up with sheer listening. Research in the past has indicated that students from primary school to university spend well over half their 'communication time' (time spent in speaking, listening, reading, writing) in listening. Thus primary school children were found to be listening

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for 2 hours 38 minutes each day (57.5% of such time). That was in 1950 (Wilt, 1950). There would seem to be no more recent work on this, but one wonders whether it would be over optimistic to assume that, in many secondary schools at least, things are very different now.

There are all kinds of other reasons for failures to understand through listening, ranging from incidental noise to emotional disturbance or specific blockage caused by the material (many people go into a doodah whenever calculations, however simple, are introduced). We tried to discover whether listening ability was related to personality dimensions such as extroversion and introversion; it may be, but no evidence showed up on our tests. Many research workers have found some correlation with I.Q. as measured by conventional tests; this varies between 0.4 to 0.8 from experiment to experiment, depending partly also on the listening test used. Our own researching, for instance, gives correlations of .63 verbal, .49 non-verbal, at 13 plus. There is, however, a separate listening factor as suggested by the work of Spearritt (1962). There are also correlations with other language measures: we found correlations of .73 at 13 plus with a reading comprehension test. It seems that there are separate factors for traditional language modes; speaking, listening, reading and writing (Carroll, 1960); abilities in these are distinct but overlapping. On commonsense grounds one would expect a fair relationship between reading and listening as they are both receptive skills.

(c) Can we improve listening ability?

Since a good deal of learning goes on through our ears the quality of our listening is obviously a matter of concern, and we must consider whether it is possible to improve it. There has been a good deal of experimentation on this in the United States. Experimental and control groups have been taken over a period of from six to 12 weeks, and gains have been recorded with the experimental groups. (Studied by Bird, 1953; Brown, J.I., 1954; Erikson, 1954; Irvin, 1953; Nichols, 1959; Lewis, 1956). Hollow (1955) constructed listening tests and in between their administration trained primary school children by daily 20-minute lessons over six weeks. In her training one can discern three aspects: the necessity for attention and appropriate set, the ability to perform certain operations—to separate main from subordinate ideas, for instance; and the recognition of certain signposts: 'the first thing', 'all of a sudden', 'there is still another thing'. Pratt (1956) distinguished a number of

listening skills'. Forty teachers introduced the skills in each of five weekly lessons and training was also given in the normal situations which might arise in regular class work. He also stressed 'set'. The materials presented to the teachers indicated that a comfortable sitting position, keeping one's eyes focussed on the speaker to observe facial expressions and gestures, willingness to listen, willingness to think about ideas expressed, and courtesy towards the speaker, were important aspects of an adequate set for listening. In both studies, pupils of all grades of ability benefited. Such experiments are often free bonus schemes payable on completion. By psychological processes which are now well-known they are almost bound to produce improvements. But what has not been demonstrated, and what would be very hard to demonstrate, is how permanent such gains are. There is in any case a danger in training listening and 'listening skills' in isolation. For this there is a ready and disturbing parallel in the teaching of reading, which has far too often become an end in itself.

We would agree that some of the suggestions in the schemes just described are helpful, outside the classroom as well as in it. Pratt's description of 'set' draws attention to non-linguistic factors in communication and the essential relationship between addressor and addressee. Hollow draws attention to some linguistic features and their functions, though at far too crude a level. The training of 'skills'* however, we are not so happy about. It appears to try to

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* American thinking on listening skills has been largely conditioned by the work of Nichols (1948) and Brown, J.I. (1949), both of whom drew up a taxonomy. It was based on the distinction between *receptive* and *reflective* listening. A fair definition is given by Pratt (1956); *Receptive skills*: Skills primarily associated with accuracy in listening: (a) ability to keep related details in mind, (b) ability to observe a single detail, (c) ability to remember a series of details, (d) ability to follow oral directions; *Reflective skills*: (a) ability to use contextual clues, (b) ability to recognise organizational elements, (c) ability to select main ideas as opposed to subordinate ideas and details, (d) ability to recognise the relationship between main ideas and subordinate ideas that support them, (e) ability to draw justifiable inferences. When J.I. Brown and G.R. Carlsen came to draw up their widely used and influential 'Listening Comprehension Test' (1953) for college students, they drew on Brown's own work, that of Nichols, supplemented by pronouncements of a commission of the National Council for the Teaching of English, and the views of 11 experts on an NCTE Listening Committee. They also examined diagnostic tests in silent reading. As a result they constructed their battery of five sub-tests: (a) immediate recall, (b) following directions, (c) recognising transitions, (d) recognising word meanings, and (e) lecture comprehension (the ability to deduce meanings from context, understand the central idea, draw inferences, understand organization, and note the degree of relevance).

externalise and describe in far too simple a way a complex internal process. It seems to us that it is far better to 'improve listening' in the context of an inter-related improvement or oracy and literacy and indeed of general development.

Thus listening tests constructed by the Oracy Research Unit at Birmingham emphasise rather the richness and variety of language than 'skills'. Significantly many listening tests and training schemes pay scant attention to the language they use; it is often written language read aloud. Scarcely ever is it considered important enough to quote in reports of investigations. We feel that the motivating force of interesting language produced, not by far distant literary figures but by people in the world around us, engaged in living and communicating as we do, is a great stimulus to the development of listening ability. We also feel that a knowledge of some of the features of language and how language operates is likely to be useful in this connection. To put it another way we do not conceive of 'listening skill' as something existing in the abstract, unrelated to such matters as the interest of the material, or the knowledge of the listener—indeed to the whole context.

2. APPROACHING THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE

There are many ways of approaching a study of language. We offer below a general framework which can be used for any piece of communication, from a government report to a rude gesture. Because we are concerned with the spoken language here we shall choose our examples from that. The framework seems to indicate the main aspects of communication which it might be thought profitable to study. Let us translate it into the form of a question.

(a) *Who communicates what to whom, how and why, and on what occasion?*

We shall take the question words in turn: *who, what, whom, how, why, what occasion*, and consider how each one leads us to consider an aspect of communication.

(b) *Who?*

The Addressor has certain primary social characteristics which he cannot avoid—age, class, education, race. Next he may play certain fairly permanent roles—as father or son, employer or employee—or more specifically as solicitor, teacher, bus-driver, miner,

And, further, he will no doubt play a number of temporary roles, as host, guest, customer, passenger. From time to time all these roles will be indicated in the language he uses. And so will important *personal* information about him—what sort of a man he is: for example how mean or generous, how secure or nervous, how rational or emotional, and so on; and also what sort of a man he *thinks* he is. There are thus five levels of information we may obtain from a person's language and other communications; his primary social placing; his general role; his specific role (as with a job); his role for the time being; and his personal characteristics. Judgments of this kind need evidence beyond a single utterance but the reader would not be surprised if the speaker of *He's as daft as a brush* were a middle-aged Yorkshire school-teacher of working class origin with a rough but kindly manner, and a belief that England does not extend south of the Trent.

(c) *What?*

We have seen that there are two types of information being communicated—cognitive and affective. Cognitively the Addressor may be presenting fact or other knowledge, he may be arguing, instructing, demonstrating. Affectively he will probably be indicating his own attitudes towards the cognitive content of his utterance; and his relationship with the Addressee. We have indicated dimensions of closeness and distance in human relationships in which people advance and withdraw, and dimensions of superiority and inferiority of status which may diminish or be reversed. *Excuse me sir, but can I see your driving licence* is an interesting example of someone claiming inferiority of status whilst having superiority.

(d) *Whom?*

The questions we ask about the Addressee are those we ask about the Addressor, for turn-and-turn about and the Addressee is the Addressor, if only for a fraction of a second while saying *mm* in agreement. But even this gives information about him.

(e) *How?*

This question is asked about the channel and the code (or sign). Information can be given very largely through the linguistic and paralinguistic channels, usually in interaction with non-linguistc channels. Most of this information will be in code, but some of it will be uncoded. The phrase *I wish I weren't so attractive to women*

needs paralinguistic and non-linguistic comment. If it is said as a joke, with a half smile, we take it one way. If it is said sadly, ruefully with a frown and a shake of the head, we may think it serious. In either case we shall make judgments not only about what is said, but also about the speaker—perhaps in the first case that he has a capacity for self-criticism; perhaps in the second that he is extraordinarily conceited. (Of course what he says may be conceited *and* true, in which case we probably despise his arrogance and envy his success.)

We are mainly concerned here with the language code. A useful approach to this is to consider the register used in its various aspects: the fact that it may not be possible to categorise it easily, if at all, is no barrier because the attempt will throw up discussion of the linguistic features. Another useful area of discussion is the predictability or otherwise of the language: how far it is 'old organised', how far 'new now organising' language. In the phrase *You really must turn over a new fig leaf*, the register of admonition and advice to the young in old organised speech is used, but the insertion of a single unpredicted word revivifies it, and reverses the apparent intention.

(f) Why?

Here we consider the 'intentions' of a speaker. These may be cognitive and affective; they may be intentions of which he is unaware—means by which certain needs or drives are satisfied. Take the following incident. Seated in a railway compartment are two men and a moderately attractive woman. One man lights a cigarette. A few minutes later the other man leans towards the woman and says 'Do you mind if I smoke?'. The intention of the second man is to find out whether the woman minds him smoking. But he also wishes to be thought well of by her, as a man of great courtesy (the compartment was a *smoking* compartment); and perhaps even to engage her in conversation (the reader will be interested to know he was successful). He may well have had a fourth 'intention'— to put the other man in his place as an ill-mannered boor who smokes in a lady's presence without permission. Certainly that is how the other man took it, though of course the speaker may have been effectively unaware of his presence, having thoughts only for the woman.

In an extended piece of utterance such as a conversation, there is

not just one, there are many intentions, cognitive and affective, overt and covert, conscious and unconscious.

(g) *What occasion?*

Speech may be occurring in the classroom, at a party, from a platform, at home over a meal, in bed, at No. 10 Downing Street. The setting and the occasion are all factors in the context of situation.

3. AN ANALYSIS OF A 'MAYDAY' CALL

Let us now apply the sentence from 2 (a) above. *What communicates what to whom, how and why, and on what occasion?* to an exchange which, we understand, is an actuality recording of a U.S. air-force pilot sending out a distress call and eventually baling out, successfully.

PILOT: twenty five angels/indicates two seven o knots/mayday/ mayday/mayday/this is one o two one five triple seven/ anybody read me on guard channel/

GUARD CHANNEL: one five triple seven demon here on guard channel do you copy/over

PILOT: roger demon one five triple seven/have just had a flame out/I'm somewhere north of Kirsche Air Base/I estimate about fifty miles/smoke and emergency problems/

GUARD CHANNEL: roger picked up emergency squad that time/ pigeons in the home place/stand vector one eight five degrees/what is your present altitude/

PILOT: roger demon/one five triple seven down to twenty thousand feet/I'm trying to get an air start now/stand by/ checking the tail pipe now/roger demon doesn't look like I'm going to be able to make it/the air start ignition switch doesn't seem to work/looks like I'm going to have to leave it/what's my pigeons now please/

GUARD CHANNEL: your pigeon is now still one eight five/you're down to. . .

THIRD PERSON: hey Prince knock it off over there/

GUARD CHANNEL: . . .you're down to/what is your present altitude/demon here/

PILOT: roger stands at ten thousand/I'm going to have to leave it demon/

.GUARD wait triple seven demon here/er do you have er glide

CHANNEL: distance enough to make to field three/do you have
              visual on it/is it too long over

PILOT: negative demon/can't make it/I'm going to leave it/there's
              time to get in my position/

GUARD   get your position air rescue is already on route to pick
CHANNEL: you up over/

PILOT: will blow canopy now/(sound of canopy blowing)

It should be said immediately that discussing this only in trans-cription, without the phonological and paralinguistic dimension, a major part of its impact is lost. The way to approach it would perhaps be to listen to it, perhaps twice, study the transcript, and play parts of it again for clarification whilst doing so, and conclude with a final playing. As it is the excitement, the indicators of human courage and self-control in face of extreme danger, are minimised. One of the features of the recording is the impersonal routine language and the personal elements are contributed mainly by the voice. To study a transcription alone is to deal with a pale shadow of the original.

(a) Who and whom?

Because the language is essentially and mainly that of radio pro-cedure, less emerges in general about the Addressor and Addressee than might in another situation. Here the roles are quite specifically defined—controller at base and pilot in aircraft. However, what does emerge about both men as individuals, and particularly the pilot, is their control of an underlying fear by application to the task in hand through the procedure designed for such an emergency.

(b) What?

The controller is concerned to gain information (*what is your present altitude* etc.) which will enable him to advise; to give in-structions on procedure; to suggest an alternative procedure when *glide distance* is found to be insufficient; to summon air rescue. The pilot is concerned to give him the information he requires, to give a running commentary on his present and intended actions (*checking the tail pipe now, I'm going to have to leave it.* etc.). Affectively there is a cry for help (*mayday/mayday*) from the pilot, and support and reassurance from the controller.

(c) How and why?

The channels on this recording are, of course, exclusively linguistic

and paralinguistic. It is not profitable to discuss the paralinguistic here—the tiny hesitations *the air start ignition switch doesn't s-seem to work*, for instance, when the pilot realises he's not going to save the aircraft.

The register is that of aircraft procedure. Much of it is not intelligible in detail to the layman but some of its general functions are clear. It provides a means of objectifying terrible events: *smoke and emergency problems*, for example, 'means' *God, the plane's on fire.* Also coming to the pilot's aid are the laconic understandments of his profession: *doesn't look like I'm going to be able to make it.* He repeats three times the matter of fact phrase *I'm going to (have to) leave it;* it is urgent but not panicky. The second time he adds the controller's code name *demon*, an appeal to another *person* for help. Demon senses the position, calls on him to wait, says he is still there *wait triple seven demon here*, but is fractionally at a loss as to what to do before it comes to him, *er/do you have er glide distance to make it to field three.* However it is too late; the pilot will have to eject. Controller accepts this immediately and gives instruction and reassurance in one breath, *get in your position air rescue is already on route to pick you up over.*

The intentions of the speakers are not devious as they would be in some conversations. Both are concerned with the same objective, the saving of the pilot, and if possible the aeroplane. To this end there is obvious cognitive purpose in the language, to exchange information to enable each to play his part. Affectively the pilot is calling for help, the controller supplying reassurance. There are various specific intentions in the course of the exchange. Thus in his first utterance the pilot is giving routine information, calling for help, giving his code number, asking for an answer. When he speaks again his purpose is to describe succinctly the condition he is in, and his position: and so on.

(d) What occasion?

The occasion is a specific one, talk between aircraft and ground control; in the sense that disasters are frequent, it is a rare one. What is interesting about it is the way it causes both parties, the pilot in particular, to be explicit. Normally colleagues talking professionally might use a private or restricted code, and to some extent they do, in that parts of their exchange (*pigeons*, for example, are meaningless to the uninitiated). On the other hand, because of their separation and

the complexity of an aircraft, the pilot describes what he is doing in a way which informs the controller, and perhaps also to some extent distances him from the event he is so intimately involved in (for example references to *air start*, *tail pipe*, *ignition switch*).

4. LISTENING TO LANGUAGE IN THE CLASSROOM

Anthologies of the spoken language recorded on tape should be as freely available as books. The construction of such anthologies, based not in set pieces—Churchill's war speeches, for example (though these are well worth studying)—but made up of language in some of the variety of situations in which it operates everyday—is a priority at the present time. It is not easy to get good recordings of 'genuine conversation' because the tape-recorder intrudes and people talk to it, or with it in mind, rather than to one another. Certainly major work needs to be done, but this is a field in which the individual teacher or teacher groups, with enthusiasm and certain technical flair for using a tape-recorder, could make a real contribution. Meanwhile there is a large amount of various language from radio and television which can be recorded comparatively simply. Let us take two such recordings and examine classroom treatments of them.

(a) *Television advertisement*

The study of the advertisement was initiated by F. R. Leavis and Denys Thompson in *Culture and Environment* (1934), where the 'appeals' of a variety of advertisements was examined. It is not suggested here that this was not a useful approach, though the way it was often implemented had the effect of reinforcing cynicism in young people at a time of their lives when cynicism was all too easy. The framework of approach we have outlined above is one in which it is possible both to be more comprehensive and more objective.

Here is the transcript of a television advertisement for sherry. The fact that video-tape is not generally available at the moment, so that the total communication cannot be studied, is in some ways helpful. A sound recording draws attention to the words; and it is a valuable part of the exercise to deduce from them aspects of the visual presentation.

MAN: original sherry/original pale cream sherry/
WOMAN: *pale* cream sherry/well that's original/let's have a look/
MAN: mm handsome bottle/who makes it/Croft indeed well you couldn't want better than that/

WOMAN: let's try some of this Croft original/pale it certainly is/and sweet/but delicate/tastes good/very good/

MAN: I wonder what this Croft original costs/ (*Price flashed on screen*)

WOMAN: I don't wonder/

The occasion presents a problem. When and where would such a conversation take place. A màrried couple at home sampling the sherry before a party? In that case they seem strangely ignorant of what they have bought in; could it be that it is part of a job lot supplied by the wine merchant? Or could they have been given the run of the wine merchant's cellars? A group of fourteen-year-old girls discussing the tape found the location puzzling.

A: well they're either in a shop or in a/in an/off licence

B: well I don't see how she can tell about it/unless she's tasting it/ unless she's at a wine tasting thing/at a wine tasting

There are difficulties also about this explanation—the video-tape seemed to show an expensively furnished drawing room. But it is probably as far as one can go. The fact is that the scene is located in the never-never land of advertisement, where, on a different culture level, housewives go into ecstasies over differences, which have no chemical basis, between washing powders.

When we turn to discuss the participants they can be assigned to an age at cultural and class level. They are described by the 13-year-olds as 'elderly' 'middle-aged'. The accents are middle-upper class (X.R.P.), variously described as 'talking posh', 'like the BBC'. 'high class'.

TEACHER: what jobs would you think they do/

A: I don't think the woman's got a job/

TEACHER: what makes you think that/

A: she doesn't sound like it/she sounds too/she sounds like she's got plenty of leisure time

TEACHER: and what about the man

A.   he'd be something quite high up/director or something

B: an M.P./

What the participants on the tape are communicating presents no difficulties. Cognitively there are certain apparent facts about the sherry. It is pale and sweet; it is made by Crofts. The price is not mentioned in the dialogue—it was flashed onto the screen. But what they are communicating on the affective level *to each other* is puzzling. As one girl said 'They seem to be on two different tracks'. Their

relationship is very doubtful; the language carefully avoids any suggestions as to this, but in doing so it gives the impression of distant cousins observing an incest taboo directing their emotions to the sherry:

A: I think they're husband and wife/
B: no/I don't think so/they don't talk like that/
A: friends/
B: yes friends/but funny/not like friends really/

The affect is directed onto .the sherry, and towards the viewing audience. It is in terms of the general recommendation that top people of this kind drink the sherry; the price is not mentioned as we have said, but it is about half as much again as an average sherry. It is also in terms of the emotion lavished on the sherry itself.

The original communication was visual and linguistic; the sound tape gives us linguistic and paralinguistic channels. The style of the language is economical, in short sentences, with heavy repetition of certain key words:

TEACHER: how does the language get the message across/
B: well they keep repeating words/pale/cream/
A: original/and the name of the sherry/I've forgotten/
B: Crofts/
A: yes Crofts/
TEACHER: do you think it would really happen/
B: not in these words/
A: it's not coming out like a conversation/
TEACHER: why not/
B: it sounds as though they're reading it/
A: a real conversation would be more relaxed/ not in such short sentences/

The word 'original' received comment:

B: like it was before/it's been the same ever since it started being made/
TEACHER: does it mean anything else/
A: oh/and it stands out from anything else/its/its individual/

Two cognitive meanings of original are pinpointed by the pupils. What they do not understand is its affective use in certain 'quality trades' as a vague term with association of 'traditional', 'long established', 'high quality'. Similarly because they do not understand the register they miss the point that 'pale' sherry is normally 'dry', and thus 'pale sweet' is a point of 'originality' in Crofts. This tells us s

something about the audience of aspirant wine-drinkers at which the advertisement is aimed, an aspect of the covert intention of the advertiser as distinct from the 'intentions' of the participants. The teacher will try to help these pupils towards this further understanding.

We have discussed the advertisement step by step in order to draw attention to different aspects of it. This is, of course, not the only way, or necessarily the most desirable way, it could be done. One might, for instance, throw up the above points, and others, by asking first of all why characters from say *Steptoe and Son*, or *Coronation Street*, were not used instead.

In the following section the lesson described is more free-ranging but still concerned essentially with the way language mediates experience.

(b) *Broadcast discussion*

In the television advertisement the effect of 'accent' on the listeners was deliberately calculated. In the tape we are now concerned with, the accent of one speaker has the effect of prejudicing the audience in a way quite contrary to what he would have wished.

The BBC series—*Man Alive*, did a television programme about the problem of finding a place to build a rehabilitation hostel for men who had just come out of prison. A site was chosen but the local residents and some of the local councillors objected. The planners, however, were insisting on building the hostel. *Man Alive* brought the two sides together to discuss their respective positions.

A teacher recently explored this situation with a group of fifteen-year-olds and began by asking them what their attitude was to the idea of a rehabilitation hostel for prisoners. In general they were in favour, and the teacher elicited and put on the blackboard a number of their reasons for approving such a plan. They were then introduced to the sound recording of the programme during the course of the discussion, being told that the interviewer asked a psychiatrist, who was in favour of this scheme, how he reacted to the objections being put forward by the local residents and the local councillors. The psychiatrist spoke with an upper-middle-class accent (XRP). Here is a transcription of his reply:

PSYCHIATRIST: I think that/it was first of all the conviction/of any-
where but here/summed up by one particular
councillor/whose er response was/er/that this was a

good and christian thing/but not a good and christian
thing/next door/to his/house/the/general/old/dark
mediaeval/belief that people/with problems don't
belong to the community/a really/fascinating/and
basic question/when does someone still belong to the
community/or when are they to be cast out with a bell
round/their neck/

The pupils were invited to listen to the psychiatrist's reply, con-
centrating their attention on the kind of person they thought he was.
Here is the teacher's instruction to them:

TEACHER: now what I want you to pause for a minute/and think
about is this man who's speaking/mm I want you to/think
of the kind of person that this psychiatrist is/mm/just
let's listen to him again/for just a/few seconds/tell me/er/as
you listen to him/what sort of person do you think he is/
o.k./listen carefully just listen to his voice/concentrate on
his voice/just tell me what sort of person you think he is/

The pupils began to react immediately and within a very short time
the following set of exchanges occur:

TEACHER: you were going to say something/

PUPIL 1: I was just going to say he sounds a bit of a snob/

TEACHER: he sounds a bit of a snob/why do you say that/ (*General
murmurs*)

PUPIL 2: by the tone of his voice/

TEACHER: by the tone of his voice he sounds a bit of a snob/go on/

PUPIL 2: he seems/er/a sympathetic bloke/but he doesn't look at the
other side of it/

TEACHER: he sounds a sympathetic bloke but he doesn't look at the
other side of it/are you agreeing then with him or not/this
idea of him being a bit of a snob/

PUPIL 2: well/I mean/you know/he's sympathetic to the prisoners—

TEACHER: yes/

PUPIL 3: (*Indistinct recording*) and says prisoners need a normal
life/(*Indistinct recording*)

TEACHER: yes/

PUPIL 3: but he don't understand the bloke who's going to live next
door to the place/

TEACHER: yes/that's the same kind of point you were making wasn't
it/er/er/Rebecca/but/let's/ let's/hold on to that one just a
minute and come back to your point Barrie/Barrie's saying

he sounds a bit of a snob/do other people agree with this/do
you agree with that or not/does anybody agree with that/
you agree with it do you/why do you agree with it then/

PUPIL 4: his accent/

TEACHER: his accent/

PUPIL 5: he might not/(*indistinct recording*)

TEACHER: do what/do what/
(*Laughter*)

PUPIL 5: (*Indistinct recording*)

TEACHER: yes/he may be thinking that/but/now/why/his accent/why
do you think because he speaks like he does that he's a
snob/

PUPIL 6: because he doesn't talk normal
(*General laughter*)

TEACHER: what do you mean he doesn't talk normal/what's what's
talking normal/

PUPIL 7: like we're talking now like/

TEACHER: but you're talking loik thees (*Mimicking humorously a
Birmingham accent*)/I don't talk like that/
(*General laughter*)

PUPIL 7: he's putting it on though/isn't he/

TEACHER: what do you mean/he's putting it on/

PUPIL 7: you know (*Pupil mimicking: recording* indistinct) I bet when
he gets home and sees his wife he don't speak like that/

TEACHER: well who thinks that/who thinks that/he doesn't talk like
that when he goes home to his wife/(*Pupils put hands up*)
who thinks that he does talk like that any time of the day/
(*Pupils put hands up*) why do you say that/why do you
think he talks like that any time of the day/

PUPIL 8: well psychiatrists usually are like that/

TEACHER: (*Laughs*) psychiatrists are usually like that are they/why/
why is that/why are psychiatrists usually like that/

PUPIL 8: I don't know/

PUPIL 7: because they're snobs/
(*Laughter*)

TEACHER: because they're snobs/
(*Laughter*)

One of the interesting features of these exchanges is that the pupils
do not realise that they are in agreement, to judge from their earlier
discussion, with the psychiatrist's views in favour of the hostel. Their

judgment had been coloured by their emotional responses to the man's accent. It was not until they had considered other aspects of this programme (we shall discuss one of these shortly) that some of them began to realise the nature of their own prejudices.

Another feature of this programme raised a different set of questions. During the course of the discussion the interviewer asked one of the councillors the following question:

> councillor/it seems to me that what the psychiatrist was suggesting/is that some of the political leadership/of local communities/could be devoted to the idea/of persuading/the people/how to accept a scheme rather than how to reject it/now/would it be possible do you think/that you could/lead the committee to bring in a hostel/

The pupils were asked to consider this question as if it had been asked of them. 'Supposing our answer was no', they were asked, 'what would our arguments be for *rejecting* a rehabilitation hostel?'. The arguments they offered were then put on the board. They were then asked to put arguments in *favour* of a rehabilitation hostel and these were also put on the board. The pupils were then invited to consider the reply given by the councillor, a transcription of which now follows:

COUNCILLOR: lead a committee to bring in a hostel/

INTERVIEWER: yes/why not/

COUNCILLOR: absolutely not/

INTERVIEWER: when political leaders are about doing good things for the community/it seems to me/

COUNCILLOR: yes but it's all got to be put into its proper context/ now it's all very well for a professional/and I presume that this gentleman is a professional/for to turn round to the ordinary people and say look we think this is a damn good scheme for you/so therefore you must be wrong if you oppose this scheme/ now/it's the same exactly/as it was in the army/you had your officer and you had your private/and there was a devil of a big gap between them/and that is my honest opinion that this gentleman who/is using his professional capacity/ to more or less talk down/to the ordinary people by virtue of saying/you have not got/the intelligence/to appreciate exactly what I am saying so therefore you are just a lot of/idiots/

The councillor was rejecting the idea of leading the community to support the proposal, but it was also evident to the class that he had not put forward a coherent set of points arguing his case. For a time the pupils were baffled; but then it became clear to them that the councillor's reply seemed to be motivated by feelings of hostility towards the psychiatrist. The discussion now began to focus on possible reasons for this, and it was at this moment that one pupil realised that the councillor's hostility was perhaps on the same order as their hostility to the psychiatrist earlier on in the lesson. As he put it 'He's like us, he don't like him because of his accent.'

(c) The study of 'living information'

In the past the study of English language in the classroom has often been thought in terms of the application of grammatical categories to isolated sentences. This has not, for very good reasons, had the beneficial effect on the pupils' own language production claimed for it; and it has not interested them in the phenomenon of language and its uses—quite the reverse. Yet, that language is a fascinating subject to school-children, has been known for some time by teachers who approach it in a humane way; and the *Language in Use* materials (Doughty, Pearce, Thornton, 1970) produced for the Schools Council, have provided a profitable approach to the subject.

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STUDENT "FAILURES"

by J. D. WILSON

Department of Education, Moray House College of Education, Edinburgh

Significant differences between pass and fail students were observed when several background variables and test scores were related to degree examination results for 1,015 first year arts and science students at Aberdeen University. The 119 students who were required to discontinue attendance at classes because of academic failure were contacted by postal questionnaire immediately on being sent down, and again fifteen months later (response rates 90 and 85 per cent respectively). Replies indicated a range of reactions to failure. Half the students made no further attempt to resume their studies, and only half of those who wished to re-enter were successful. An analysis of student comments suggested that a number of the students could not be regarded as 'failures'.

I. INTRODUCTION

Most studies of student performance have concentrated on predicting fail students from the relatively homogeneous population which comprises a university's intake. Few have subsequently followed up those students who are required to discontinue attendance at classes to obtain the students' versions of their difficulties, and to find out their reactions to failure. The present report, part of a larger inquiry into first year student performance at the University of Aberdeen (Wilson, 1969), compares passing and failing students on certain background data and test scores, and describes the fortunes of 119 students who discontinued in October, 1968. The students were contacted by postal questionnaire on two occasions: first of all, on being sent down, and secondly fifteen months later. Response rates were 90 per cent and 85 per cent respectively.

The number of academic failures has increased with the expansion of student numbers. Malleson (1967) estimated that there might be 20,000 cases annually by 1981. The U.G.C. (H.M.S.O., 1968 Table 29, p. 42) inquiry showed that 3,837 students who would normally have graduated in 1965–66 had left university for academic

reasons during their course, half by the end of first year. To cope with this increasing problem several universities including London, Edinburgh and Aberdeen have introduced a special redeployment service to supplement the work of the Careers Advisory Service by making contact with failures, and informing them of alternative courses of study and new career opportunities, (e.g. Mackintosh and Bassett, 1970).

2. BACKGROUND TO THE FOLLOW UP STUDY

The academic performance of 1,015 students who entered the arts and science faculties at the University of Aberdeen in October, 1967, was related to information on entrance qualifications and headmasters' estimates taken from their application forms. Over the session, scores were obtained for a sample of arts students (n = 343), representative on university degree examination performance, on the Moray House Adult Intelligence Test, the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Form A), and motivation and study methods scales developed by Entwistle and Wilson (1970). Scores on home-made scales of personality, validated against the E.P.I., motivation and study methods were also obtained from 281 science students (at a lecture), as part of a survey of the teaching of Chemistry in Scottish Universities, while, following promising results from a pilot study based on interviews (Wilson, 1968), ability was measured by the student's score on the seventeen most difficult words in the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. (The men science sample had a significantly better academic performance than the total male science intake).

Pass and 'fail' students were compared, by faculty, on these data. The latter were students who had failed two or more of their three (arts), or four (science) subjects, and were consequently required to discontinue attendance at classes for the following session, although they might re-sit the degree examinations at the end of the session, and if successful resume their course the following October.

Information for the majority of the students was available on (1) number of higher grade passes obtained at the student's first attempt at the Scottish Certificate of Education (S.C.E.); (2) grades of S.C.E. higher passes counting for entry to university[1]; (3) school

[1] Grades were scored (A = 1, B = 2 etc), an average was calculated for each student, and the distribution, which ran from 1.0 (good) to 3.0 (poor) was dichotomised to give the best relationship with the criterion.

year (fifth or sixth) by which a university entrance qualification had been obtained; (4) intended level of degree (honours or ordinary); (5) headmaster's general report on the student;[1] and (6) headmaster's estimate of the student's diligence. Information on father's occupation, requested on the questionnaires, was classified as manual or non-manual. Means and standard deviations were derived on the tested variables.

3. THE FOLLOW-UP STUDY

Securing the cooperation of fails is one major problem of a follow-up study. Wankowski (1969) reported that only half his sample at Birmingham University accepted an invitation to attend for interview, and Kendall's (1964) postal questionnaire had a similar response rate, though the students in his study had left university ten years before. He found that a higher proportion of men had attempted to recoup at university degree or diploma level than women, but the proportions recouping successfully were similar. Over half of the men who did not recoup (and under half of the women) made some attempt to continue their formal education. At the University of Texas, Hill (1966) showed that men more often than women planned to return to college, and enrolled in another college.

Replies to the first questionnaire, sent out in November 1968, were received from 107/119 students. Since 18 students had not in fact left university (see table 3 (1) below), the second questionnaire (February 1970) was sent to only 101 students, and 85 replied, including three who had not replied to the first. Slightly different versions of the questionnaire were completed by 'non-sitters' (n = 47) who had not attempted to gain readmission to university in June and September 1969, 'non-passers' (n = 18) and 're-entrants' (n = 20). Both the latter groups had attempted to secure readmission, but only re-entrants had been successful and were in mid-session when they received the questionnaire.

The good response to the Aberdeen inquiries suggests that a questionnaire approach is a useful way of eliciting information about a subject on which students may feel sensitive. Great care, of course, was taken with the accompanying letters. Students were never referred to as 'failures', but simply as individuals who had encountered

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[1] Reports were classified as expressing 'no' or 'some' reservations about the student's promise.

TABLE 1   PASS AND FAIL STUDENTS: BACKGROUND DATA

Variable	Arts				Science			
	Pass		Fail		Pass		Fail	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1. 3 or more S.C.E. 'H' passes at first attempt.	346	89.6	40	10.4	131	87.9	18	12.1
2 or less S.C.E. 'H' passes at first attempt.	95	80.5	23	19.5†	29	61.7	18	38.3*
2. Grade of S.C.E. 'H' passes:								
1.0–2.4 (Good)	308	90.6	32	9.4	117	90.0	13	10.0
2.5–3.0 (Poor)	129	81.1	30	18.9*	37	69.8	16	30.2*
3. Entrance Qualifications:								
By 5th Year	301	91.8	27	8.2	110	88.7	14	11.3
By 6th Year	140	79.6	36	20.4*	50	69.4	22	30.6*
4. Degree aimed at:								
Honours	294	92.2	25	7.8	238	86.2	38	13.8
Ordinary	273	86.1	44	13.9‡	57	82.6	12	17.4
5. Headmaster's Report:								
No Reservations	436	92.8	34	7.2	254	87.9	35	12.1
Some Reservations	58	76.3	18	23.7*	45	79.0	12	21.0
6. Headmaster's Rating:								
Diligent	505	90.3	54	9.7	258	89.0	32	11.0
Not Diligent	53	79.1	14	20.9*	60	76.0	19	24.0*
7. Social Class:								
Non-Manual	214	91.9	19	8.1	167	87.4	24	12.6
Manual	96	87.3	14	12.7	81	91.0	8	9.0

By χ^2_c * p <.01,   † p <.02,   ‡ p <.05.

TABLE 2:

PASS AND FAIL STUDENTS: TEST DATA

	Arts						Science					
	Pass (N = 310)		Fail (N = 33)			Pass (N = 249)		Fail (N = 32)		
Variable	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	t	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	t
1. Neuroticism	11.8	4.6	10.6	3.5	1.76	4.3	2.4	3.6	2.6	1.45
2. Extraversion	12.0	4.5	13.8	3.7	2.54*	4.8	2.0	4.9	2.2	0.46
3. Motivation	7.4	2.6	6.6	2.9	1.51	5.5	2.1	4.6	1.8	2.58*
4. Study Methods	10.0	2.9	9.7	2.9	0.63	4.4	2.2	4.4	2.2	0.06
5. Ability	75.2	11.7	73.2	10.3	1.05	22.0	5.2	21.6	5.4	0.38

* t test significant at .02 level.

Note: Arts Motivation and Study Methods scales contained 16 and 17 items respectively; Science Neuroticism, Extraversion and Study Methods scales contained 10 items, and the Motivation scale 11 items.

difficulties. Confidentiality was assured. Stress was placed on the potential usefulness of the replies for guiding future entrants. The letter accompanying the second questionnaire invited students to request a copy of a report of the inquiry.

While it is undeniably relevant to obtain the student's version of his difficulties at university, the validity of that data is necessarily limited. Questionnaire responses may, of course, merely represent conventional rationalisations.

4 RESULTS

The results presented in tables 1 and 2 show that pass and fail students can be discriminated on many variables. The arts—science differences on level of degree and headmaster's report (table 1 (4) and 1 (5) respectively) reflect the different compositions of the faculties. There are many more women in arts than in science, and arts women are significantly less likely than men to aim for honours. Recruitment to the arts faculty is also more local than science, where a higher proportion of students come from outwith the university's catchment area.

But the results also illustrate the great overlap on any of the predictive measures selected. Even the attempt to combine variables significantly related to fail performance on an individual basis (Wilson, 1969) has not successfully distinguished pass students from fails.

Table 3 (1) shows that 18 students transferred within the university (mainly from science to arts and from arts to the B.Ed.), and 48 of the 89 who discontinued said that they wanted readmission to university. The proportion was greater in science (20/31) than in arts (28/58). Banking and insurance were common occupational choices, where students would require to obtain professional qualifications at, or close to, ordinary degree level if they were to progress in their careers. Most of the women continuing in full-time education had transferred to a Diploma course in a College of Education.

Item 2 shows that 12/41 permanent leavers felt they had made a mistake in coming to university, with Science students less likely to reject this item, and one in five said he was 'mainly relieved' (item 3) to be dropping out, although the question had indicated that there was a range of reactions to dropping out. The 'other' category included a number of comments in which students expressed

TABLE 3: FAIL STUDENTS—FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE

Fail Students

Item	Men (N = 67)	Women (N = 40)	All (N = 107)	Arts (N = 62)	Science (N = 45)
1. Future Plans (All Students)					
(a) Readmission to University.	33	15	48	28	20
(b) Full-time Education elsewhere.	5	8	13	10	3
(c) Permanent Employment.	12	9	21	15	6
(d) Transfer within University.	13	5	18	4	14
(e) Other.	4	3	7	5	2
2. Do you now feel you should not have come to University?					
(1b, c and e only)	(21)	(20)	(41)	(30)	(11)
(a) Yes.	6	6	12	8	4
(b) No.	12	13	25	21	4
(c) Don't know.	3	1	4	1	3
3. How do you feel about dropping out? (1a, b, c and e only)	(54)	(35)	(89)	(58)	(31)
(a) Mainly relieved.	9	9	18	13	5
(b) Mainly depressed.	23	16	39	26	13
(c) Other.	22	10	32	19	13
4. Main reason for difficulties at University (i). (All Students)	(67)	(40)	(107)	(62)	(45)
(a) Lack of motivation/hard work.	20	9	29	17	12
(b) Study difficulties/Adjustment to teaching.	16	12	28	19	9
(c) Lack of guidance/wrong subjects.	15	8	23	14	9
(d) Other.	16	11	27	12	15

(i) The first or predominant difficulty was classified.

TABLE 4: FAIL STUDENTS—SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE

Item	Men (N = 51)	Women (N = 34)	All (N = 85)	Arts (N = 55)	Science (N = 30)
Classification of Students:					
Non-Sitters.	26	21	47	30	17
Non-Passers.	13	5	18	10	8
Re-Entrants.	12	8	20	15	5
1. Pressure to re-sit. (All Students)	(51)	(34)	(85)	(55)	(30)
(a) Free decision.	42	28	70	47	23
(b) Some pressure.	9	6	15	8	7
2. Further Education: (Non-Sitters and Non-Passers only)	(39)	(26)	(65)	(40)	(25)
(a) Enrolled in new course.	16	17	33	19	14
(b) Applied but not yet enrolled.	7	1	8	4	4
(c) Not applied.	16	8	24	17	7
3. New course and university course (2a and 2b only).	(23)	(18)	(41)	(23)	(18)
(a) Confident of success in new course.	19	17	36	22	14
(b) Not confident of success.	3	0	3	0	3
(c) University course helpful.	9	13	22	12	10
(d) University course not relevant.	9	4	13	7	6
(e) New course more congenial.	8	15	23	16	7
(f) New course less congenial.	4	0	4	0	4
4. My year at university was (2a, 2b and 2c).	(39)	(26)	(65)	(40)	(25)
(a) Useful/beneficial/enjoyable.	19	13	32	20	12
(b) A missed opportunity.	8	3	11	6	5
(c) A waste of time.	4	6	10	7	3
(d) Other/No opinion.	8	4	12	7	5

Table 4—continued

Item	Men (N = 51)	Women (N = 34)	*Fail Students* All (N = 85)	Arts (N = 55)	Science (N = 30)
5. Failure and relationship with parents:					
(a) No adverse effect.	17	19	36	30	6
(b) Some adverse effect.	9	3	12	4	8
				$x_c^2 = 8.61$	
				$p < .01.$	
6. Preparing for resits. (Non-Passers and Re-Entrants only).	(25)	(13)	(38)	(25)	(13)
(a) Special Problems.	11	9	20	12	8
(b) No special Problems.	14	4	18	13	5
(c) Kept in touch with staff.	12	3	15	10	5
(d) Did not keep in touch.	13	10	23	15	8
7. Performance at end of second year (Sept. 1970) (Re-entrants only)	(12)	(8)	(20)	(15)	(5)
(a) Passed all subjects by June 1970.	6	5	11	8	3
(b) Passed all subjects by Sept. 1970.	1	0	1	0	1
(c) Failed one subject by Sept. 1970.	4	2	6	6	0
(d) Failed two or more subjects by Sept. 1970.	1	1	2	1	1

annoyance at themselves, and occasionally at the examination system and teaching staff.

Despite the subjectivity of the classification procedure, and the fact that some of the categories may be inter-related (wrong choice of subjects probably relates to lack of motivation) a useful profile of the students' reasons for their difficulties is presented in item 4. Categories (a) (b) and (c) account for the major difficulty of 80 students. In category (d), personal problems were reported more frequently by women students.

Replies to the second questionnaire (table 4) indicated that the great majority of students had made the decision whether or not to re-sit on their own. 33 of the 47 nonsitters had made up their minds by the end of October 1968. Of those who had not returned to university (items 2 to 5) 2 in 3 had enrolled, or applied to enrol, in a course of further education, and 9 had embarked on degree level courses. All those who regarded their year at university as a 'waste of time' were 'non-sitters'. Science students were significantly more likely to report that failure had adversely affected relationships with parents. The difference between non-passers and non-sitters on this item ($x_c^2 = 2.85$) just failed to reach significance.

Of students who had attempted readmission, seven had kept in touch with members of staff responsible for curricular and personal guidance, five with teaching staff, and three with staff in both capacities. Some re-entrants who had maintained no contacts claimed that their self-reliance and capacity for independent work had benefited from having no one to lean on.

Only five of the re-entrants were 'confident' of passing the degree examinations at the end of session, and only seven were 'confident' of ultimately graduating, the remainder being only 'fairly confident' of success. Hardly any said they had experienced a major problem in readjusting to university. Two of the students (item 7) appeared to be in quite serious difficulties once more by the end of session. An additional analysis did not indicate that re-entrants were significantly superior to other unsatisfactory students on any of the background measures and test scores.

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The relative absence of significant differences between sub-groups, contrary to previous findings, directs attention to the general results

of the study, and to how the students reacted to their performance. The study illustrates one aspect of the 'cooling-out function' in a Scottish University (Clark, 1960; Macpherson, 1970). Though the door to re-entry was not officially closed, just under half the students quickly abandoned the idea of re-sitting the following year, and of 48 who initially wished re-admission, 38 resat, and 20 got back (more in arts than in science, despite the fact that more science students originally wished to get back in). Two in three of those who had not returned had enrolled or were about to enrol in new courses at other institutions. The overall picture, therefore, indicates that eighteen months after being failed, 61 of the 85 students for whom information was available were continuing with their education at degree level or below, a slightly higher percentage than that reported by Kendall (1964).

The replies to the first questionnaire indicated three common reactions to failure—equanimity, resentment or guilt. In the first group were students, dissatisfied with what the university had to offer, and glad to be out of an uncongenial atmosphere, or to be free of subjects which bored them. Two said they were persuaded to stay for the degree examinations but had planned to leave irrespective of their performance. Some said they had only come to university to please parents or teachers. One girl remarked, 'From the first day I knew I had made a mistake, but when I went to see someone about leaving I got a good talking to, being told that the Senatus knew better than to pick someone they did not think fit'. Another girl summed up this attitude as follows: 'I treat my year as a year of learning which came my way by mistake. It was not entirely wasted, but as I discovered, the life of learning was not for me'.

In the second group was a small number of students who felt depressed or annoyed at their failure and harboured feelings of resentment and a sense of injustice against the university. Faults in examining, bad teaching and inadequate guidance were cited as contributing factors. One or two students seemed emotionally scarred by their experiences. An older woman described her year as a 'nightmare' which had left her unable 'to shake off this feeling of indifference, of not really worrying about anything'. Two students felt that too little account of their illnesses had been taken.

Students in the third category, the majority, blamed themselves for being inadequately prepared for their courses, or for lacking the ability or will-power to study effectively. Many had done passably at

school with little effort, and had attempted to continue in this fashion at university. Failure had come as a rude awakening, and the problem of securing adequate employment had spurred many to try for readmission to prove that they could 'make the grade'.

Other accounts defy any attempt at classification. Personal circumstances, including lack of a stable home life or illness of a parent, were reported by a number, particularly women, while one student was so disorganised that, so he claimed, he turned up a day late for his re-sit examination!

The case-histories indicate the impossibility of ever attaining a completely accurate prediction of student failure, but they also indicate the variety of causes or excuses students advance, and the variety of reactions to 'failure'. Indeed, they suggest that this emotive label with its emphasis on the institutional interpretation of a student's performance cannot be justly attached to a number of these students. Failure, as much as success (Stott, 1950) must be related to the individual's personal values, and clearly, for some, satisfaction lay in abandoning their university careers and turning to something more congenial.

Though at Aberdeen considerable efforts have been made to counsel and guide new students on their choice of course, many of the students continued to express criticisms of the advice they had been offered, both at school and at university, and saw themselves as 'misfits'. Prior to the establishment of the student redeployment services mentioned at the outset, these students were turned out of university with but limited, and usually unsuccessful, attempts to guide their future careers. The new services should meet a real need, and if they can contact students experiencing academic difficulties in time, they should be able to help them cope with their 'failure' and select more appropriate courses, or careers.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

THE FUNCTION OF SPORT IN SECONDARY EDUCATION

by I. C. COPELAND

Lecturer in Education, Berkshire College of Education

ABSTRACT

The paper's principal concern is to examine the intended and unintended consequences of sport and particularly of team games in secondary education. The analytical framework employed is that formulated by Robert K. Merton to explore the manifest and latent functions of actions in a social system. The discrepancy between educationalists' intentions and resultant pupil attitude and behaviour is shown. An explanation of the inverse relationship between pupil involvement in sport and commitment to academic achievement is offered. There follows a discussion of aspects of the present position in British schools and a qualitative change in the nature of sporting activities is outlined. The possible decline of the dysfunctional tendencies of sport in secondary education is suggested.

I. INTRODUCTION

THE intended and unintended consequences of social ideas and processes was one of the central concerns of Karl Marx in his analysis of society. A similar concern is shown by Robert K. Merton who offers a conceptual framework in which what are called the latent and manifest functions of behaviour may be examined. Manifest functions are defined as 'those objective consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of a social system which are intended and recognised by participants in the system'; latent functions 'correlatively, being those (objective consequences) which are neither intended nor recognised' (Merton 1949). The relationship which exists between sport and formal education can be usefully examined in terms of the intended and unintended consequences or the manifest and latent functions of sport in the educational system.

2. THE MANIFEST FUNCTION AND INTENDED CONSEQUENCES

If teachers or educationalists are asked the intention or purpose which games or physical education are thought to serve in the school curriculum, the answer usually contains a reference, in one form or another, to Juvenal's axiom 'mens sana in corpore sano'. Although the axiom is attributed to Juvenal, the notion was formulated long before his time and can be seen in Plato's description of the guardians' education: . . . . 'the upbringing of our young men must include physical training; and this must be no less carefully regulated throughout life from childhood onwards' (Plato 1941). The axiom contains a number of elements—mind and body, and the notion that they are in some way connected. The notion very often takes the form that if the body is healthy, then the mind too is healthy or that a healthy mind is achieved by means of a healthy body. An extreme formulation of this view was presented by Baron de Courbertin at the international congress which heralded the revival of the Olympic Games. Addressing the closing session, he declared: 'In the last resort, man is not composed of two parts, body and soul, but of three; body, mind and character; it is not the mind that forms the character, but principally the body' (McIntosh 1963). If, at that time, the idea seems to have been formulated extravagantly, more recently a headmaster has expounded dogmatically: 'The claim for games as an essential part of education rests upon their dual role of promoting bodily fitness and developing character. Obviously nobody in mente sana is going to dispute the corpus sanum proposition . . . . . .' (Kittermaster 1958).

Now while there may exist some objective, medical criteria for the assessment of a healthy body, the same is not true of a healthy mind. The state of a healthy mind exists, so to speak, in the eye of the beholder. If a person is prompted habitually to act in a way which conforms to what is considered to be the right way by the assessor, then that person may be judged to possess the attributes of a healthy mind. The state of a healthy mind is an evaluative concept and its attributes vary in relation to the criteria of evaluation.

To judge from the most widespread and frequent form which sporting activities take in school, the means whereby headmasters and teachers commonly believe that the state of a healthy mind in a healthy body may be achieved, is to be found residing mainly in organised team games (Hutchinson and Young 1962, Kalton 1966). Such games, moreover, are often considered to provide a means of

attaining other secondary but perhaps even more desirable goals. These goals may be divided into those which are considered desirable for the individual and those desirable for the school (Randall et al. 1966). In the former category may be placed the argument that games provide for the individual a preparation for life or character building and in the latter that games foster the corporate spirit of loyalty, harmony and purpose.

The sociologist Willard Waller suggests that the individual may learn the principle of fair play by internalising the rules of the game and that 'the code of sportsmanship becomes........the very source and spring of all ethics for youngsters and for those adults who hold to the conflict theory of human life. There are men who insist that they learned the most important lessons of life upon the football field. They learned to struggle there and to hold on, and they learned to respect the rights of others and to play according to the rules' (1961).

In his review of the intended goals of physical activities in the curriculum, Waller further suggests that games facilitate corporate goals in that students become more tractable through the draining off of their surplus energies and for this reason become less inclined to mischief, while the games themselves become substitutes for tabooed activities; that by means of the inter-school contest a unity and solidarity of both teacher and taught is brought about by the group's identification of a common enemy outside the group; that the spectators of such a contest experience a catharsis which purges undesirable tendencies; and finally that the control and direction of behaviour in the school is possible through the manipulation or reinforcement of the games' leaders who are also considered to be natural pupil-leaders. In this respect the manifest function of sport has been summarised aptly:'..... many public-school masters came to believe that organised games might prove useful in the attainment of certain educational ends. Probably most important was the belief that team games, used as an instrument for character training, would help impart such desirable traits as group loyalty, willingness to compete according to rules, co-operativeness, courage, leadership ability and the like' (Dunning 1967).

While such may be the intended purposes of games envisaged by teachers, this need not necessarily mean that the participants view them in the same light. In this respect there seems to be one group of

pupils who see participation in games as a means of attaining and maintaining physical fitness while another group would claim that physical fitness need not be induced by artificial means since the youthful mode of life in itself ensured sufficient activity. Yet others would claim that games were a positive hindrance in that time and energy thereby consumed were diverted from other academic or cultural activities. To the committed games player, however, sport may be seen as a means of achieving social prestige, and of opening doors, both social and academic, which might otherwise remain closed (Sports Council 1969).

3. A CRITICISM OF THE MANIFEST FUNCTION

Before moving on to a statement of the latent functions a closer examination of the manifest functions is necessary. Plato's suggestion that the guardians should achieve both physical and mental fitness is essentially a practical argument brought forward at a time when every adult citizen could be summoned—and often was—to active military service in defence of his homeland. Moreover, at a time when the protection of one's family, household and self rested largely on one's own physical prowess, physical fitness was a necessity of life. The modern state does not require all its male citizens to display such physical fitness.

To suggest that games provide a preparation for life and a knowledge of the important lessons of life seems to take a narrow account of reality for 'men who have such a conception of life do not live in a very complex world' (Waller 1961). It has been mentioned that games may provide catharsis for the spectators. There may also be a catharsis for the individual participant. Thus persons in other respects considered completely honest and respected may persistently abuse and transgress the laws of the games they play. Rugby Union players provide an obvious example of this. Such transgression must be regarded as a latent function of sport.

To suggest that games make pupils more tractable through draining their surplus energies and thus less inclined to mischief seems an unacceptable and negative justification. For presented in this form it seems to deny the games their intrinsic purpose, thus confounding the healthy mind in a healthy body thesis. Further it assumes that all the surplus energy of all the participants is consumed thereby. This may be contrary to fact for firstly all pupils may not be involved in

games and secondly all participants may not be equally involved. Finally, far from removing inclinations towards mischief, games may actually promote tendencies and opportunities for misbehaviour. There may occur such phenomena as group disrespect for property, souvenir-hunting etc. which is called either hooliganism or high spirits according to the evaluation of the acts. This too must be regarded as a latent function of games.

While the unity of teacher and taught achieved by the identification of an external enemy may be useful in gaining certain educational goals, there is an inherent danger in stressing the overthrow and defeat of any enemy by such means. There is only a small mental shift involved in claiming that one school is better than another in one particular respect on one particular day and the assumption that the one school is better than the other in all respects on all days. Such assumptions may lead to a dulling of the critical faculties by promoting a confusion between what has been described in another context as a sensitivity to the content of objects and a sensitivity to the structure of objects (Bernstein 1958). It follows from this argument that if games' leaders are chosen because they are those pupils with suitable physique who have most readily internalised the school's norms, then these pupils may be the ones least able to differentiate between the structure and content of objects and therefore if something other than blind and undifferentiated commitment to the school's direction is sought from pupil leaders, then such games leaders would seem to be the most unlikely and unsuitable leaders in other respects.

Some educationalists have become aware that games are not producing some, at least, of the intended beneficial results for participants and that 'all too often the qualities (sport) does develop are entirely different: such qualities as a prima donna attitude, excess of self-esteem, envy, club fanaticism. . . . . .' (Hansen 1958, cf Wolfenden Committee 1960).

4. THE LATENT FUNCTION AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

In a series of publications, James S. Coleman has described what he calls a 'peculiar phenomenon of industrial society: adolescent subcultures, with values and activities quite distinct from those of the adult society' (1960). From Coleman's descriptions of the values and norms of the subcultures which he found existed in schools in America,

there may be extracted information concerning the latent function of games in relation to the school structure. Although only a small number of schools—no more than a dozen—were subjected to examination, for several reasons it may be assumed that other institutions in America with the same structural organisation would exhibit similar values and norms. While it may also be assumed that in general English schools would exhibit similar features, an attempt must be made to show whether there is a quantitative or qualitative difference arising from the differing structural organisation.

Coleman's study set out to examine the 'climate of values'—the interests and values of the adolescent subculture. He has shown clearly the declared favourite leisure time activities of boys and girls and found that few of these activities have any relation to things which go on in school. 'Some of the hobbies may, of course, have their genesis in shool, and some sports are centred around the school, but, except for these, school activities are missing' (1965). In setting out the values of the adolescents, Coleman has shown that among such criteria as 'good personality', 'good looks', 'nice clothes' and 'wealth', girls rank 'good grades' sixth in order of importance as a criterion for gaining membership to the 'leading crowd' and that boys rank 'good grades' fifth in a similar list which includes 'being an athlete'. The importance of athletics to boys was highlighted when in response to the question by which single criterion—being a 'brilliant student', 'star athlete' or 'most popular'—they would most like to be remembered at school, 'boys responded star athlete over 40 per cent of the time and brilliant student less than 30 per cent of the time' (1965). Coleman comments on this finding: 'This despite the fact that the boy is asked how he would like to be remembered IN SCHOOL, an institution explicitly designed to train students, not athletes'.

If it is accepted that the purpose of school is academic achievement, then games and other extra-curricular activities must be regarded as dysfunctional in the school structure. As Coleman says, 'Because high schools allow the adolescent subcultures to divert energies into athletics, social activities, and the like, they recruit into adult intellectual activities people with a rather mediocre level of ability. In fact, the high school seems to do more than allow these subcultures to discourage academic achievement; it aids them in doing so' (1960).

Why do adolescents value athletic achievement higher than academic achievement and how is this situation encouraged by schools? Coleman has stated the explanation at length and it may be

summarised briefly: scholastic achievement takes place within an institutional framework of competition between individuals which encounters resistance from the group's goal of maximum rewards for minimum effort. Thus because the group norms act to hold down the achievements of those who are above average, so that the school's demands will be at a level easily maintained by the majority, there is created an artificial dilemma: 'On the one hand are sociable average students (who could do far better); on the other hand are a few academically-oriented, highly competitive isolates' (1965). Why then is the situation different in athletics? Athletic achievement takes place within a framework of inter-group competition where the individual's achievement enhances the standing of the group and consequently individual effort is supported and encouraged by other members of the group. Whereas scholastic achievement tends to put classmates at a disadvantage and not to benefit the school, an individual's athletic achievement brings prestige to the school as a whole, status to the team and kudos to the individual. Because the athlete is seen to benefit the community as a whole, the community encourages and reinforces his efforts. This process is validated and bolstered by two factors outside the school. Firstly, the citizens of the community served by the school have a tendency to take a keen interest in inter-school contests because these provide a basis for community solidarity and unity against the outside world. Secondly, this interest and solidarity is enhanced and strengthened through local, regional and national reports and coverage by the mass media. This process, in turn, further reinforces youth's commitment to athletic achievement in school and so the circular movement becomes self-perpetuating and validating.

5. A CONSIDERATION OF BRITISH SECONDARY SCHOOLS

In what state do British secondary schools stand in regard to games? Can Coleman's description of the American scene be translated to the situation in this country? In attempting to assess the situation a part of Coleman's analysis may be usefully employed. He has shown that the desire to be an athletic star and the esteem awarded to athletes by the peer group was highest in those schools which were engaged in inter-school games leagues which were knit together in state tournaments. The games in such leagues and tournaments received wide publicity both in school and the local newspapers. Two schools,

however, did not conform to this pattern and in these schools, although academic achievement was not awarded the highest esteem, the desire to be a star athlete was surpassed by the desire to be the most popular student. These two schools differed from the others in that, while they took part in games contests with other schools, their opponents were so scattered that they could be said to constitute a league in name only. These schools, moreover, did not take part in city or state tournaments.

It can be argued that in general this describes the situation of the majority of British secondary schools. For there can hardly be said to exist at the moment a schools league table either locally, regionally or nationally and the newspaper coverage of inter-school games is to a large extent non-existent. This, however, is not to deny that there is a movement towards this position. Firstly, there are reports that the inter-school contest is assuming greater importance both in the school and the community it serves and that 'The results of the first XV are the equivalent, for the physical education teacher, of examination results' (Thomson 1968). Secondly, there is a movement to unite into one body the two distinct entities which supervise the game of association football in the public schools and certain grammar schools and that played in primary and secondary schools. One declared object of the union is to organise the increasing number of representative matches and tournaments in such a way and at such times that there will be minimum loss of the services of their best players to those schools which lay greatest emphasis on inter-school fixtures (Wickson 1968).

While the absence of publicity and of participation in a league table may be the general situation applying to the majority of secondary schools, there are exceptions. The first may be found in the public schools fixtures lists where, by and large, the opposing schools are determined by tradition and have remained constant over the years and where even the date of the fixture may be constant. The older and longer established the institution, the more the fixture list for games is determined by tradition and the more inflexible it is. Thus each school knows exactly who its opponents are and what success they have had in any one season. There is, in fact, an unofficial league table. This tendency is reinforced by the growing practice of announcing school games fixtures weekly in the national press. Further, it is fashionable to have the school's record reported in certain national newspapers at the end of each term.

The second exception may be found in the startling growth in local, regional and national tournaments which are spread over one day but sometimes more. These often receive wide publicity both locally and nationally through newspapers and television coverage. Typical examples are the schools soccer tournaments organised around the Christmas and Easter period and the seven-a-side competitions in the North of England, Wales and the Home Counties. This is a recent phenomenon and is beginning to exhibit many of the distinctive features Coleman has demonstrated. The movement is spreading too—both horizontally to new locations and times and vertically to include junior and senior pupils of secondary school age. The type of school which takes part in such tournaments, however, is, at the moment, very largely restricted to public schools and certain prestigious grammar schools. Evidence of the increasing number of such organised tournaments, of the elements of a league and of the regard in which they are held may be judged by the following extract from a headmaster's bulletin to the school's old boys: 'The School has not been idle. After reaching the semi-final at Ilkley and the final at Manchester, our Seven has just won the Loughborough Tournament beating 'Castleton' Grammar School by 19–15 in the final. As 'Castleton' had already won the Roehampton Public Schools title and the Ilkley Cup, this must put our seven pretty high in the charts. We and 'Castleton' are in different halves of the draw for Llanelli and and could meet in the final—if we beat the 'Swandiff' Grammar School in the first round. 'Swandiff' have at least two Welsh Schoolboy Internationals'. This particular headmaster must have been delighted when the school seven emerged victorious at Llanelli, went on to win a local old boys tournament and subsequently were rewarded by a civic reception at the Town Hall and much newspaper coverage.

In the past there has been criticism of the public schools' devotion to athleticism. It may well be that some state schools have aped the public school so successfully that they now display its vices as well as its virtues. Evidence of the successful conquest of the state school can be seen in the change of name of the Sevens Tournament held annually at Rosslyn Park from 'Public Schools Sevens' to 'Schools Sevens'. Commenting on the change, a report recalls nostalgically that the names of the teams appearing in the final stages of the competition have altered over the last decade and 'the centre of power has shifted away from the famous names' (Wordsworth 1969).

If, these exceptions aside, for the majority of British secondary schools there exists no league table nor organized local or regional schools sporting competitions, then one would expect a tendency not towards the ideal of 'star athlete' but towards the ideal of the 'most popular student'. If such is the case then the function of games in relation to the English school structure may be qualitatively different from the American.

There may be some evidence that the choice of games played in some schools may now be subservient to the ideal of popularity. Rugby Union although technically an inferior game to Rugby League which demands a greater depth of skill and physical fitness (Macklin 1967), is rarely played in comprehensive schools and much less in grammar schools in spite of evidence that some pupils at least would prefer to play League (Jackson and Marsden 1966). Although less demanding in skill and fitness, Union lays great stress on the social activities connected with the game and may, as evidenced by the social activities of the clubhouse, thus provide circumstances for the continuation of whatever popularity was achieved at school.

The extent of the dysfunction of games in British secondary schools is difficult to assess because of the lack of concrete evidence. It is on record however that just less than a third of secondary schools have playing fields which are of the acreage prescribed by the Ministry of Education, slightly less than this proportion have what amounted to at least half the prescribed acreage and the remainder less acreage (Newsom Report 1963). From this it may be presumed that there are some schools where games must be less dysfunctional because there is little or no opportunity for the pupils to be engaged in them to any extent. On the other hand, if it is agreed that the pool of the nation's academic talent rests mainly in selective secondary schools or in new comprehensive schools, then these are precisely the institutions which by and large have the best games facilities.

Because of a change in the nature of the games played, it is possible that the influence of games is declining. Just as the increasing division of labour is occurring in the total society, so it is taking place in schools. Whereas previously schools may have insisted on pupils playing one or possibly two team-games during the winter or summer seasons, it has been reported that there is now a greatly increased number of both team and individual games played in schools all the year round. 'One of the most striking developments in recent years has been the increase of informal outdoor pursuits

offered to young people, through the schools and through youth and sports organisations' (Newsom Report 1963). While in the past it may have been possible for pupils to turn their attention to fifteen or eleven team-members according to the time of year and realise that the school's prestige depended upon them, because of the proliferation of team and individual sporting activities it may now be impossible to decide where and when the school's prestige in fact is at stake.

The evidence which is available, while not refuting that this tendency exists, suggests that the change is slow and partial. A recent survey of boarding schools shows that while three or more half-days per week are given over to organised games, badminton, golf, fencing and sailing are very definitely minority activities and fives, shooting, squash and basketball are only rarely engaged in by more than half the pupils of any school. Rugby is by far the most prevalent game in these schools and, of the schools for which the information was available, the majority occupied over three-quarters of the pupils in this game (Kalton 1966). The Public Schools Commission commenting on this situation, suggested that if the intake to these schools were widened, then a change in leisure pursuits would be necessary.

There may well have occurred also a change of reasons which prompt the individual to take up games in school. Whereas pupils may previously have been coerced into participation in team-games which did not coincide with the pupils' own idea of physical and recreational pursuits—in 1959 less than a third of boys continued to play games three years after leaving school (Crowther Report 1959)—games which are easily organised, involving only a few players and dependent on personal rather than team skills may introduce pupils to recreational interests which can readily be carried forward into adult life. Thus, 'Squash, skating, archery, fencing, judo have all been successfully introduced in some areas' (Newsom Report 1963). These games are qualitatively different from the traditional team-games.

6. CONCLUSION

In conclusion it must be stated that there is a great gulf between the manifest and the latent function of games in relation to the school structure: that while the manifest function may be criticised on rational grounds, the latent dysfunctional nature of games is a

·cogent argument for the revision and redirection of current education-
al practices and particularly so in those institutions which are thought
to cater for the nation's most promising academic talent: and finally
that the dysfunctional nature of games may now have a tendency to
decline as a result of a change in the nature of the games which young
people pursue or are directed to pursue.

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SCIENCE TEACHERS' OPINIONS OF THE PUPIL AND MEASUREMENT OF PUPIL ROLE

by W. J. WILKINSON

Dept. of Educational Studies, University of Hull

I. INTRODUCTION

IN recent research into pupils' academic attainment much as been done on the contributions of intelligence, personality (Cattell and Butcher 1968) and motivational factors (Cattell 1965) to success. These are all factors associated with the "inner person" and are considered invariant under most environmental conditions. However the influence of the social context in which a pupil works should not be entirely ignored. Teachers, parents and peers are continually affecting and influencing the behaviours of pupils in the classroom situation. These behaviours determine the role which the pupil eventually adopts. Thus equally intelligent pupils with a similar personality structure may adopt quite different behaviours in different situations. Obviously in different situations both classroom 'norms' of behaviour and teacher influences will vary. Cattell (1965) is well aware of the effects of role in personality measurement when he writes "a role . . . affects powerfully the expression of personality and could blind us and our measuring instruments to the real person". Some psychologists, e.g. Bruner (1966), emphasize these influences in the learning process. In this process learning not only operates through certain drives but also as a result of pupils aspiring to emulate a model (the teacher) and becoming committed to "the web of social reciprocity".

There is some confusion as to how role should be defined (Gross, Mason and McEachern, 1958). The above authors divided a variety of definitions into 3 categories

(a) Those which equate role with normative cultural patterns. Thus Linton (1936) writes that role consists of " . . . attitudes, values and behaviour ascribed by the society to any and all persons

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occupying this status". Similarly Newcomb (1951) considers it as "the ways of behaving which are *expected* of any individual who occupies a certain position".

(b) Those that use a person's definition of his situation with reference to his own and others' positions. (Sargent, 1951).

(c) Those that refer to what a person actually does in occupying a role (Davies, 1948). Davies defines role as "How an individual actually performs in a given position, as distinct from how he is supposed to perform . . .". This is often what is meant by role in group dynamics in which role is dependent on the interaction profiles of group participants.

In this study role as defined in (a) is the one which is measured. This is what Newcomb refers to as the 'prescribed' role. Thus information about the pupil role, expected by science teachers, is obtained to establish a consensus of opinion among teachers. Once this knowledge of the characteristics of the 'ideal' pupil is obtained it can be used in the construction of a test to measure the degree of conformity of each pupil to these ideal behaviours.

Torrance (1965) provides a check list entitled 'Your Ideal Pupil' in which he uses 62 characteristics gathered from 50 empirical researches involving the study of creative and non-creative groups. This check list is used by Raina (1970) to study science-student teachers' perception of the ideal pupil. With some evidence that science pupils are 'convergent' thinkers (Hudson, 1966) one is interested in whether or not science teachers regard pupil characteristics which are considered by experts in 'creative' personality, as important. Raina shows that prospective teachers in India encourage conformity, obedience and non-creativity.

2. METHOD

Torrance's check list was given to 40 science teachers (39 replies were received) spread over 22 secondary schools chosen from both rural and city areas. All but one school (a boys' public school) were either local education authority (grammar or comprehensive) schools with science teachers possessing mainly university degree qualifications.

Teachers were given the following instructions.

"The following list of characteristics are commonly used in the description of pupils. In teaching, science teachers often

have some notion of the type of pupil whom they consider is ideal in fulfilling an acceptable role in learning science in school. What characteristics, from the list below, do you consider make the ideal science pupil? Tick 10 of the most important characteristics.

What characteristics, from the list below, do you consider are *undesirable* and need to be *especially discouraged*? Draw a line through the 10 characteristics which should be discouraged or punished".

From an analysis of the teachers' opinions the 10 most valued characteristics and the 10 least valued ones are obtained. These characteristics form the basis on which an instrument is devised to measure the degree to which pupils fit into a role expected by science teachers. Each characteristic is rated in a 5 point scale. An ideal pupil will rate highly on the most valued characteristics and lowly on the least valued ones (see appendix) while a pupil who doesn't conform to this 'prescribed' role will rate in the opposite direction. Thus a final score is obtained over all the items which gives a measure of the extent to which a pupil fulfils the acceptable role as prescribed by science teachers.

3. RESULTS

The table lists (in the order of importance) the pupil characteristics which science teachers consider are ideal in studying science. 2 of these (curious and independent in thinking) are highly creative characteristics, 2 somewhat creative (persistent and determined), 3 slightly creative (thorough, remembers well and industrious), 2 neutral (receptive to the ideas of others and desires to excel) and 1 not creative at all (does work in time).

Thus 7 of the characteristics, which science teachers like to see their pupils possess, have a creative element in them. These characteristics also show concern for suitable pupil motivation, e.g. curious, persistent, industrious, determined and desire to excel. Teachers also like pupils to be thorough in their work and to present it on time. With regard to pupils' thinking in science they hope that pupils will be independent in thinking, receptive to the ideas of others and capable of good retention of information.

For the least valued characteristics only 2 of those chosen by science teachers agree with those chosen by the experts. Those are

TABLE

THE MOST VALUED AND LEAST VALUED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IDEAL SCIENCE PUPIL AS PERCEIVED BY THE EXPERTS AND SCIENCE TEACHERS.

	Most Valued		Least Valued	
	Experts on the Creative Personality	Science Teachers	Experts on the Creative Personality	Science Teachers
1.	Courageous in Convictions	Industrious	Conformity	Haughty and self-satisfied
2.	Curious	Curious	Willingness to accept the judgment of authorities	Disturbs class organization and procedures
3.	Independent in thinking	Thorough	Fearfulness	Negativistic
4.	Independent in judgment	Receptive to ideas of others	Timidity	Domineering
5.	Becomes preoccupied with tasks	Persistent	Obedience	Stubborn
6.	Intuitive	Independent in thinking	Courtesy	Timidity
7.	Unwilling to accept 'say-so'	Remembers well	Promptness in doing work	Critical of others
8.	Visionary	Determined	Socially well adjusted	A good guesser
9.	Willing to take risks	Does work on time	Haughty and self-satisfied	Self-assertive
10.	Always asking questions	Desires to excel	Neatness and orderliness	Emotional

haughty and self-satisfied, and timidity. Those chosen by science
teachers as least valued are mainly characteristics which show non-
conforming tendencies and attitudes which may lead to disruptive
and non-co-operative practices among pupils, e.g. disturbs class
organisation and procedures, negativistic, domineering, stubborn,
critical of others, and self-assertive and haughty and self-satisfied.
Also personality defeats meet with disapproval, e.g. timidity and
emotionality.

4. DISCUSSION

Raina (1970) showed that Indian prospective science teachers.
"impose sharp restraints on the development of the creative
potential". This study, however, shows that for British science
teachers these restraints are not nearly so severe. The most valued
characteristics indicate that creativity is given some consideration
if not a prominent one. As seen from the results the degree of pupil
motivation and the quality of his work are equally important. The
ideal pupil's role is seen as one which must fit in with existing school
conditions. This is clearly seen from the list of least valued character-
istics where behaviours leading to class-room non-conformity are
especially disapproved of. Science teachers also disapprove of good
guessers and those who are critical of others. However, positive
criticism could be of some value in discussing science problems and
even a good guesser (like Bohr in his postulation and theory of atomic
orbits) is invaluable in the advancement of science. Scientific
theories are often good guesses. Obviously the inveterate guesser is
to be disapproved of if such guesses become a substitute for clear,
rational and logical scientific thinking, Possibly science teachers
oppose the latter type of pupil thinking rather than the former.

Science teachers, therefore, compromise between the wholly
creative pupil continually challenging and reflecting on existing
procedures, ideas and views and the totally conforming pupil
dependent on the thinking of others. Thus the ideal science pupil
may be described as one who

(a) is highly motivated,
(b) is concerned for thorough and punctual work,
(c) fits in with class organisation and procedures,
(d) shows a creative element in his thinking,
(e) is stable and unemotional and
(f) lacks non-conforming attitudes and tendencies

The characteristics chosen by the British science teachers are similar to 6 of those chosen by a sample of U.S.A. teachers (Torrance, 1965). Torrance also found that teachers in the U.S.A. and Germany preferred more creative characteristics than those in India, Philippines and Greece. Again this contrast is obvious when Raina's results with prospective Indian science teachers is compared with those of the British sample.

Teachers' views of the ideal science pupil must be influenced by those external factors which lead to success in work and examinations. A pupil is not free to exhibit uncontrolled thinking and to adopt unconventional procedures in carrying out his studies. It is by adjusting to normal class-room behaviour that efficient work can be accomplished and examination syllabuses covered. Hudson thus found that science pupils were conditioned through their training to adopt non-creative or 'convergent' thinking. However, this was in the mid-sixties and it could very well be that science teachers are now more concerned about teaching pupils understanding through guided discovery methods than in the mere acquisition of scientific facts. Now there is greater freedom in class-room activities and greater participation in original thinking. The introduction of discussion activities, science projects and the new 'Nuffield' courses are leading to greater stress on pupil initiative and originality.

The author used these results to make up a role test (see appendix). The results obtained with this test will be discussed in a future publication.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

APPENDIX

The University of Hull Role Test for Science Pupils consists of the following items which are rated on a 5-point scale.

1. Curious	5 4 3 2 1	Disinterested, non-inquisitive.
2. A good guesser.	1 2 3 4 5	Relies on evidence and rational thought.
3. Understands others' point of view; disinclined to criticise others.	5 4 3 2 1	Critical of others.
4. No desire to excel, unambitious.	1 2 3 4 5	Desires to excel.

5. Determined.	5 4 3 2 1	Lacks determination, irresolute.
6. Domineering.	1 2 3 4 5	Likes to be an ordinary and co-operative member of the group.
7. Fits in with class organisation and procedures.	5 4 3 2 1	Disturbs class organisation and procedures.
8. Emotional.	1 2 3 4 5	Unemotional, stable.
9. Aware of own limitations and desire to improve; unassuming.	5 4 3 2 1	Haughty and self-satisfied.
10. Unoriginal; relies on thinking of others.	1 2 3 4 5	Independent in thinking.
11. Industrious.	5 4 3 2 1	Lazy; does minimum work.
12. Gives up easily; easily loses interest.	1 2 3 4 5	Persistent.
13. Receptive to the ideas of others	5 4 3 2 1	Critical of others' ideas; slow to alter own opinions or ideas.
14. Remembers poorly; forgetful.	1 2 3 4 5	Remembers well.
15. Sensitive and submissive to others.	5 4 3 2 1	Self-assertive.
16. Stubborn.	1 2 3 4 5	Pliable and easily handled.
17. Self-confident	5 4 3 2 1	Timid.
18. Slovenly; careless.	1 2 3 4 5	Thorough.
19. Does work on time.	5 4 3 2 1	Late in completing work; unreliable in presenting work.
20. Negativistic; lacks drive or incentive to work.	1 2 3 4 5	Positivistic; joins actively and purposefully in lessons.

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PERSONALITY AND PREFERENCES FOR ACTIVE/PASSIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH COLLEGE OF EDUCATION TUTORS

by L. Cohen, F. Cross, D. Edynbry and K. Shipstone
School of Research in Education, University of Bradford

1. INTRODUCTION

Two important findings in a recent study of some 1,671 student teachers in 10 Colleges of Education (McLeish 1970) were "the remarkable *similarity* in personality and attitudes of the students selected and entering [those] institutions," and the degree of *dissimilarity* between the Colleges themselves when assessed on subjective and objective scales designed to measure their climates o[r] environments.

Of particular interest were those environmental aspects which (according to students' estimates) served to distinguish between 'good' and 'poor' Colleges in terms of student morale and satisfaction.

Among other factors, colleges were differentiated by the degree to which their students were encouraged to be 'independent and individualistic', 'to express [their] ideals in action', and 'to criticise standards and methods of teaching by staff'. Common to these concerns is the desire on the part of some students to take an active rather than passive part in the planning and conduct of the academic activities that constitute a large part of the life and work of a College of Education.

McLeish's data suggest that to no small extent differences in student satisfaction and morale may well relate to the degree of person-environment-fit that they experience in their particular colleges.

The present study takes up the theme of *activism* in student-tutor relationships and explores a number of personality correlates of students' preferences for active or passive classroom relationships with college staff.

2. SAMPLE AND PROCEDURES

One hundred and twenty first year student-teachers (37 males, 83 females) in a northern College of Education were invited to respond to a personality inventory and to a questionnaire designed to elicit their preferences for active or passive classroom relationships with their College tutors. Students completed the schedules (anonymously) during an Education lecture period.

3. MEASURES

(1) The Gordon Personal Profile (Gordon 1963) measures four aspects of personality: (i) *ascendancy* (the self-assured, assertive person), (ii) *responsibility* (the persevering, reliable person), (iii) *emotional stability* (the well-balanced, non-anxious person), and (iv) *sociability* (the gregarious, approachable person).

The respondent is asked to single out from a set of four choices the alternative with which he mainly associates himself (marked in one column) and that which he finds most alien to his nature (marked in an adjacent column).

(2) The Active-Passive Inventory (Cohen 1971) is a 17-item scale derived by factor analytical techniques from a 24 item scale by Drabek (1966). It has been used to explore English student teachers' preferences for active or passive relationships with College staff. Respondents indicate the strength of their agreement or disagreement with such statements as "I would not enjoy a course where the lecturer allowed students to plan most of what was to be studied," and "The responsibility of the lecturer is to give assignments not to ask students what they wish to do."

The present inquiry had two principal objectives,
(i) to obtain further validation data in respect of the Active-Passive Inventory.
(ii) by multiple correlation techniques, to discover which aspects of personality measured by the Gordon Personal Profile best account for variance in the criterion (the A.P.I.)

4. RESULTS

Table 1 presents a correlation matrix (males and females separately) of the relationships between Ascendancy, Responsibility, Emotional Stability, Sociability, and Preferences for Active-Passive Relationships with college staff.

TABLE I

PERSONALITY AND PREFERENCES FOR ACTIVE/PASSIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH COLLEGE TUTORS

	Ascendancy	Responsib.	Emotional Stability	Sociability	Active-Passive Preference
			MALES		
Ascendancy		-.14	.24	***.73	***.49
Responsib.	.18		***.48	-.01	**-.37
Emotional Stability	***.29	***.58		.08	-.02
Sociability	***.73	.12	.02		.29
Active-Passive Preference	***.35	.09	-.02	***.44	

F E M A L E S

Females (N = 83)
  * r .21 p < .05
  *** r .28 p < .01

Males (N = 37)
  * r .30 p < .05
  ** r .36 p < .02
  *** r .39 p < .01

(1) *Ascendancy and Active-Passive Preferences*

It was hypothesised that the more self-assured and assertive the individual, the more likely that he would seek active relationships with his tutor in the planning and direction of his studies.

Correlation coefficients of $r = .49$ (men) and $r = .35$ (women) provided strong support for the hypothesis ($p < .01$).

(2) *Responsibility and Active-Passive Preferences*

It was hypothesised that a high level of perseverance and "determination in an assigned task" (Gordon 1963) would be associated with low preferences for active relationships with college staff in course planning. The hypothesised relationship was supported in respect of male student teachers only $r = -.37$ ($p < .02$).

(3) *Sociability and Active-Passive Preferences*

It was hypothesised that the out-going, gregarious student would be more likely to seek active relationships with college staff in directing his personal studies. The proposed relationship was strongly supported in respect of women students ($r = .44$ $p < .01$,) but just failed to reach an acceptable level of statistical significance in the smaller male sample $r = .29$ ($r = .30$ $p < .05$).

(4) *Emotional Stability and Active-Passive Preferences*

No hypothesis was formulated in respect of emotional stability and preferences for style of relationship with College staff.

(5) *Validation of the Active-Passive Inventory*

The significant relationships between Ascendancy, Responsibility, Sociability and preferred style of interaction with college staff shown in Table 1 provide further* validation of the Active-Passive Inventory.

(6) *Predicting Student Preferences for Active or Passive Relationships with College Tutors.*

Multiple correlation coefficients were computed (for male and female groups separately) to measure the amount of variance in the criterion (A.P.I.) that could be attributed to the two most discriminating independent variables in the respective correlation matrices (see Table 1).

For female student teachers just over 18% of the variance in their preferences for active or passive relationships with their college

* open-mindedness (Rokeach 1960) and high self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965) have been shown to correlate significantly with student teachers' preferences for active classroom relationships with College tutors (Cohen 1971).

tutors could be accounted for by their scores on the personality scales, Ascendancy[+] and Sociability[+]. The multiple correlation coefficient $Rm = .442$ was significantly different from zero ($F_{2,80} = 8.98$ $p < .001$).

For male student teachers over 33% of the variance in their active/ passive preferences was attributed to their scores on Ascendancy[+] and Responsibility[−]. The multiple correlation coefficient $Rm = .576$ was significantly different from zero ($F_{2,34} = 8.44$ $p < .001$). Table 2 reports these analyses for the male and female groups.

TABLE 2

MULTIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR MALE AND FEMALE STUDENT GROUPS

Males (n = 37)

1. = A.P.I.
2. = Ascendancy
3. = Responsibility

$r_{12} = .49$
$r_{13} = -.37$
$r_{23} = -.14$

$R_{1.23} = .576$
$F_{2,34} = 8.44$ (p > .001)

Females (n = 83)

1. = A.P.I.
2. = Ascendancy
3. = Sociability

$r_{12} = .35$
$r_{13} = .44$
$r_{23} = .73$

$R_{1.23} = .442$
$F_{2,80} = 8.98$ (p > .001)

5. DISCUSSION

McLeish's finding of a 'remarkable degree of homogeneity in student personality and attitudes' among the ten colleges he studied in no way implied that there may not have existed within the student body in any one of those colleges a considerable range of personalities, opinions and attitudes. Indeed McLeish reports substantial differences in students' religious and political affiliations as well as their educational values. His finding of a large degree of dissimilarity in the climates of the various colleges suggests that many students may have spent a considerable part of their college lives as 'square pegs in round holes'. Because it has been shown that discrepancies in person-environment-fit lead to lack of satisfaction, lower morale and negativistic attitudes (Pervin 1967a, 1967b, 1968. Pervin and Rubin 1967) it is manifestly important to understand the dynamics of congruence as they relate to student teachers and their college environments.

A fundamental aspect of any college environment—the relationships between staff and students—was selected for study in the present research. Our findings of significant relationships between

certain dimensions of personality and student preferences for active or passive relationships with College staff lend support to our belief that to no small degree, congruence in person-environment fit in the setting of the college may be considerably improved. We suggest a number of possibilities.

Firstly colleges whose philosophies and practices *necessitate* active and continuing student participation in the planning and conduct of their various curricula might look more carefully to their selection procedures in order to recruit those who will both enjoy and profit from such cooperative ventures. Not all students wish for such activism. Indeed for the trainee-teacher whose personal disposition and pre-college experiences lead her to prefer more passive classroom relationships with college staff, the imposition of activism may lead to considerable personal distress (Cohen 1971).

Secondly, it ought to be possible to give greater assistance to students in their endeavours to select those colleges which are "best for them". Whereas most college brochures detail the *content* of their curricula in terms of main and professional studies, few if any reveal the *methods* of teaching, examining or assessing employed in the execution of those studies.

Thirdly, whilst our remarks to this point have been addressed to the matching of students to colleges and colleges to students, they are as applicable to the assignment of students to tutorial, practical, counselling, or other learning groups within the colleges. The styles of certain tutors in the conduct of their classes appeal more readily to certain students rather than others. It ought to be possible in some areas of the college curriculum (Education studies, for example, which are followed by all) to group students on other than a random basis so as to increase the possibility of congruence between tutors and students.

Clearly there are opportunities here for rewarding and worthwhile experimentation.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE "IDEAL-SELF" IN SOME WESTERN NIGERIAN SCHOOL CHILDREN

by MICHAEL OLASEBOYE OLASEHINDE
Teachers College, Columbia University, New York

1. PURPOSE

THE problem investigated was the development of the 'Ideal-Self' in some Western Nigerian School children. While it has been generally agreed that the ego-ideal is important in the development of character and personality, and a great deal of attention has been given to the problem of its origin in the early years of life, very little work has been done on its development during childhood and adolescence. The little that was done, took place in such countries as America, Australia, New Zealand and recently in the Pacific Islands (Samoa). The present study therefore represents the first of such endeavours in Nigeria.

As the aim of the study was to explore certain facts, the guidelines were cast in the form of questions for which answers were sought:

(a) What kind of trend exists in the development of the subjects 'Ideal-Self' concept?

(b) In what way do the primary, secondary and tertiary identifying figures influence the development of the subjects 'Ideal-self'?

(c) Are the personality traits of models chosen related to the relative maturity of the subjects?

2. PROCEDURE

The study took place in Ile-Ife, one of the towns in Western Nigeria. Twenty primary schools and five secondary grammar schools out of the 43 primary and 9 secondary respectively were involved in the investigation. In all 1000 subjects drawn from the two types of institutions (primary and secondary grammar) took part in the study. The ages of the subjects ranged from 6 through 15.

The procedure adopted in the conduct of the investigation was two-fold: oral interviews in the local language were organised among primary school subjects, while secondary school subjects were asked to write essays in English or in the local language. The directions given to the subjects were as follows:

'Describe the person you would most like to be like when you grow up. This may be a real person, or an imaginary person. He or she may be a combination of several people. Tell something about this person's age, character, appearance, occupation and recreations. If he is a real person, say so. You need not give his real name if you do not want to'.

3. RESULTS

An analysis of the subjects' responses revealed the following categories of persons chosen: Parents, Surrogates, glamorous adults, heroes, Saints or religious figures, Attractive successful adults, imaginary characters, age-mates, occupations only, Not classifiable. See Table 1.

TABLE I % CLASSIFICATION OF PERSONS DESCRIBED AS THE IDEAL-SELF FOR SEPARATE AGES BY THE ENTIRE SAMPLE

Categories of Persons described	Pry. I (6) N=100	Pry. II (7) N=100	Pry. III (8) N=100	Pry. IV (9) N=100	Pry. V (10) N=100	Pry. VI (11) N=100	Form I (12) N=100	Form II (13) N=100	Form III (14) N=100	Form IV (15) N=100
1. Parents	42	29	31	14	21	15	3	2	0	0
2. Surrogates and neighbours of parental generation	11	4	5	9	7	7	7	2	5	0
3. Glamorous adults e.g. Athletes, military figures	7	8	8	16	10	15	4	10	5	8
4. Heroes, people with a substantial claim to fame, usually tested by time	8	22	23	20	34	37	18	21	20	32
5. Saints or Religious figures	6	11	6	5	1	0	3	5	10	3
6. Attractive successful adults within the subjects' range of observation	24	20	23	28	24	25	37	49	39	45
7. Composite or Imaginary figures	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
8. Age-mates or youths	2	2	3	8	3	1	7	2	3	0
9. Occupations only	0	0	2	0	0	0	15	9	11	9
10. Miscellaneous Responses, not classifiable among those mentioned above	0	0	2	0	0	0	5	0	5	3

Note: the figures in brackets indicate the average age of the subjects in the various classes.

The responses of the entire population both in terms of persons chosen and traits admired were grouped into three broad age groups corresponding to (1) Childhood, (2) late childhood and (3) Early adolescence. See Tables 2 and 4 respectively.

TABLE 2

Classification, into three broad age groups, of persons described as the Ideal-Self by the entire sample

Categories of persons chosen by all subjects	(AGE-GROUPS)		
	I 6–9 yrs. Childhood	II 10–12 yrs. Late Childhood	III 13–15 yrs. Early Adolescence
1. Parents	29	13	1
2. Surrogates	7	7	2
3. Glamorous Adults	10	10	8
4. Heroes	18	30	24
5. Saints/Religious figures	7	1	6
6. Attractive successful adults	24	29	44
7. Composite/imaginary figures	0	0	1
8. Age-Mates	4	4	2
9. Occupations only	1	5	10
10. Not classifiable	1	1	3

Note: $X^2 = 54.66$. The number of degrees of freedom, $v = 18$. As the value of X^2 was greater than $P = 0.1\%$ value, 42.31, the differences were most significant.

A further analysis of the responses showed that the following traits were admired in the models chosen: material values, good looks and appearance, good personality, friendliness, honesty and kindness, cooperation and patience, self sacrifice and altruism.

TABLE 3

% Classification of Traits Admired in the Ideal Self for Separate Ages by the Entire Sample

Category of traits admired	CLASSES									
	Pry I (6) N=100	Pry II (7) N=100	Pry III (8) N=100	Pry IV (9) N=100	Pry V (10) N=100	Pry VI (11) N=100	Form I (12) N=100	Form II (13) N=100	Form III (14) N=100	Form IV (15) N=100
1. Material values—money, clothes and property	38	27	29	16	6	5	5	4	7	8
2. Good looks, good appearance, neat clean	19	11	13	12	7	3	14	20	23	22
3. Good personality, popular	2	15	11	28	22	25	19	15	12	11
4. Friendly, lots of friends, courteous, polite	5	9	7	0	7	6	2	3	0	2
5. Honest, responsible, industrious kind.	42	23	30	34	39	25	22	17	15	14
6. Cooperative, helpful, patient	2	12	10	10	11	21	15	12	6	3
7. Self-sacrifice, working for social justice, human brotherhood, and altruism	0	2	0	0	6	16	23	29	37	40

Note: Figures in brackets indicate the average age in the various groups.

TABLE 4

Classifications, into three broad age groups of traits admired in the Ideal-Self by the entire sample

Categories of traits admired by all subjects	(AGE-GROUPS)		
	I 6–9 yrs Childhood	II 10–12 yrs Late Childhood	III 13–15 yrs Early Adolescence
1. Material values— money, clothes, property	28	6	6
2. Good looks, good appearance, neat, clean	14	8	22
3. Good personality, popular	14	22	13
4. Friendly, lots of friends, polite	5	5	2
5. Honest, responsible, kind	32	29	15
6. Cooperative, helpful, patient	9	16	7
7. Self-sacrificing, working for social justice, human brotherhood, altruism	1	15	35

Note: $X^2 = 44.51$. The number of degrees of freedom, $v = 12$. As the value of X^2 was greater than $P = 0.1\%$ value, 32.91, the differences were most significant.

4. FINDINGS

This study showed that there was present in some school children in Western Nigeria, as in Western Australian, Samoan, New Zealand and American youths, a similar developmental trend in the ideal self. In all these cases, the younger children identified first with persons in the home and thereafter there was a diminution in the number of parental figures chosen and an increase in the number of characters outside of the home within the subjects' range of observation and knowledge. While there was a progression out from the family circle, the ideals of the subjects did not become abstract as they grew older, a point on which the subjects of this study differed from their counterparts in the other lands aforementioned. The evidence of this study was insufficient to support Havighurst's thesis entirely, but it

did show clearly the change with age from the parental to the societal figure. Younger subjects identified with persons with whom they had direct contact, while older children selected ideal self from real people.

In general the responses of the subjects revealed that two major goals seemed to motivate their choice of models. First was a deep-seated feeling for power or mastery over their environment. Some chose their models because of military prowess, others because their models occupied positions of social prestige, economic affluence and political power. Even when they chose occupations only, it seemed as if their aim was an admiration of the power attached to the occupations. The second goal was love and affection. This goal was most pursued by the 6 and 7 year olds in their identification with parental figures and surrogates. The subjects of these age-groups admired love and kindness from parents, immediate neighbours and teachers.

The importance of certain basic needs was manifested in the behaviour and events associated with some models; for example, there were reports of giving and receiving help or affection especially among younger subjects. In some responses there seemed to be glimpses of maladjustment in the subjects; some responses seemed to suggest the need for psychological impasse arising from a conflict between what such subjects were, and what they would like to be like. Such a discrepancy might be indicative of the children's lack of self-understanding or self-acceptance and their corollary, sound mental health.

Local choices as compared with remote choices predominated. It seemed true that the subjects' interests broadened as they grew older, but not even the older ones found ideals in the larger world as represented by history, movies, contemporary international life and events. The subjects' interests did not extend beyond the local community to include broader world concepts. The growth of reading ability should have intervened to play a major role in opening the way to wide interests; it was however possible to argue that this local nature of the subjects' choices was indicative of a genuine satisfaction with the society in which they lived or of outright ignorance.

There was an evidence of sex differentiation of choice as exemplified by more boys making military and political choices and among the girls there were choices of characters associated with humanitarianism. Moreover the boys' choices were preponderantly of the same sex,

while the choice of models of opposite sex was characteristic of the girls.

Teaching in the various schools which provided the subjects for the study did not seem to be aimed at inculcating ideas of the ideal-self. Were this the case, a knowledge of the lives of great men would have influenced the children's report of their ideal-self.

The use of essay writing as an instrument for eliciting the ideal-self concept of subjects seemed to be valid. If subjects are not coached as to who they would choose as models, the results on their essays would represent something genuine in their personality.

Social environment seemed to have influenced the subjects' choice of ideal self, as different social environments had exposed them to different kinds of people who served as objects of identification and taught different values and aspirations. The effect of social environment was seen by comparing the frequencies of responses in the glamorous persons and imaginary categories for all the group in Table 5.

TABLE 5

Choice of models by all subjects from high and low Socio-Economic backgrounds using their fathers' Occupational and Educational levels

	% DISTRIBUTION			
Categories	Fathers' Occupational level		Fathers' Educational level	
	High N = 300	Low N = 700	High N = 200	Low N = 800
1. Parents	8.3	10	5	10
2. Surrogates	6.6	11.4	10	11.3
3. Glamorous adults	10	24.2	12.5	22.5
4. Heroes	11.6	17.1	15	16.3
5. Saints/Religious Figures	13.3	2.8	7.5	3.7
6. Attractive successful adults	15	12.8	15	12.5
7. Composite Imaginary figures	3.3	4.2	5	5
8. Age mates	8.3	5.7	10	6.3
9. Occupations only	13.3	7.1	15	7.5
10. Not classifiable	10	4.2	5	5

The results showed that subjects from families of lower socio-economic status named a higher proportion of glamorous persons. 24.2% and 22.5% of the responses under the low occupational and educational levels respectively fell into the category of glamorous adults, while 10% and 12.5% of the responses under the high occupational and educational levels respectively fell into the category of glamorous adults. The results here seemed to agree with Carroll's[1] who found that three-quarters of the lower-class responses fell into the category of glamorous adults, while only about half as many of the middle-class responses fell into this category. It might be reasonably suggested that we have this trend because children from low socio-economic background are, in actual life, more remote from glamorous adults than children from high socio-economic homes where the latter could be in closer contact directly or vicariously with glamorous adults and so they attach very little importance to glamorous adults. This influence of socio-economic background may also have been responsible for lack of clear trends in some categories.

5. RELATIVE MATURITY OF THE SUBJECTS

The categories of persons chosen were not used as indicators of maturity rather the traits admired in the models; and so it was found that there was a shift from the admiration of ego-centric and concrete material values to more abstract qualities such as self-sacrifice, altruism, etc. With increase in the age of subjects there was a change of emphasis from concrete and obvious characteristics and traits of the self-ideal to psychological qualities and abstract values. At lower ages the subjects tended to stress material values and physical qualities but at more advanced ages such qualities as self-sacrifice, patience and altruism predominated. With this change from ego-centric tendencies to altruism, the maturity of the subjects seemed to increase as their chronological age increased.

6. HINTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The data secured for this study, despite the size of the sample, raised some general factual questions for further research. Some of them have earlier been discussed. Others and similar questions might be raised. In this regard, the following might be said:

[1] R.E. Carroll, Relations of Social Environment to moral ideology and personal aspirations of Negro Boys and Girls, *School Review*, 1945, 53, pp. 30–38.

Of immense concern for adolescents is the ever-present question of vocational identity. This study has revealed some evidence concerning this, for, in some of the responses adolescent subjects mentioned occupations only, when in fact, they were asked to mention persons. It was obvious that many of them knew the various occupations but not why they picked on them. It might be reasonable to suggest an urgent need for research into the career guidance needs of Nigerian youths as well as for research into the vocational interests and attitudes of Nigerian youths.

It might be worthwhile to look into the relationship between identification patterns, motivation and the school achievement of school children.

It would seem useful to find out the amount of self-acceptance displayed by school children through studying the congruence between the way school children think of themselves (self concept) and the way they think they would most like to be (ideal self). The idea basic to this being that the amount of discrepancy between the self and the ideal self concept is a measure of the children's self: acceptance or self-rejection. Equally important is the need to find out whether individual differences in childhood experiences affect the process of identification and influence the type of imitation shown by a person.

In concluding, it must be confessed that the foregoing study, here described, into the ideal-self concept of some Western Nigerian school children and its development has been very revealing. It showed more than ever before that knowledge of the qualities which children admire in others would help teachers and educators to do more work with school children.

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BOOK REVIEWS

W. H. Burston, C. W. Green et al. (eds.), *Handbook for History Teachers* (Methuen, 2nd edition, 1972, £6.00).

The second edition of this handbook is published not a moment too soon, since the first was beginning to appear increasingly a historical document. The new edition retains the format of its predecessor, but takes account of recent debate and research on history: its 1070 pages are a mine of information and advice for the practising teacher.

Part one comprises seventeen new articles which offer a valuable conspectus of contemporary thinking. Six bear directly on problems of syllabus construction. Chapters on 'Social Studies' and 'the Teaching of Civics' are replaced in this edition, significantly, by offerings on 'World History', 'The Place of History in Integrated and Interdisciplinary Studies' and 'General History and Aspect History'. This latter, by Miss Bryant, stands out as a brave attempt to grapple with the practical issues involved in syllabus construction.

One would have welcomed, somewhere in the volume, more direct comment on urban history and historical demography in the school situation, both of which have been canvassed recently in H. A. publications, and the neglect of the 'taxonomists' may itself contain a value judgement, but, again, one felt that a chapter on the degree of definition possible in drawing up teaching objectives would not have been out of place at the present time.

But the editors have already come close to getting a quart into a pint pot; there are valuable chapters on audio-visual material, the history room, and the use of radio and television. In particular Mr. Thompson's contribution on 'Some Psychological Aspects of History Teaching' offers a comprehensive review of the research, and is by far the best such survey available. The chapter on examinations has already excited leader comment in the *Times Educational Supplement* (3 March). Suffice to say here that it seems strange that the section on the G.C.E. assumes that the essay question remains unchallenged, when several boards (in particular A.E.B., J.M.B. and London) have experiments under way on new modes of examining. This chapter should be read alongside several contributions to *Teaching History*, particularly that by Henry Mackintosh (May, 1971). Miss Kathleen Davies contributes some sensible remarks on the primary school syllabus, although one feels that those who advocate the use of census returns and parish registers in the junior school owe their public a clear

statement of how they might be used, and of the foreseeable difficulties. Despite these criticisms, the Handbook offers still the best available collection of general essays for the History teacher.

But it is the sections on school books, audio-visual material, and the advanced bibliographies which make this volume a 'must' in every staffroom. Refreshingly, the section on school books is enhanced by closer reference to appropriate age-ranges, and some indication of price is now offered. The invidious distinction made in the first edition between secondary modern and secondary grammar class textbooks is abandoned. Part three, dealing with audio-visual material, can now stand alongside Miss Williams' pamphlet and the E.F.V.A. catalogue as a major source of information. The select bibliography which comprises part four is a masterly piece of compression, occupying only a few more pages than its predecessor, but suffering in consequence a slight loss of criticality. It is a pity, too, that there is not space for more journal references.

This publication represents a considerable achievement upon which the editors are to be congratulated: their task is rather like painting the Forth bridge. Perhaps the third edition is less than a decade away!

R. A. LOWE

R. & B. GROSS (Eds.), *Radical School Reform* (Gollancz, £2.40)

COLLECTIONS of excerpts and short articles are frequently uneven in their quality and this does not appear to be an exception. The first four extracts attempt to portray what is wrong with American schools. Those by J. Herndon, J. Kozol and J. Henry are a similar amalgam of description, interpretation, evaluation, and prescription. Such are travellers tales rather than sociological studies. The extract from J. Holt's book, How children Fail, is better, but this opening section is perhaps the weakest of the book.

The second part attempts a radical reappraisal of the basic postulates of schooling. Its unevenness stems in part from the concern of each writer to examine one postulate and then to base a prescription for action on his conclusions. Amongst the contributions that avoided this trap, M. McLuhan and G. Leonards' 'Learning in the Global Village' makes engaging and reading. They suggest that the question of the youth exposed to an in-formation packed urban evironment might be 'Why should I go back to school and interrupt my education?' thus posing the possibility of schools preparing pupils for a world already ceasing to exist because of the rapidity of change. N. Postman and C. Weingartner are as refeshing and illuminating as in their book 'Teaching as a Subversive Activity,' and the Montgomery County Students Alliance provide useful discussion material in a list of suggestions for student participation. The remaining articles

make some interesting points to make up possibly the strongest section of the book.

The third section attempts to give examples of radical initiatives. There is an extract from the 1949 Ministry of Education report on Summerhill and 'The British Infants Schools' by J. Featherstone. These and other examples will be familiar to many English educationalists. A lively paper by H. Kohl relates some of his experiences with a Harlem class further described in his book, 36 Children. O. C. K. Moore's experiments with the 'talking typewriter' will tend to intrigue or distress according to one's disposition towards Educational Technology.

The editing of the book is perhaps the most suspect feature. The commentary is emotive, overgeneralised and oversimplifies the problems. The editors do not seem to be aware of the dangers of exchanging one repressive orthodoxy for another. Their material is selected to support their conviction that present schools are wholly bad. This is, in short, a hot look at schools rather than a cool appraisal. But for those without time to read the books of some of the contributers, parts of this collection may well further their personal attempts to grapple with the complex problems of schooling. This is probably the strength of this type of book.

R. MEIGHAN

D. BIRLEY and A. DUFTON An Equal Chance (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1971, £2.50.)

The aspects of education covered by this book are not well documented in literature of the subject. D. Birley and A. Dufton perform a useful service in attempting to describe and assess the ambiguous area between schools and the social and welfare services. The title is perhaps a little misleading since only this one major aspect of equalities and inequalities in educational opportunity is covered.

The opening chapter is an interesting and lucid account of the problems of equality of opportunity in a pluralistic society. One might query the assumption that a system giving everyone an equal start in the race to become unequal is what most people think desirable, however.

The authors are quite clear about what they expect of teachers. 'What is reasonable and practical is that the teachers should know enough and care enough to do two things: first, to be aware of when, where, and how to refer a problem to someone else; and second, to be able to respond through his own teaching methods to the child's needs when they are identified' (p.28).

Inevitably perhaps, in covering so much ground, inadequacies can be detected. The sections on the Youth Service for example seem rather weak. 'The Youth Service, in some areas at least, has more serious purposes than clubs and play.' (p. 96) is indicative of the tone of these sections and

suggests a misunderstanding or an undervaluing of the informal educational approach. Readers with special knowledge of other areas, may find other sections deficient in some respects. This should not be allowed to detract from the overall merits of this book which is carefully structured, perceptively written and contains some thoughtful proposals for modest but significant reforms.

<div align="right">R. MEIGHAN</div>

CAIRINE PETRIE, *Backward and Maladjusted Children in Secondary Schools* (Ward Lock Educational 1972, £2)

ALTHOUGH there were two day schools for maladjusted children opened in the 1930's, and a marked increase in providing places for maladjusted children to attend day classes and schools began after the publication of the Underwood Report in 1955, published books giving accounts of working with maladjusted children in a day setting in Britain are practically non-existent. This is a field of special aducation urgently needing description and evaluation.

Mrs Petrie's book, alas, does not contribute much to our knowledge. It is a description of her work with fourteen boys and girls of secondary school age attending a special class, presumably attached to a secondary school. The children are not unintelligent, the levels of intelligence ranging from 90-111. It is not clear how the children were selected for her class, nor whether it was a class for the parent school only, or for other schools of the area.

Mrs Petrie describes her work with the children and says little that is new to experienced special class teachers. Her account is punctuated with generalisations and platitudes, and rather superficial observations. She tells us, for example, that it is normal for children to hate school, that dull children do not misbehave in class, that 'it is, of course, normal to reject parents during adolescence', and that 'it is possible that those who have become maladjusted have inherited their parents' inability to cope with life'. When reflecting on why so many children in her class were in the care of the local authority, the only explanation Mrs Petrie advances is that the houses in the area were particularly suitable for conversion into children's homes, and her statement that 'Personalities are largely informed by heredity and environment' lost the impact of originality some time ago.

Mrs Petrie inevitably becomes involved in the rather meaningless dichotomy between therapy and education. When describing her help to a bereaved child, she writes, 'I worked as a teacher, not as a therapist', What she did was fundamental in assisting the child's recovery from a disastrous experience, but she seems uncertain of her role and illustrates this confusion by adding 'No private talks took place so he never felt he was

receiving treatment'. What does Mrs Petrie think therapy is? If she really believes that it must include private talk, she could easily have helped the child to talk about his grief. Would she then have felt she was working as a therapist and not as a teacher? Plainly, there can be no meaningful separation of the teacher's and the therapist's role for those working closely and positively with maladjusted children.

While it is difficult to make many positive comments about her account, the book does show that Mrs Petrie provided very positive experiences for the children in her class. It is easy to see why they responded warmly to her as a teacher; it is more difficult to respond in quite the same way to Mrs Petrie as an author.

ROBERT LASLETT

VIOLET MADGE. *Introducing Young Children to Jesus* (S.C.M. 1971, 80 pp. 75p).

VIOLET Madge's earlier book, *Children in Search of Meaning* (S.C.M. 1965) showed great skill in sympathetic observation of young children and in religious interpretation of their quest for life. Although characterised by the same readiness to listen to children and the same delight in recording their experiences, the new book is in some ways not such a success. This is because the author is this time not only reflecting on the religious development of children but also relating this to a specific set of Christian beliefs, those connected with Jesus.

Miss Madge sees clearly the dilemmas which immediately arise. The problems are indeed aggravated by the immaturity of the child's thought processes, but (as the quotations from the remarks made by college of education students show) they rest upon genuine modern difficulties in theological thought. The difficulties are how ancient mythology (virgin birth, ascension, miracle) can be reconciled with modern understanding, and how the universal and absolutist claims made about Jesus (pre-existence, divinity, present lordship) can be reconciled with the actual figure of the Palestinian preacher.

The solution adopted is one which psychologically and pedagogically makes good sense but which does give rise to some important questions of theology and of theological method in education. In a series of nine short sections, each headed by a text from the Gospels, Miss Madge draws out certain aspects of Jesus and shows how the experience of young children might be enlarged so as to make some comprehension of those aspects of Jesus possible. Children's experiences of loss and death for example may be a preparation for their understanding of the idea of new beginnings after death.

But how does one decide *which* Jesus to present to the young child? Are the texts which serve as sub-headings chosen because they represent central aspects of Jesus or because they refer to healthy aspects of child development which happen to have a similarity to aspects of the life of Jesus? Is Jesus the model for child development or is child development guided by other sets of values which turn out to be like those expressed in the figure of Jesus? Should we, in brief, adapt the child to Christ or Christ to the child?

In the case of an integrated Christian person this may be rather a chicken-and-egg sort of situation, but on the whole Miss Madge prefers to adapt Christ to the values of child development. The result, and this is found in many modern books on the subject, is a distinct portrait of Christ, arrived at not through Gospel criticism, but through application of the principles of modern child centred education.

'As Jesus conversed with people he helped them to answer their own queries through opening their minds to the significance of commonplace affairs. Inherent in his persistence to get people to find their own answers to their questions is a modern education principle' (p. 48). When the teacher tells stories they may, like the stories Jesus told, 'hold religious significance because they mirror human nature and human needs' (p. 50). But when Jesus conversed and told parables he did so in the context of a commonly accepted framework of Jewish belief about God and his Kingdom, about Torah and Messiah. He was not inviting them to find their own answers, but to accept his interpretation of his mission, which required a reappraisal of their existing beliefs. If we ignore the theological context of Jesus' ministry, the next step is to turn Jesus into the teacher of timeless truths, which is where Miss Madge finishes on the last page of the book where we are told '. . . it is in the individual's re-living of timeless truths, not by mere reverent remembering of bygone history that the Gospel story can be most fully comprehended' (p. 74).

It would seem then that in the end Miss Madge accepts that the Jesus to whom the young child will be introduced will be the Christ of modern existentialist theology. And yet earlier on p. 26 emphasis is laid upon the importance of the historical Jesus as a child of his time, and we are reminded that he was not an 'abstract universal norm of human life' (p. 26). And when we turn to the list of books for further reading, we find there not a single book which would introduce the reader to contemporary Christological enquiry, but such traditionalists as J. B. Philips and even Frank Morrison are recommended. It seems therefore that what we have here is not an explicit and self concious adoption of existentialist Christology but a case of the old Liberal fallacy exposed by Schweitzer long ago, in which the image of Jesus is recreated according to a preconceived model in the mind of the author.

It may seem unnecessary or even unkind to ask questions of this sort about a book which is after all intended to help the teacher of infants, not the theological student! On the other hand, the problem of the criteria for the selection of a Christ for presentation to the young has been hanging around in the wings of Christian education ever since experiential religious education became popular in the early sixties, and it ought no longer to be avoided. *The problem in education springs mainly out of the problem in theology.* This is the basic difficulty in presenting Jesus to children today.

In spite of these unsolved problems and unasked questions, this is a book full of wise pastoral insight and practical wisdom. It offers many new ways of looking at the subject and the records of children's work are delightful. For these reasons students and teachers will read it with interest and profit.

JOHN M. HULL

M. L. J. ABERCROMBIE, *Aims and Techniques of Group Teaching* (Society for Research into Higher Education Ltd., 1970).

THIS pamphlet distinguishes the functions of lecture, tutorial, and group teaching. Their aims are not the same, though this is commonly forgotten in discussions of the 'best' method of teaching. The authoritarian assumptions in the first two are seen as one reason that the third should come into greater prominence in order to help the student to develop intellectual independence and maturity. Various types of groups are discussed, with examples—free discussion to develop observation and reasoning, to explore a professional role, to explorate human group relations, to develop team work, to develop creativity by 'syntactic' and 'brainstorming' techniques. The tone of the pamphlet is moderate, and says that there are few controlled experiments as yet on the effects of group teaching: and concludes by quoting a warning study from Michigan which shows the satisfaction of students there lying in affective gains, and not in cognitive.

A. WILKINSON

EDUCATIONAL REVIEW

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SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

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E. A. PEEL
A. M. WILKINSON
W. CURR

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SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

A SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL STUDY OF CERTAIN ATTITUDES TOWARDS UNIVERSITY OF STUDENTS FROM CO-EDUCATIONAL AND SINGLE- SEX SCHOOLS*

by P. M'C. MILLER *and* R. R. DALE

University College of Swansea

ABSTRACT

Using the Semantic Differential, 274 first-year university students rated four concepts concerning university, producing scores on 'evaluation', 'potency' and 'activity'. For comparison these concepts were each paired with a concept relating to school.

In a special 'balanced' sample, the students from single-sex schools evaluated 'university' higher than did the co-educated (P <0.05) and they also evaluated 'student' higher in balanced and remainder samples combined (P <0.05). Students from single-sex schools were also more favourable to university as compared to school than were co-educated students (P <0.05). While the former rated 'student' higher than 'my class', there was an opposite tendency for the co-educated (0.1 level only for combined effect), and while co-educated women rated university lecturer (and school teacher) higher than co-educated men did (P <0.05), the women from girls' schools had no such tendency. In all samples the university was evaluated more highly than 'my school' (P <0.001).

Students from single-sex schools saw the university as less potent than school and 'lecture theatre' less potent than 'classroom', but co-educated students did not (P <0.01), while the former possibly rated 'student' and 'my class at school' combined as more potent than did the latter (balanced sample) (P <0.1 only).

The co-educated men and women from girls' schools saw the classroom as less active than the lecture theatre, and the co-educated women vice versa (not significantly). In general university is seen as more active than school (P <0.001). lecturer than school teacher (P <0.05), and student than 'my class' (P <.001).

* Research project assisted by the S.S.R.C.

1. INTRODUCTION

THERE has been much research in recent years on the improvement of the selection of university students, with only limited success, and this study is part of an attempt to discover whether the type of schooling—co-educated or single-sex—is a hidden variable affecting the situation. The direct attack on the problem, through the comparison of academic attainment, will be reported elsewhere. Here we are concerned with differences in attitudes, some of which might affect attainment, but all of which are of interest in themselves.

To explore this aspect the semantic differential technique developed by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) and recently reviewed by Heise (1969) was employed. In this test respondents rate *concepts* such as 'my school', on a series of seven-point scales the poles of which are defined by pairs of adjectives such as good/bad, hard/soft, etc. Any such scale loads on one of three different and independent *factors* labelled by Osgood et al (1957) *'evaluation'*, *'potency'* and *'activity'*.

2. THE SAMPLE

The sample consisted of 145 men and 129 women from the 1968–69 and 1969–70 first-year classes at the University College of Swansea. It was limited to those students in the Faculties of Arts and Pure Science who had sat the W.J.E.C. A-level examination and were taking at least one of the following subjects:—French, History, Geography, Applied Mathematics, Pure Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Botany, but there were 24 non-co-operators, and 18 who had attended both types of school were eliminated.

3. PROCEDURE

In the second and third weeks of the winter term the students were asked to co-operate in a large survey, of which the semantic differential test formed a part. They were usually tested in large groups, but occasionally individually. Nine concepts were used of which four related directly to the subject of this article; they were 'this university college', 'university lecturer', 'student' and 'lecture theatre'. Reference will also be made to four school concepts with which they were paired. Each concept was rated on 11 seven-point scales, five of these loading on evaluation, and three each on potency

and activity. The rating scales and method of scoring used are detailed in the appendix.

Before calculating the mean differences between the principal groups the A-level attainment, faculty and social class variables were controlled by choosing from the main group a special '*balanced*' sample. All the subcells of this sub-sample contained nearly equal proportions of students from the two faculties, from defined categories of A-level attainment and from the various social classes. To preserve correct proportionality the sample had to be drawn from the top three categories only (out of four), reducing this balanced sample to 104 students. The remaining 170 however, except for 18 randomly eliminated for procedure by analysis of variance, were used as a cross validation sample (termed the *remainder sample*). Results for both samples are reported but the two are by no means equivalent in composition. Those variables which could not be balanced out from either sample, notably the urban/rural variable, were also examined to determine whether they could account for the significant differences found.

The results for the balanced and remainder samples were very similar, suggesting that the extraneous variables have relatively little effect. Accordingly the two samples were pooled and further analyses run on the combined data. The results of all three analyses are reported. All significant interactions were followed up using techniques described in Kirk (1968) for the analysis of simple main effects.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The means of the ratings on evaluation, potency and activity are set out in tables 1 to 3.

Two points need to be made before commenting on the main results. First, the statistically highly significant tendency of the women to rate these concepts higher than the men rate them is only of peripheral interest in this article and is fully appraised elsewhere. Second, in only one case did we find an unwanted variable having anything approaching a systematic effect—students from rural school background seeming to evaluate 'this university college' slightly more highly than did those from urban background. This effect, if real, would *reduce* the differences on the co-education/single-sex variable, and therefore it could not account for the significant result found.

TABLE 1

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL—MEAN EVALUATION RATINGS FOR THE CONCEPTS (Range 5–35)

| Concept | BALANCED SAMPLE (N = 104) | | | | REMAINDER SAMPLE (N = 152) | | | | COMBINED SAMPLES (N = 256) | | | |
| | MEN (N = 52) | | WOMEN (N = 52) | | MEN (N = 76) | | WOMEN (N = 76) | | MEN (N = 128) | | WOMEN (N = 128) | |
	Co-ed. (N = 26)	Single-sex (N = 26)	Co-ed. (N = 26)	Single-sex (N = 26)	Co-ed. (N = 42)	Single-sex (N = 34)	Co-ed. (N = 42)	Single-sex (N = 34)	Co-ed. (N = 68)	Single-sex (N = 60)	Co-ed. (N = 68)	Single-sex (N = 60)
My school	28.19	29.19	29.46	27.69	27.52 (28.37)	26.79	29.36	27.53 (27.49)	27.78 (28.32)	27.83	29.40	27.60 (27.57)
This university college	28.92	31.00	30.85	32.62	29.43 (29.81)	30.06	31.00	30.85 (30.97)	29.24 (29.54)	30.47	30.94	31.62 (31.67)
School-teacher	28.46	29.46	29.35	28.15	27.21 (27.88)	28.21	29.45	27.85 (28.03)	27.69 (28.06)	28.75	29.41	27.98 (28.08)
University lecturer	27.46	28.77	28.00	28.88	26.79 (26.68)	27.76	28.55	27.62 (27.74)	27.04 (26.92)	28.20	28.34	28.17 (28.23)
My class at school	28.19	28.38	29.65	29.73	27.81 (28.32)	26.62	29.71	29.82 (29.86)	27.96 (28.28)	27.38	29.69	29.78 (29.80)
Student	27.27	29.00	28.88	30.23	26.93 (27.22)	28.24	28.88	29.53 (29.69)	27.06 (27.24)	28.57	28.88	29.83 (29.92)
Classroom	24.23	25.19	25.00	25.50	23.69 (24.71)	23.97	25.86	27.18 (27.06)	23.90 (24.56)	24.50	25.53	26.45 (26.39)
Lecture theatre	24.77	23.15	24.73	26.50	25.26 (25.19)	25.76	26.14	27.03 (27.14)	25.07 (25.06)	24.63	25.60	26.80 (26.87)

Figures in brackets are the means before the random elimination of 18 students mentioned in the text.

TABLE 2

SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL—MEAN POTENCY RATINGS FOR THE CONCEPTS (Range 3–21)

| Concept | BALANCED SAMPLE (N = 104) | | | | REMAINDER SAMPLE (N = 152) | | | | COMBINED SAMPLES (N = 256) | | | |
| | MEN (N = 52) | | WOMEN (N = 52) | | MEN (N = 76) | | WOMEN (N = 76) | | MEN (N = 128) | | WOMEN (N = 128) | |
	Co-ed. (N = 26)	Single-sex (N = 26)	Co-ed. (N = 26)	Single-sex (N = 26)	Co-ed. (N = 42)	Single-sex (N = 34)	Co-ed. (N = 42)	Single-sex (N = 34)	Co-ed. (N = 68)	Single-sex (N = 60)	Co-ed. (N = 68)	Single-sex (N = 60)
My school	11.88	14.35	13.23	13.96	11.17 (11.70)	12.50	12.02	13.44 (13.20)	11.44 (11.75)	13.30	12.49	13.67 (13.52)
This university college	12.12	12.00	12.85	13.00	12.02 (12.20)	11.60	13.40	12.97 (13.00)	12.06 (12.18)	11.77	13.19	12.98 (13.00)
School-teacher	12.81	14.27	13.58	14.19	12.14 (12.69)	13.32	13.40	13.53 (13.57)	12.40 (12.73)	13.73	13.47	13.82 (13.84)
University lecturer	11.62	11.85	12.04	12.85	11.29 (11.41)	10.79	12.40	12.79 (12.83)	11.41 (11.47)	11.25	12.26	12.82 (12.84)
My class at school	12.69	13.58	12.50	13.46	12.48 (12.64)	12.50	12.69	12.47 (12.49)	12.56 (12.66)	12.97	12.62	12.90 (12.90)
Student	12.50	13.15	13.12	14.38	12.21 (12.44)	12.09	13.10	12.97 (13.06)	12.32 (12.46)	12.55	13.10	13.58 (13.62)
Classroom	12.15	13.35	13.23	13.31	12.21 (12.39)	12.94	12.57	13.41 (13.31)	12.19 (12.32)	13.12	12.82	13.37 (13.31)
Lecture theatre	12.31	11.31	12.08	12.69	12.64 (12.80)	11.65	12.95	12.47 (12.43)	12.51 (12.65)	11.50	12.62	12.57 (12.54)

Figures in brackets are the means before the random elimination of 18 students mentioned in the text.

Taking the evaluation factor first (the sum of the scales Pleasant/Unpleasant, Trivial/Important, Negative/Positive, Valuable/Worthless and Good/Bad) we find that in the balanced sample the students from single-sex schools evaluate university higher than do the co-educated students (P <0.05), but this does not occur in the remainder sample. Those from single-sex schools also tend to be more favourable to university as compared to school than are the co-educated students (P <0.05 for the combined samples). The co-educated women evaluate 'university lecturer' (and schoolteacher) higher than do co-educated males (P <0.05), in line with the general trend mentioned above for the two sexes, but this is not so for women from girls' schools, who may even show the reverse tendency on 'schoolteacher' (0.1 level only).

The students from single-sex schools show some tendency in both samples (P <0.05 for the combined) to rate 'student' higher than do the co-educated students; the former also evaluate 'student' higher than 'my class at school', while the co-educated students have a contrary tendency (0.1 level only). This last finding seems to link with that reported in the previous paragraph on 'university lecturer' and 'schoolteacher'.

A possible explanation of the differences in the ratings given by the students from the two types of school is that those from the single-sex schools welcome the relaxation from the undeniably stricter discipline of their schools (compared with co-educational schools in England and Wales) and also evaluate 'student' more highly because they welcome the opportunity to mingle with the opposite sex at the university. A relevant point from past research is that pupils tend to be less happy in single-sex schools than in co-educational schools and that this is mainly due to the presence of both sexes (Dale, 1969 and 1971). It must be emphasized, however, that this hypothesis about attitude at the university is tentative. Nor, of course, is high evaluation entirely synonymous with happiness or liking.

A finding incidental to the theme of the article is that, as might have been expected, university is evaluated more highly than school in all samples (P <0.001).

Results on the potency factor were more marked towards school than university. Whereas on three of the four school concepts the single-sex educated gave higher mean ratings than the co-educated did, with the difference on 'my school' reaching a high level of significance, there is little evidence of any 'carry over' of these differences to the university concepts with which the schools concepts

were loosely paired. Indeed there is a hint that students from single-sex schools saw 'this university college' and 'lecture theatre' as less potent than 'my school' and 'classroom' respectively, though the co-educated did not ($P < 0.01$ and < 0.05 respectively). The precise meaning is important—students from single-sex schools rated their school ($P < .001$), schoolteacher ($P < 0.05$), and 'classroom' ($P < 0.05$) as more severe, strong and hard than the co-educated did, but there is no consistent trend—rather a near equality—for the university concepts.

An incidental finding is that schoolteacher was seen as more potent than university lecturer ($P < 0.001$ overall).

On the activity factor (comprising the scales Passive/Active, Sharp/Dull, and Slow/Fast) there is no consistent and statistically significant difference between the co-educated students and those from single-sex schools on the rating of the university concepts. However, by-products of the study are that overall 'this university college' is seen as more active than 'my school' ($P < 0.001$), lecturer than teacher (except for single-sex educated students in the balanced sample, $P < 0.05$), and student more active than 'my class at school' ($P < 0.001$).

Perhaps the most important result of this research is the demonstration that the variable co-educational/single-sex schooling is one that they may need to be taken into account in some research studies on university students. Moreover attitudinal differences may exist which are wider in scope and also stronger than those already found. It should be pointed out, however, that the differences are much stronger in relation to school than in relation to university.

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APPENDIX

Code number ——

CONCEPT (e.g.) THIS UNIVERSITY COLLEGE

PLEASANT	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	UNPLEASANT (E)
PASSIVE	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	ACTIVE (A)
TRIVIAL	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	IMPORTANT (E)
SEVERE	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	LENIENT (P)
SHARP	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	DULL (A)
WEAK	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	STRONG (P)
NEGATIVE	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	POSITIVE (E)
HARD	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	SOFT (P)
VALUABLE	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	WORTHLESS (E)
SLOW	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	FAST (A)
GOOD	——:——:——:——:——:——:——	BAD (E)

The scoring on each side is weighted from 1–7 according to the adjectives constituting its extremes.

The score on the *Evaluation* factor is the sum of the scores on the items marked (E) above. Similarly for *Potency*, where items are marked (P), and *Activity*, where items are marked (A).

MAD, SAD, OR DISTINCTLY FRUSTRATED?

An investigation into children's ability to differentiate emotions verbally.

by G. Yarlott, R. J. Shepherd and D. H. Wilkinson
School of Education, University of Nottingham

ABSTRACT

Beginning from the standpoint that the ability to differentiate emotions verbally is an important element in the child's emotional development, the authors describe their own investigation into how this ability is influenced by factors of age, sex and social class. On the basis of a study of over 200 children, aged from eight to fifteen years, they conclude that this ability, besides becoming more discriminative with age, tends to be more highly developed in girls than in boys, and in middle class than working class children.

I. INTRODUCTION

EMOTIONAL development, it is generally agreed, includes among other things, a process of gradual differentiation of emotion, so that whereas a new born baby feels only generalised excitement or quiescence, by the age of two years, according to Bridges (1932), distress, anger, fear, disgust, jealousy, affection, and elation are clearly distinguishable. Moreover, each child has to learn to discriminate among the basic emotions for himself, and to label these appropriately in accordance with established language conventions. By developing this verbal capacity he is enabled both to identify and to communicate his own feelings more effectively and to understand better the feelings of others. The person who lacks this verbal capacity, and has to rely, as does the baby or deaf-mute child, on non-verbal signals to communicate his feelings, frequently has difficulty in communicating these satisfactorily, as Fernberger's (1927) and Sherman's (1927 and 1928) experiments have shown.

Presumably, children learn the vocabulary of emotion by listening and talking to adults (Kenny, 1963), and by reading stories or watching television. They may be influenced too by their awareness of

certain distinctive internal symptoms which, it is claimed, accompany specific emotions (Wolf and Wolff, 1943; Funkenstein, 1955). The processes of learning are probably influenced by such variables as sex differences, personality characteristics, intelligence (more specifically verbal intelligence), reading aptitude, social class factors, and the like. As yet, no comprehensive study of these complex processes has been undertaken, but the investigation reported below examines the extent to which the ability of children to differentiate emotions verbally is affected by age, sex and social class.

In carrying out this investigation we began with the following three hypotheses:

(1) that the ability to differentiate emotions verbally improves with age,
(2) that (in the light of earlier observations we had made) girls might be expected to show a greater ability than boys,
(3) that middle class children probably have a greater ability than working class children.

We did not specifically examine the effects of intelligence nor of any of the other variables mentioned above, although we accept that these probably influenced our results.

To test our three main hypotheses it was decided to use a sample of schoolchildren between the ages of eight and fifteen years and a small number of university postgraduate student teachers for pur poses of comparison (see Table 1).

TABLE I

BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE BY AGE AND SEX

Age (years)	Male	Female	Total
8–9	27	30	57
10–11	28	26	54
12–13	16	31	47
14–15	16	36	52
22–23	6	9	15
Total	93	132	225

The children were drawn from four mixed schools: a junior, and a secondary bilateral school, both with predominantly working class intakes from large council estates, and a junior, and a secondary grammar school comprising mainly middle class children from

affluent residential districts. In fact, only the junior working-class school was socially homogeneous, but the social bias in each of the other schools was sufficiently preponderant to justify our classifying them as broadly Junior and Secondary Working-Class, and Junior and Secondary Middle-Class schools respectively.

2. TEST PROCEDURE

The test was administered in the form of a story, the object being to see how successfully children could supply names of appropriate emotions at stipulated points in the narrative. A simple story was devised which would be interesting enough to appeal to eight- to fifteen-year old children, yet detailed enough to provide adequate situational contexts for each of twelve different emotions, without overtaxing the younger children's attention. The emotions selected for inclusion were ANGER, DISGUST, ELATION, EMBAR-RASSMENT, FEAR, FRUSTRATION, GRATITUDE, GUILT, JEALOUSY, RELIEF, SHAME, SYMPATHY—these providing a sufficiently broad spectrum for our purposes. These emotions, we thought, were within every child's feasible experience, and they represented a satisfactory balance of positive and negative emotions. Obviously, many more which could have proved interesting had to be left out, especially more adult emotions like NOSTALGIA, which both experientially and verbally, were beyond the range of many of our subjects.

It was not difficult to decide on the outline of the story, but there were problems in finding the right cues for the emotions, and much re-drafting was necessary. Sometimes stock associations of ideas or the syntactical structure of a sentence would point too obviously to a particular emotion; sometimes an ambiguous cue would point to more than one emotion (difficulties which we never completely resolved). Sometimes it seemed advisable to ask for names of emotions in their adjectival rather than their noun form. We had to decide furthermore how easy or difficult the test should be, how many pointers should be given to a word, and how to exclude answers which, although viable, were not strictly names of emotions. The version of the story finally agreed upon ran as follows:

Everything seemed to go wrong that morning! First of all Tommy was late getting up to go to school. Then, when he was dressing to go to school, he couldn't find his shirt. He spent several minutes looking for it, becoming hotter and hotter, looking in drawer after drawer. Then he found it screwed up and creased under the bed. He was in so much of a hurry now that nothing

seemed to go right. He put on his shirt over his head without undoing the buttons, and, of course, the shirt ripped. And then, when he tried to do up his shoes quickly, the laces got all knotted together, so that he couldn't undo them properly. Because so many things seemed to be blocking his way that morning, he felt (. . . 1).

At last he got down to breakfast. But he was in a very bad mood. His sister, Mary, was sitting in *his* special chair next to his mother. 'That's my chair,' he shouted. '*I* want to sit near Mummy!' 'No you can't,' said his sister. 'I want to sit next to Mummy. *I* got here first.'

Tommy stopped shouting; but, as he sat there looking at his sister sitting in *his* special chair by his mother, getting all her attention while she did not seem to care at all about him, he looked at his sister and could not help feeling (. . . 2).

'I'm afraid you're too late for the bacon,' said his mother. 'Never mind. I'll fry you some potatoes. Feel if there are any potatoes left in the cupboard.'

Tom put his hand into the dark cupboard and felt about inside it. Nothing. Then his fingers touched something cold and slimy. He pulled out his hand quickly, and there, clinging to it, was a slippery mass of wet, rotting potato, with an ugly maggot crawling on top of it. 'Ugh!' he said, shaking it off onto the floor. The very sight of it aroused a feeling of (. . . . . 3)

His mother saw the look on his face and seemed to understand his feelings straight away.

'Oh, that *was* a nasty thing to happen, wasn't it, Tommy? I know, just for a special treat, this morning you can have something different.' She went to the cake tin and cut him a large slice of his favourite chocolate cake.

'Here, have this instead,' she said. 'It's not tea-time, I know, but that was a horrible thing to happen, and this might make up for it. And what's more, if you eat this now, instead of waiting for me to cook something for you, you won't be late for school.'

His mother *was* understanding. Because she had given him this special treat, and because she had stopped him being late for school, he looked at her and felt (. . . 4).

Then Tom and Mary both had to hurry, or they would be late for school. As Mary dashed upstairs, Tom suddenly remembered that his bike needed mending. If he had to walk to school he would be late. Then a wicked idea came into his mind. He decided to take Mary's bike while she was still upstairs, leaving her to make her own way to school as best she could.

If you were late getting to school in the morning your name was called out in front of everyone and all the teachers frowned at you, and the other children stared and giggled, which was enough to make anyone blush bright red and feel (. . . 5). Tom could not face that. So he took Mary's bike and he was able to arrive at school just as the bell rang. As he sank into his seat, hot and breathless, he knew that he was safe. He drew a deep breath and felt very (. . . 6).

But shortly afterwards while they were all in assembly listening to the headmaster, he looked out of the window and saw a lonely figure hurrying across the playground. It was his sister Mary, and she was crying, because she was going to get into trouble through no fault of her own. Tom realised

then how wrong it had been to take her bike, and that he ought to own up to the headmaster, to get her out of trouble. He had done a wicked thing for which she would *never* forgive him. He felt (. . . 7).

By playtime, however, he had forgotten all about this. Then, while they were drinking their milk, the teacher told them that they were to have an unexpected treat. As a surprise, Bobby Moore, the captain of the England football team, somebody whom they *all* liked, was coming to talk to his class, and Tommy was mad about football. He dashed out of the stuffy classroom into the bright sunlight outside. He was free! He almost felt like singing! His heart lifted. He felt (. . . . 8). He kicked wildly at a ball that bounced across his path.

Then in a moment everything changed, for there, standing in front of him, was Tiger Martin, the school bully. Tiger had an ugly look on his face.

'Who said you could kick my ball?' he growled.

'I didn't know it was yours.'

'Oh yes you did, and I'm going to show you.'

Tiger took off his coat and rolled up his sleeves. He wore a thick belt with brass studs on it. As he came towards Tom he looked fierce, and his cruel eyes glinted. Tom felt (. . . 9).

The first savage blow drew blood from his nose. The second blow knocked him over, and he fell, hitting the back of his head with a thud on the ground. But other children came between them. They saw that Tom was badly hurt, and stooped over him, trying to comfort him. As they looked down at him their faces showed (. . . 10).

It was at that moment that the headmaster appeared. He strode across the playground looking very stern, and shouting at Tiger to stop it. He walked quickly and his voice was loud and harsh. He was obviously very (. . . 11).

'You great bully!' he shouted. 'Just look what you have done to this little boy. He's only half your size.'

At that, even Tiger Martin hung his head and looked down at his big clumsy boots. He felt (. . . 12).

But Tom didn't care about him. He had seen Mary's face in the crowd and from the way she was looking at him, he knew that she had already forgiven him.

The tests were carried out in the classroom, the story having been tape-recorded beforehand by a female drama student, who was encouraged to use whatever variations of intonation, pitch and tempo she felt necessary to express the meaning effectively. On Test A, which was open-ended, the subjects had to write down the best word for the emotion which they could think of at each of twelve breaks in the story. They were allowed to insert a second choice word if they so wished, and where these words improved a child's score they were allocated full marks. On Test B, which was a multiple-choice test administered one week later, the subject had to choose

the best word from five words presented to him at each break in the same story. For example, the correct word, FRUSTRATED, was presented alongside MAD, UNHAPPY, FED-UP, and DE-PRESSED. Test A tested the subject's active vocabulary therefore, while Test B tested his passive or latent vocabulary. To familiarise them with the procedure, subjects had a trial run with a story which contained only three emotional words (BORED, EXCITED and SORRY), and they also heard the test story right through without interruption before doing Test A.

3. METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The results of Test B were not difficult to analyse, there being only one correct word among each multiple choice batch, and a maximum possible score therefore of 12 marks. To analyse the results of Test A, a panel of five judges was used, made up of three men and two women, four of them graduates in English and one in modern languages. Their task was more difficult, since for each emotion there was a range of anything from 25 to 70 different responses to evaluate. The panel attempted to classify these responses into obviously 'correct' Category I words (each of which scored +2 marks), obviously 'incorrect' Category III words (each of which scored −2 marks), and a middle band of 'in-between' Category II words, often difficult to classify, which, while not strictly incorrect, were insufficiently precise for the context (and which scored 0). Thus, for the emotion FRUSTRATED, Category I words included 'exasperated', 'harassed', 'irritated', 'irritable' and 'impatient'; Category II words included 'sad', 'unhappy', 'mad', 'terrible', 'panicky', 'horrible', 'awful' and 'rotten'; Category III words included 'sick', 'excited', 'happy', 'tired', 'bored', 'pitiful' and 'frightened'.

The maximum possible score on Test A was +24 therefore, and the minimum possible score −24. In addition, it was decided to penalise a blank answer or the repetition of the same answer for two different emotions by −1 mark in each instance. However, in a few cases, repetitions were not penalised: for example, it was felt that 'ashamed' was an acceptable Category I word for GUILTY and EMBARRASSED as well as for ASHAMED, and no penalty was incurred for this particular repetition. On the above marking scheme a final score of +6 might thus be arrived at in the following manner, by a child who left one answer blank and also repeated one word:

Score	Category I words	6 (+2) =	12
	Category II words	3 (0) =	0
	Category III words	2 (−2) =	−4
	One blank answer	1 (−1) =	−1
	One repetition	1 (−1) =	−1
	Total		+6

It is acknowledged that subjectivity was bound to enter into our allocation of words to these three categories. Wherever there was disagreement the responses of the P.G.C.E. students, who were taken to represent a group of people with a very good vocabulary to choose from, were consulted, after which the majority verdict of the panel was recorded. A great deal of time was spent in seeking objectivity for each decision, and, while complete objectivity in such an exercise is unattainable, we think it very doubtful whether another panel would have produced a significantly different analysis. Notwithstanding these reservations, it is clear that the results of the investigation bear interestingly on our three original hypotheses.

4. RESULTS

Not surprisingly perhaps, the figures on p. 97 amply confirm our initial hypothesis, revealing how the ability to differentiate emotions verbally improves with age, whether it is the active or the passive vocabulary which is being tested. On Test A, most fifteen-year olds were able to supply a well differentiated range of emotional words to fit the requirements of the test story, whereas eight-year olds could often produce no more than four or five different words, which they applied undiscriminatingly to a variety of emotional situations. The difference may be illustrated by comparing these actual responses of two abler fifteen-year olds with those of two weaker eight-year olds:

	Fifteen-years		*Eight-years*	
FRUSTRATED	dispirited	frustrated	sad	mad
JEALOUS	jealous	hatred	sad	sad
DISGUST	repugnant	repulsion	(blank)	(blank)
GRATEFUL	better	grateful	happy	silin (?)
EMBARRASSED	embarrassed	ashamed	sad	(blank)
RELIEVED	relieved	relieved	happy	glad
GUILTY	repentant	guilty	sad	mad

TABLE 2

Breakdown of results in percentages of 'correct' answers according to age

	Test A (ACTIVE VOCABULARY)					Test B (PASSIVE VOCABULARY)				
Years	8–9	10–11	12–13	14–15	22–23	8–9	10–11	12–13	14–15	22–23
No. in sample	57	54	47	52	15	57	54	47	52	15
FRUSTRATED	8.8	22.2	29.8	48.1	80.0	3.5	31.5	51.1	78.8	80.0
JEALOUS	5.3	25.9	23.4	46.1	86.6	38.6	63.0	89.4	82.7	93.3
DISGUST	0	1.8	10.6	36.5	66.6	10.5	22.2	21.3	40.4	100
GRATEFUL	5.3	11.1	10.6	19.2	46.6	36.8	40.7	55.3	51.9	53.3
EMBARRASSED	19.3	38.8	68.1	80.8	93.3	29.8	72.2	85.1	84.6	93.3
RELIEVED	12.3	31.5	44.7	71.1	73.3	33.3	72.2	70.2	100	100
GUILTY	12.3	35.2	48.9	59.6	86.6	36.8	63.0	78.7	83.7	80.0
ELATED	15.8	33.3	42.5	46.1	80.0	5.3	0	8.5	23.1	100
FRIGHTENED	56.1	75.9	87.2	96.1	100	75.4	92.6	91.5	90.4	100
SYMPATHY	33.3	31.5	48.9	76.9	93.3	45.6	77.7	89.4	98.1	100
ANGRY	86.0	90.7	87.2	100	100	77.2	83.3	95.7	98.1	100
ASHAMED	17.5	33.3	70.2	67.3	93.3	66.6	79.6	95.7	96.11	93.3

	Fifteen-years		Eight-years	
ELATED	exhilarated	elated, ecstatic	happy	glad
FRIGHTENED	frightened	petrified, helpless	scared	(blank)
SYMPATHY	concern	pity, concern	(blank)	sad
ANGRY	angry	annoyed	angry	angry
ASHAMED	ashamed	ashamed	sad	mad

Almost all children were able to label basic emotions like FRIGHT-ENED and ANGRY with appropriate words, but younger children especially had difficulty with several of the other emotions.

ELATED is a word requiring some explanation, in view of the relatively small number of 'correct' responses recorded by subjects other than the postgraduate students. In fact, almost every child recognised that a positive emotional label was required at this juncture in the story. The majority offered viable words like 'happy' or 'glad' on Test A, but preferred alternatives to ELATED like 'happy', 'fantastic' or 'great' on Test B. However, our object in cueing this particular emotion was to elicit a more precise word than the rather general term 'happy', and, judging by the large number of 'correct' responses supplied by older subjects, which, on Test A, included 'overjoyed', 'on top of the world', 'high-spirited', 'ecstatic', 'exuberant' and 'exhilarated', this object was successfully achieved.

Regarding the words GRATEFUL and DISGUST we decided, on reflection, that the relatively poor results obtained for these emotions were partly due to the fact that we had not cued the original story sufficiently precisely. To check this, we tested a fresh sample of 12–13 and 14–15 year old children, using more pointed cues for these particular emotions, and this resulted in an improved performance at the comparable age levels of approximately 5% and 15% on Test A, and 46% and 17% on Test B, for the words DISGUST and GRATITUDE respectively. We must accept therefore that the original story might have been cued to produce more favourable results for each of the twelve emotions, but we very much doubt whether this would have significantly affected the overall pattern of age, sex and social class differences revealed by the present investigation.

Girls versus boys

The results indicated that on Test A the girls' performance was better than the boys' on every emotion except ANGER, where both sexes scored equally. Only on four of the emotions in Test B

(DISGUST, GRATITUDE, ELATION and SHAME) did boys score marginally better than girls. The girls' superiority was revealed on both tests therefore on almost every individual emotion as well as in their overall performance. There was a consistent directional tendency and an overall difference of 6.6% on Test A and of 7.0% on Test B in favour of the girls, a difference which was likewise reflected among female and male postgraduate students.

We conclude therefore that, as regards the verbal labelling of emotions, girls' ability is slightly better than boys', thus confirming our second hypothesis. However, in the light of researches currently being pursued at Nottingham University, we believe that there are certain additional skills, relating to the verbal communication of emotion in its fullest sense, in which girls' ability may be considerably superior to that of boys'.

Middle-class versus working-class

A significant difference in the performances of the children designated 'middle-class' and 'working-class' also emerged clearly. On every individual emotional word except FRIGHTENED and ANGRY (two basic emotions which all children learn to identify early in their lives) there was a marked bias in favour of middle-class children. Similarly, there was an overall average difference of 7.72% on the active vocabulary test and of 9.90% on the passive vocabulary test in favour of middle-class pupils. It appears therefore that our third hypothesis, that middle-class children have a greater ability to differentiate emotions verbally than working-class children, has also been largely confirmed. However, as we remarked earlier, the division of the schools in our sample into 'working-class' and 'middle-class' pairs is a broad one, based mainly on the preponderance of one social class in each school according to parental occupation, and further studies are now needed to examine this social class factor more closely.

5. DISCUSSION

The results of our investigation indicate that the ability to differentiate emotions verbally is influenced by factors of age, sex and social class, as was originally hypothesised. But how important is it that a child should develop this ability? Would the lack of it seriously impair his emotional and social development? Obviously, we must avoid the mistake of supposing that children who lack this ability cannot feel anything. It is equally obvious that children generally

succeed in getting their feelings across somehow, even if they cannot label them precisely, since they can use facial expression, gesticulation, changes of bodily posture and vocal tone to reinforce or even supplant precise articulation. In intimate inter-personal contexts effective interaction can take place, at least within certain limits, without explicit recourse to words like 'frustration', 'sympathy' or 'gratitude'.

Nevertheless, there are situations where precise articulation of subjective states of feeling—to the extent that inner experience can *ever* be satisfactorily conveyed by abstract verbal symbols (Yarlott, 1972)—is both desirable and necessary. In dealing with complex moral issues relating to a lesson in school or to his personal behaviour the pupil may sometimes find it incumbent upon him to explore his inner experience, to analyse questions of intent, motivation and social disposition. Inability to meet this obligation may raise tensions which, because they are not subject to verbal control, may become unpleasant. What Bernstein (1964) has said about the restricted code user being unamenable to techniques of psychotherapy probably applies, over a much wider area, in terms of personal frustration, to those who specifically lack the verbal resources for expressing their emotions adequately. Conversely, it is possible that by enlarging one's verbal capacity to identify and differentiate emotions precisely, one is enabled not only to develop richer, subtler and more satisfying personal relationships, but actually to extend the range of emotions one is capable of experiencing.

We must at this point face the question of what *is* a precise emotional label, or, to put it in another way, what does a word like 'jealousy' actually mean to a child, or to anyone else? As has convincingly been shown (Osgood, *et al.*, 1957), words can mean very different things for different people, and the likelihood of anything so arbitrarily determined as an emotional labelling word corresponding accurately to an experiential event in some individual person's private consciousness is exceedingly remote. Consequently, we were not surprised that children offered a number of very different responses for each one of our test items, although in some instances the number exceeded our expectations. The total number of different responses for each emotion was as follows: FRUSTRATED (53), JEALOUS (51), DISGUST (70), GRATEFUL (50), EMBARRASSED (36), RELIEVED (32), GUILTY (48), ELATED (40), FRIGHTENED (36), SYMPATHY (58), ANGRY (25) and ASHAMED (51). Among the many factors which could be adduced

to explain why these responses were so numerous, three in particular need to be mentioned. These are: (1) the socio-linguistic usages to which each child is accustomed; (2) the past learning opportunities he has had for extending his vocabulary; and (3) the antecedent dispositions and immediate impulses or emotional 'sets' which each child brings with him to the classroom and which govern his perception of each fresh situation.

(i) The influence of socio-linguistic usage was revealed in the number of everyday idiomatic expressions supplied by the children (phrases like 'oh, bother', 'big-headed', and 'odd one out'). It was revealed also in the high proportion of vague 'blanket' words, as we called them, which were offered (words like 'mad', 'awful', 'terrible', 'rotten', 'horrible', 'nice' and 'upset'). These are usually ambiguous words, whose precision has long since become blunted, and it was with the express purpose of discovering whether, when challenged, children could improve upon such 'blanket' terms, that we deliberately included a number of them, as red herrings so to speak, in Test B. The examples of 'great' and 'fantastic' alongside ELATED have already been mentioned; similarly, on Test B, 'fed up' was juxtaposed with FRUSTRATED, 'better' with GRATEFUL, 'terrible' with FRIGHTENED and 'bad' with ASHAMED. It was gratifying to find therefore, in terms of our original hypothesis, that older subjects particularly did tend to choose the 'correct' word on Test B in preference to the vague general word.

(ii) Compared with the adult the young child has naturally had more limited opportunities for adding to his vocabulary, and there are bound to be many emotional labelling-words he has never encountered. The interesting question then arises whether a child can understand an emotion he has never heard of nor personally experienced. We cannot yet determine the answer to this question, but, for interest's sake, we experimented with a separate story, cued towards the rather sophisticated emotion of NOSTALGIA, which ran as follows:

An old man sits thinking of the home where he lived as a child. He remembers the happy days he used to have, the joys, the delights, the laughter. He wishes that those days could come back. The memory of those far away days is sad but still sweet. It brings a feeling of . . .

As expected, we found that no child below the age of fifteen produced the word NOSTALGIA on Test A, the younger children's responses clustering around the words 'happiness' or 'content', and 'sadness' or 'sorrow'. Of the fifteen-year olds, only one pupil actually produced

the word NOSTALGIA, and one offered the word 'regret', which was regarded as an acceptable alternative in this context. On Test B, where NOSTALGIA was inserted among the words HAPPINESS, PLEASANTNESS, UNHAPPINESS and SOLITUDE, only one out of forty-three 11–12 year olds identified the correct word, whereas sixteen out of twenty-two 15–year olds did. We suspect, therefore, that both verbally and experientially, NOSTALGIA is a word which lies outside the range of most children below the age of fifteen; and that, above this age, while the word may have been assimilated into the pupil's latent vocabulary, it lacks the strong experiential associations which might translate it into his active vocabulary.

(iii) Our procedure throughout has obviously been to emphasise the primacy of the situational context in providing cues for emotional words, and in this we would have the support of the majority of leading contemporary affect psychologists, who follow Magda Arnold (1960) in insisting that emotional experience, is, almost invariably, related to perceptual responses to particular situations. It is the weakness of Davitz's (1969) method, in our view, that the check-list of 382 items, by means of which he guided his subjects towards definitions of emotions, included too many items which were so unspecific that they could equally well be related to totally different situations or to quite diverse emotional experiences. It was not surprising perhaps that in attempting by this method to identify 'commonalities of meaning' and 'areas of intersubjective agreement', Davitz discovered ultimately that the definitions of emotional words he was seeking overlapped to such an extent as to have little practical value.

Yet, despite the fact that in our investigation we took pains to locate each emotional word within a well-detailed situational context (this being the purpose of administering the test by means of a story) we were nevertheless presented with a considerable variety of responses to each emotional situation. In fact, this outcome was inevitable, and it would have resulted no matter how differently the story had been cued. It is dictated by the fact that, not only are children's linguistic resources widely different, but, because of the different temperamental characteristics they bring with them to their individual perceptions of situations, they actually *see* the same situation differently. In terms strictly of language resources it is only a question perhaps of whether one chooses to use the word 'mad' or 'angry', whereas temperamental factors operate much more decisively.

prompting this person to use 'angry' where another person might use quite an opposite word like 'sad' or 'depressed'.

A good illustration of how temperamental as against strictly linguistic factors appear to operate in determining individual responses to a situation occurred in the case of the word JEALOUS. Here, it was noticeable that Test A responses tended to gravitate towards one or other of two opposite poles. A very large group of children, containing a high proportion of girls, reacted to the story by appearing to show animosity towards the girl character, Mary, and instead of using the word JEALOUS to describe Tommy's feelings towards his sister, they chose words suggesting that he felt 'angry', 'mad', 'enraged', 'furious', 'bitter', 'revengeful', 'resentful' or 'vindictive'. A slightly smaller group, however, which interestingly enough contained a majority of boys, reacted quite differently. Their response to the JEALOUSY situation was a more passive one, and they chose words suggesting that Tommy felt 'unwanted', 'abandoned', 'left out', 'rejected', 'neglected', 'miserable', 'lonely' or 'downhearted'.

Several of the emotions in fact produced two similar broad classes of reply, indicating that pupils' reactions to the story were influenced as much by their antecedent dispositions or attitudes as by their logical interpretation of the available textual cues. A similar tendency has been noted by Peel (1971) who, in a sentence-completion test somewhat analogous to our own, found that subjects' responses appeared to start off from two directly opposing attitudes, and that these attitudes reflected the different meanings subjects read into the sentence. On more complex emotions in our experiment responses tended to cluster around up to half a dozen different main elements: for example, for DISGUST, there were clusters of words denoting 'nausea', 'fear', 'sadness', 'hostility', 'misery' or physical revulsion ('coldness', 'dirt', 'slime', 'rottenness' and 'ugliness').

The different attitudes which pupils bring with them to their perceptions of situations, and which are psychologically prior to their logical processes of interpretation, constitute therefore a factor of great significance in the classroom. It is this factor, more than any other perhaps, which often precludes the teacher from eliciting a particular word he or she is pressing for from a struggling class of children. It is disconcerting to realise that, in other people's eyes at least, there may be a dozen words infinitely preferable to the one being pressed for, some of them words totally different from the one the teacher expects.

6. CONCLUSION

The processes by which children acquire a vocabulary for differentiating emotions are complex. They are influenced by factors of age, sex, social upbringing (and, in all probability, by intelligence and the child's aptitude for reading). It must be remembered also that the vocabulary of emotion is itself arbitrarily determined, being a product of cultural conventions, so that the English child's vocabulary is quite different from the French or the German child's. Furthermore, all emotional labelling words are, in the final analysis, merely crude, abstract symbols for attempting to pin down elusive, highly individualised, subjective states, and, being 'public' symbols, they may not always be flexible nor accommodating enough to convey satisfactorily every innermost feeling which a child needs to articulate. Nevertheless, he is compelled to make use of them for want of anything better, if he wishes to communicate his feelings to others at a level beyond that of mere rudimentary gesticulation. It is the task of the educator, surely, to help children to develop this verbal ability, rather than leaving it simply to develop by chance. But, hitherto, educationists have paid little attention to the factors which influence this development. The above paper may be regarded, therefore as an initial stage in the kind of investigation which is needed to make teachers more aware of these factors.

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GROUP PROCESSES IN EDUCATIONAL DRAMA: REPORT OF A PILOT STUDY

by S. GILMORE

Hamilton College of Education and University of Stirling

ABSTRACT

Fifteen seven-year old pupils from a mixed primary class were divided into three groups of five pupils. Two of the groups were selected on the basis of sociometric measurement and one group selected at random from the remainder of the class. Each group participated in an improvised drama situation lasting 10 minutes and the nature and frequency of verbal communicatory acts of each pupil recorded on schedules based on the Bales system of categories for the analysis of small group interaction. From the results obtained it is tentatively suggested that the criteria employed in the grouping of pupils for drama activity may affect the cohesion existing within the group with resultant variation in task achievement.

I. INTRODUCTION

THERE are two separate and distinct levels of educational research. At one level the classroom teacher, (in the present study a team comprising of students, one teacher, and a college lecturer), tries out a new idea or technique, evaluates the results, and keeps a record of the experiment. At the other level, a research specialist or team conducts a full-scale investigation over a large sample of pupils or students, notes the findings, forms a hypothesis and proceeds to test that hypothesis as rigorously as possible.

One advantage which may accrue to classroom-centred research is that it partially avoids the danger indicated by Argyle (1969) that: " . . . any experimental situation is likely to be simplified or stripped down which may lack essential features of the original situation, and which may produce types of behaviour that would not normally occur." Bearing in mind that every experimental situation within the context of the classroom will contain 'simplified' and 'stripped down' features and that the results apply to that particular class, there still

remains the possibility that other teachers may obtain the same results with their own pupils engaged in similar improvised drama activities.

There is, however, a more compelling reason for research in improvised drama to be undertaken by students and teachers engaged in Educational Drama. Although student teachers are given guidance and instruction in the uses of drama as an art-form or as a teaching technique to facilitate learning in many curricular areas, it may well be the case that the special province of Educational Drama is in the field of social learning. If this is so, it follows that the student or teacher working in Drama should according to Mangham (1967) ". . . be fully aware of the socio-psychological forces which influence the individual development within the group."

The aim of the pilot study was to observe the dynamics of one such socio-psychological process, namely, cohesiveness, occurring among seven-year old pupils organised in groups of five engaged in an improvised drama activity.

Seven-year old pupils were chosen on the grounds that a crucial transitional change can be observed in the social development of pupils in this age group. Pupils are beginning to be more willing to interact than at the infant level. Miller (1968) has noted that, ". . . the playgroups of six-to-seven year olds still shift about a good deal, and are organised rather loosely. This has often been described as a 'transitional' age, leading to the 'gang-age' between the ages of eight to twelve." A similar general conclusion was drawn earlier by Gessell and Ilg (1965) when they stated that, "Group play is attempted but is not fully developed." In a more recent study, Simms and Simms (1969) confirm the susceptibility of the seven-year old to social interaction in play.

It was also decided that the improvised drama activity should maximise the possibilities for co-operation among the pupils comprising the groups. A 'survival'-type situation was, therefore devised as one more likely to fulfil this requirement.

It is difficult to state precisely and unequivocally what the optimal size of a group engaged in improvised drama should be. However, the experience of many drama teachers suggests that five is, generally, thought to be a sensible one. The view stated by Payne (1968) that, "If there are many more in a group, there will be an inner core working hard and an outer fringe discussing . . . as they lean against the radiators", could be regarded as representative.

2. PROCEDURE

A sociometric test was administered to twenty nine seven-year old pupils in a mixed primary class and sociometric rating of each pupil and the interpersonal structure of the whole class obtained. As the pupils did not choose or were chosen on a rigid sex differential it was decided to use mixed groups in the ratio of 2 girls/3 boys which reflected the sex ratio of the whole class. Three groups of five pupils were chosen from the class. The first group (E_1) was selected on sociometric grounds as the most cohesive; the second group (E_2) was also selected sociometrically as the least cohesive. The third group (C) was selected at random from the class register after the names of the pupils comprising groups E_1 and E_2 had been deleted. The arithmetical mean social ratings for the class as a whole and that of the random group were similar.

Each group, in turn, and in isolation was given an identical task by one and the same member of the study team who assumed the role of the class teacher in a typical drama lesson. The groups were asked to imagine that the plane in which they were travelling as passengers has been forced to crash land on a deserted tropical island set in a vast ocean. The pilot of the plane, the only adult in the party, has been killed. The damage to the plane was irreparable. The group were asked how they would react to and cope with the situation.

Each pupil was observed by a single investigator who recorded the verbal communicatory acts for that pupil on schedules based on a modification of the system of categories related to the major frames of references proposed by R. F. Bales shown below:

A Socio-Emotional Area (positive reactions)	This includes giving of help, praise, joking, showing agreement, and solidarity.
B Task Area (attempted answers)	This includes giving opinion, explanations as well as answering questions.
C Task Area (attempted questions)	This includes requests for advice as well as direct questions.
D Socio-Emotional Area (negative reactions)	This includes statements of disagreement, antagonism, withdrawal.

3. RESULTS

TABLE I

FREQUENCY OF COMMUNICATORY ACTS

	Group E_1	Group E_2	Group C
A	28	23	15
B	43	22	20
C	4	2	6
D	0	27	3
	75	74	44

TABLE II

% FREQUENCY OF VERBAL COMMUNICATORY ACTS

	Group E	Group E_2	Group C
A	37	31	34
B	58	29	45
C	5	3	14
D	0	37	7
	100	100	100

4. DISCUSSION

(a) Communication

The highly cohesive and the least-cohesive groups produced roughly the same number of verbal communicatory acts. The assumption that pupils will communicate more with liked than with disliked pupils is not fully supported by research findings reviewed by Lott & Lott (1965) who state that it is probable that: ". . . the relationship between interpersonal liking and communication will vary with the conditions under which the interaction takes place." The random group produced far fewer verbal acts than either of the two selected groups. This could be accountable to the fact that in the socio-emotional area there was less tension compared with the least-cohesive group, and in the task area there was less solidarity and, therefore, less free flow of discussion, compared with the highly-cohesive group.

(b) *Task Area*

The highly-cohesive groups confirmed research findings among adults, Goodacre (1951, 1953), Bjerdst (1961), for example, that the more cohesive the group, the more effective will be the task achievement. Although it is difficult to quantify achievement in improvised drama, all the members of the study team rated, independently, on impressionistic grounds the achievement of the groups on a three-point scale. The qualitative differences among the groups in task performance were so marked that the team recorded unanimous agreement on rating the highly-cohesive group (E_1) as HIGHLY SATISFACTORY, the random group (C) as SATISFACTORY, and the least-cohesive group (E_2) as UNSATISFACTORY.

The lower scores and rating recorded for both the random group and the least-cohesive group in the task area confirmed Schnachter's (1951) findings that the less cohesive the group the less effective will be the task achievement.

(c) *Socio-Emotional Area*

All three groups reacted positively to the drama activity. The differences between the low-cohesive group and the other two groups was most marked in the area of negative reactions. Almost two-fifths of the verbal communicatory acts of the low-cohesive group were recorded in this category which reflected the degree of disagreement, tension, and antagonism existing among the pupils in this group.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The relation between drama activity and group processes is by its nature a complex one. The type of drama activity undertaken is a determinant of the group process; the achievement of the activity, its consequence. Group processes are the intervening variables between the activity and its achievement. Drama activities vary widely in nature and in scope but one would expect that for each drama activity there will be some group processes which are optimal for its achievement.

From the results obtained in this pilot study it is tentatively suggested that the random grouping of pupils for drama activity does not reduce or increase harmony within the groups but the resultant achievement of the activity is enhanced when pupils are grouped as cohesively as possible on the basis of sociometry.

Further research is required to validate these findings with larger samples of pupils in order to provide a basis for the investigation of

the interplay of the personality of the pupil within the group which is of urgent importance to the teacher of drama in his quest for verifiable findings upon which to base his work.

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THE ASSESSMENT OF A GROUP OF TEACHERS IN RELATION TO EARLIER CAREER EXPERIENCE

by GERALD A. CORTIS
School of Education, University of Birmingham

ABSTRACT

*This study is a follow-up of a sample of 222 teachers with two yea[r]
experience. They supplied self-ratings of satisfaction and dissatisfact[ion]
with teaching and were rated by their head teachers on a scale based [on]
the 'critical incident technique'. These ratings were evaluated in terms o[f]
their earlier career data. Correlational techniques revealed significan[t]
relationships between field performance and college assessments, an[d]
discriminated significantly between 'successful' and 'less successfu[l]
teachers. Analyses of variance techniques revealed significant differenc[es]
between various groupings of the teachers in respect of school typ[e]
(primary or secondary), sex and degrees of satisfaction with teaching.*

I. INTRODUCTION

THOUGH many investigators have noted the inconclusiveness of
correlational studies in the prediction of teaching success other
researchers have not been dissuaded from pursuing similar
studies. A probable reason for such persistence is that the variables
used (no matter how crude or gross) have been relatively accessible
and readily computable. In this experimental field, as in others, the
advent of the electronic computer has increased the sheer number of
variables available for manipulation, sometimes dramatically, but
whether this technical sophistication has led to a parallel conceptual
advance is of course arguable.

In the general research area of teacher competence the 'basic
effectiveness model' (Morrison and McIntyre, 1969) where personal
characteristics are correlated with a criterion of effectiveness has not
basically altered during this century. Meriam (1906) for exampl[e]
obtained correlations by hand computation ranging from $+0.16$ [to]
$+0.44$ in respect of practice-teaching marks and later teacher 'succes[s]

These correlations are as high as many obtained in current studies sixty years or more later involving advanced computer techniques. This is not to imply overall criticism of them, for as Vernon (1960, p.47) says, 'Often . . . the correlation between a test and its criterion is less important than the fact that the test adds something to already available data' but it illustrates how limited the correlational approach alone can be.

Mitzel (1957) proposed a useful extension of the basic effectiveness model which interposed other types of variable, such as school size and pupil behaviour, between initial predictors and final criteria, as well as changing the conventional nature of the latter. However, the initial promise of this pattern has not really been fulfilled. It is very significant that the Teacher Characteristics Study of Ryans (1960) with vast resources, even by American standards, could not complete portion of its study concerned with the relation of observed teacher behaviour to pupil change. In fact to implement a research design on the Mitzel pattern with a small sample of thirty teachers for example would need sixty separate visits to classrooms in a pre-test/post-test experimental design. Ryans' difficulties are indicative of why future broad investigations using this model are likely to be few.

Hence the difficulty in abstracting relevant pupil variables on any wide scale makes it likely that the basic effectiveness model, incomplete as it is, will not be discarded, for sophisticated computer programmes have now made possible a much wider range of analyses than the correlational one. Wiseman (1952, p.31) writing before the general advent of the computer in British educational research said, perhaps prophetically, 'multiple correlation technique is commonly used for dealing with selection and follow-up problems, although it should be noted that analysis of variance may frequently be more appropriate'. The present study is therefore in essence an attempt to extend the correlational model.

2. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE

The subjects of this study were given extensive test batteries of intelligence, attitudes and personality in the final year of their college course. Together with biographical details and college grades, the variables obtained were subjected to a factor analysis (Cortis, 1968).

At the end of their second year of teaching information on the teachers was obtained by self-report questionnaires and head teacher ratings. The ratings were made on the basis of the 'critical incident technique' described by Stewart (1956) and the resultant categories

obtained were treated as both continuous and dichotomous variables.

Significance tests between 'respondents' and 'non-respondents' on both this analysis and the earlier one revealed no differences in examination grades in educational theory and practical teaching. Thus from the data available the group was not unrepresentative of the whole population concerned, in terms of examination performance whilst at the student age. The final 'effective' response rate (a teacher and his head teacher both replying) was 79 per cent. The number of teachers on whom data was available totalled 222, 127 primary teachers and 95 secondary teachers.

Predictor variables totalled thirty eight and included the following: a multiple-choice vocabulary test adapted from Thurstone's Primary Mental Abilities battery; Heim's AH5 Test of high-grade intelligence; Oliver and Butcher's Survey of Opinions about Education; Cattell's 16 Personality Factor Questionnaire; two objective personality tests (Backward Writing and Addition); four biographical variables (Number of GCE 'O' and 'A' level subjects passed respectively, social class of father's occupation and family size); four final examination variables and five demographic variables relating to population and school factors in the teacher's home area at certain points in his pre-college career, which were calculated from National Census returns and from Education Authorities' Year Books.

The teachers' four self-ratings of degrees of satisfaction with teaching functioned as both criterion and predictor variables. That is, the thirty eight purely predictive variables bore predictive relationships to the degrees of satisfaction expressed. In turn, the four 'satisfaction' variables became predictor variables when correlated with the eight 'pure' criterion variables. The criterion variables consisted of eight head teachers' ratings of the teachers on various aspects of teaching technique, (e.g. planning and organisation, class management and control). The total number of experimental variables was 50.

Basically the investigation was concerned in assessing how far test, biographical and demographic data both predicted later field performance and discriminated between groups of the teachers, (e.g. between men and women). The experimental methodology is of the longitudinal survey type, and of the kind which Campbell and Stanley (1963) have designated 'quasi-experimental'. They use this term to describe work in 'natural social settings' outside of the laboratory where, for example, design could be introduced into the scheduling

of data collection procedures but not into the randomisation of experimental variables.

The principal statistical methods employed were: (i) Factor analyses of the total sample and of sub-samples together with an examination of individual correlation matrices (ii) Multiple regression analyses of the total sample and of sub-samples (iii) Split plot analyses of variance of groupings of the data followed by computation of t tests between selected pairs of variables. For reasons of space only the major findings in regard to the *total sample* will be reported here. Fuller details are available in the original report (Cortis, 1970).

3. RESULTS

(a) *Factor analysis* The data was subject to a series of principal components analyses which were further rotated to the varimax criterion to attain effective 'simple structure' of the Thurstone model (Harman, 1965). The interpretation of the factors is, by the nature of factor analytic technique, somewhat subjective. It is believed that they are psychologically meaningful and in accordance with the direction of the highest loadings on each factor. Table 1 gives details of the varimax rotation for the whole sample of teachers (N = 222).

(b) *Analysis of variance* This was carried out by a Split Plot Analysis of Variance programme designed at the University of London Institute of Computer Science by Clarke and Maxwell (1966). The programme enables comparisons to be made not only between any number of means of groups on the same variable, as in simple analysis of variance, but between any number of means of groups on any number of variables. The number of subjects within each group need not be constant.

The whole sample of 222 was split into various groups (and in certain cases further divided into sub-samples of primary and secondary teachers before the groupings were made) and twenty four split plot analyses of variance in all were obtained. Only those in which F reached at least the 5 per cent level are reported here.

To see where the significant differences between variables might lie, t tests were calculated between the means of the groups. Though the practice has been queried by Guilford (1965), for example, it was felt appropriate to make exploratory analyses on the widest scale bearing relevant cautionary notes in mind. Guilford (1965, p.276) notes that if F is significant 'the chief logical objection to making t tests after an F test is that if there is significance anywhere among the

TABLE I

VARIMAX ROTATION—FACTOR DESIGNATION AND MAIN LOADINGS

Designation of Factor	*Main Loadings on the Following Variables*
1. Teaching ability	(a) Higher rating on head teacher's rating scale (b) More favourable teacher's estimate of satisfaction with his teaching post (c) Higher College grades in practical teaching
2. Anxiety	'Higher' personality factors on Anxiety dimension
3. College Success	(a) Higher grades on college examinations (b) Larger family size of respondent (c) Higher number of GCE 'A' levels
4. Extraversion	'Higher' personality factors on Extraversion dimension
5. Intensity of dissatis-faction with teaching	(a) Higher Teacher's estimate of dissatisfaction with his teaching post (b) 'Higher' insensitive and unconventional personality factors
6. Residence in 'growth' area	(a) Demographic variables (b) Tender-minded educational attitudes (c) Poorer performance on 'stress' tests
7. Pupil membership of larger-sized schools	(a) Demographic variables (b) Tough-minded educational attitudes (c) 'Higher' conventional and suspicious personality factors
8. Sociability	(a) 'Higher' friendliness, shrewdness and sensitive personality factors (b) Higher teacher's estimate of satisfaction with teaching post (c) Lower intelligence test scores
9. Cultural/verbal ability	(a) Higher scores on verbal tests (b) Higher number of GCE 'A' levels (c) Lower grade on college practical teaching
10. Educational attitudes	Higher scores on naturalistic, radical and tender-minded educational attitudes scale
11. Radicalism	(a) 'Higher' radical personality factor (b) Higher number of GCE 'O' levels
12. Self-Sufficiency	(a) 'Higher' self-sufficient and dominant personality factors (b) Better performance on 'stress' tests (c) Higher number of GCE 'A' levels

interset differences in means, as the F test has indicated, it is most likely to be found by making a t test among the largest differences.

But the largest differences are known and are not obtained by random sampling from a population of differences. In a sense, we are "betting on a sure thing".' To meet this objection it was decided to make an adaptation of the solution Guilford himself notes—namely that of Tukey (1949). In this present case all means in each group (50 variables x n, where n is number of comparisons) were subjected to t tests unless, (in a 3 group case for example), differences between the first and second group and the second and third group were so negligible as to make the first and third group 'differences' virtually certain to yield similar levels of significance for t.

(i) *Secondary men teachers v Primary men teachers v Secondary women teachers v Primary women teachers*. The obtained F ratio is 3.65 (P <.01). In the t test comparisons it was decided to compare Primary men teachers v Secondary men teachers and Primary women teachers v Secondary women teachers. In fact six sets of comparisons are possible between four groups. It was felt that any 'between sex' comparisons would be covered when women teachers v men teachers were compared.

TABLE 2

MEN PRIMARY TEACHERS V MEN SECONDARY TEACHERS:
SIGNIFICANT t TEST COMPARISONS

Variables	Men Primary Teachers N = 39	v	Men Secondary Teachers N = 56
			Higher
Conscientiousness (Cattell 16 PF)			Secondary
Sensitivity (Cattell 16 PF)			Primary*
Self-Sufficiency (Cattell 16 PF)			Secondary*
Backward Writing (higher score—higher flexibility)			Primary
Intercensal population increase (excess of births over deaths)			Primary
Intercensal population increase (balance—i.e. population movement)			Secondary
Grade in main subject examination			Secondary*
Overall average in college examinations			Secondary*
Planning and organisation rating of head teacher			Secondary
Suitability of material and method rating of head teacher			Secondary*

(Asterisked at 1 per cent level: others 5 per cent level)

TABLE 3

WOMEN PRIMARY TEACHERS v WOMEN SECONDARY TEACHERS
SIGNIFICANT t TEST COMPARISONS

Variables	*Women Secondary Teachers* N = 39	v	*Women Primary Teachers* N = 88
			Higher
Intelligence test—AH5			Secondary*
Stability (Cattell 16 PF)			Primary
Number of GCE 'A' level passes			Secondary
Grade in academic main subject examination			Secondary*
Overall average in college examinations			Secondary*

(Asterisked at 1 per cent level: others 5 per cent level)

TABLE 4

VERY SATISFIED TEACHERS (N = 89) v MODERATELY SATISFIED TEACHERS (N = 111) v LEAST SATISFIED TEACHERS (N = 22)
SIGNIFICANT t TEST COMPARISONS

Variables	Highest Score	Middle Score	Lowest Score
Naturalistic attitudes to education (Oliver and Butcher)	LS ——	MS ——	VS
Radical attitudes to education (Oliver and Butcher)	LS —— x ——	VS	
	LS x — MS ——	VS	
Tender-minded attitudes to education (Oliver and Butcher)	LS –xx–MS–xx–VS		
Friendliness (Cattell 16 PF)	LS —— xx ——	VS	
Dominance (Cattell 16 PF)	VS – x – MS ——	VS	
	LS —— MS ——	VS	
Conscientiousness (Cattell 16 PF)	LS —— x ——	VS	
Sensitivity (Cattell 16 PF)	VS – x – MS ——	LS	
	VS —— MS – x –	LS	
Self-Discipline (Cattell 16 PF)	VS —— x ——	LS	
	LS – xx –MS——	VS	
Anxiety (Cattell 16 PF)	LS —— xx ——	VS	
Teacher's number of reasons for satisfaction	LS – x – MS – x –	VS	
	VS – xx –MS——	LS	
Teacher's number of reasons for dissatisfaction	VS —— xx ——	LS	
	LS – xx – MS –x–VS		
Intensity of dissatisfaction	LS —— xx ——	VS	
	LS – xx –MS–xx–VS		
Head teacher's ratings of teaching ability (8 in all)	LS —— xx ——	VS	
	VS – xx – MS – x –	LS	
	VS —— xx ——	LS	

KEY: A. LS-Least Satisfied: MS–Moderately Satisfied: VS–Very Satisfied
B. ——Not significant: ——x— Significant at 5% —xx— Significant at 1%

(ii) *Very satisfied teachers v Moderately satisfied teachers v Least satisfied teachers* The obtained F ratio is 3.28 (P <.05).

(iii) *Women teachers v Men teachers.* The obtained F ratio is 9.04 (P <.05). Men scored significantly higher than women on the intelligence test (at the 1% level), on the personality factors of Dominance, Surgency, Unreservedness, Suspiciousness and Extraversion (all at the 1% level except Surgency at 5%) and on two dissatisfaction variables—Teacher's number of reasons for dissatisfaction and Teacher's intensity of dissatisfaction (at the 5% and 1% levels respectively).

Women scored significantly higher than men on tender-minded attitudes to education (at the 1% level), on the personality factors of Sensitivity, Unconventionality, Insecurity Tenseness and Anxiety (all at the 1% level except Tenseness at 5%), on Number of GCE 'O' level passes obtained, on Grade in educational theory examination (both at the 1% level) and on the following at the 5% level: Grade in practical teaching examination, Teacher's number of reasons for satisfaction and Head teacher's rating of overall teaching ability.

4. DISCUSSION

Firstly, there are statistically significant relationships between college teaching assessments and later field performance over the two year period involved. In fact teachers rated higher by their heads were superior on *all* college examinations, and not only on practical teaching, than those rated lower. This is the general trend of the majority of the researches in the literature where the interval between assessments of college and field performance is not too long. Though as the interval increases the correlation coefficients tend to fall, and hence to induce pessimism amongst investigators, even in other occupational fields, and often with greater refinements of measurement, 'the validity coefficients . . . rarely get higher than ·60' (Thompson, 1965, p.83).

Secondly, in terms of the variables used, groups of teachers were clearly differentiated at a significant level. For example, lower rated teachers were pupils of larger schools while higher rated teachers attended smaller schools. Sensitivity personality factors were associated with higher ratings of overall teaching ability, suspiciousness and insecurity factors with lower ratings. This is not surprising, for sensitivity 'springs in part from an intense emotional awareness of the situation (although not necessarily an intellectual under-

standing)' (Warburton, 1969, p. 119) and it might well be argued that teaching (particularly outside of the sixth form with which the investigation is chiefly concerned) is primarily a matter of the emotions, and secondarily an intellectual matter. The suspicious and insecure teacher too is, by definition, unlikely to create the conditions for effective learning or be able to implement them if they are created by someone else.

In comparing men primary teachers and men secondary teachers the primary males are more sensitive, do better on a flexibility test (Backward Writing) and come from areas of denser population. Secondary males are more self-sufficient and conscientious and come from 'growth' areas. When primary and secondary women teachers are compared, the primary women appear more stable in test terms but secondary women have more GCE 'A' levels, and do better both in written examinations and on an intelligence test.

The satisfaction area would appear a crucial one for teacher competence. It is associated both with higher-rated teaching performance, and the factor of friendliness. Cattell and Eber (1964) note that the friendliness factor is characteristic of the teaching role—'Teachers have to adapt cheerfully to a lot of compromises with human failings and to take a ceaseless impact of emotional problems' (p. 11). The least satisfied overall have more 'progressive' educational attitudes (naturalism, radicalism and tender-mindedness), and are more dominant and self-disciplined.

It was noted by Oliver (1953) that elementary school teachers' responses to a check list of educational beliefs were consistent with modern educational philosophy (i.e. were in the 'progressive' direction) but classroom observations of the same teachers indicated that these beliefs were not implemented in the classroom. This may explain why here the least satisfied teachers (who are also in general lower-rated) have more 'progressive' educational attitudes—especially as they completed the scale two years before being rated by their head teachers, in fact two years before most of them had actual classroom experience as a qualified teacher. The dominant and self-disciplined (as these least satisfied teachers tended to be) probably feel frustration with much of modern educational practice in its emphasis on co-operative action and decision.

The differences found between men and women are well in accord with those that Gabriel (1957) noted when analysing the emotional problems of the teacher in the classroom. He reported that women teachers experienced greater worry and strain than did men teachers

and suggests that this comes about through women's greater identification with the teaching situation. The emotional responses of the men teachers in his study were less severe and indicated a more detached and impersonal attitude to the job.

In summary then the 'successful' teacher, in terms of the variables used in this study, tends to be 'easy going' in personality terms, and at once sensitive, friendly and conventional. He is satisfied with his job and has done well at college. His educational attitudes are not very 'progressive' and he tends to enjoy smaller group membership—family and primary school, for example. He appears to be a 'consensus man' evolving his behaviour to suit the attitudes of others. As Lane, Corwin and Monahan (1967) remark, 'the success of these people is as much a function of other people's evaluation of them as it is of their own performance' (p. 347).

The 'unsuccessful' teacher in personality terms tends to be more aggressive and dominant, but simultaneously suspicious and insecure. He is dissatisfied with his job and has done less well at college. His educational attitudes are 'progressive' and he tends to be a member of larger social groups. He is an individualist who appears to be unable or unwilling 'to subordinate his personal interests to those of the organisation' (ibid. p. 357).

It would therefore be of great value if future investigators could repeat the experimental design with other samples and in other geographical areas to ascertain whether the 'response style' of this sample is a national one. If it is, it raises interesting issues for both teacher educators and the schools, which have been adumbrated lucidly elsewhere (University of London Institute of Education 1971, pp. 64–65). In any case the literature *in this country* is not replete with reports of the assessment of practising teachers in terms of their earlier career experience and it is not difficult to see why. Samples of such teachers are very difficult to contact and assess and this inaccessibility is likely to impose limitations on the research design that can be used. Purely random sampling, for example, is likely to be practically impossible, since the whole area of teacher assessment/investigation is a very sensitive one, demanding the experimenter's reassurance to subjects at the personal level. A sample which will satisfy the statistical 'purists' is unlikely to yield such personal variables: conversely, a sample which yields personal variables will most likely be 'impure' statistically in some degree. Perhaps the answer to this problem 'lies in the determination and estimation of sources of error, in the careful discussion of results and not in the

avoidance of the possibility of error at the expense of reality' (Wall, 1968, p. 10). Despite the inherent difficulties, such research should yield useful returns, since the field in the United Kingdom is still largely an uncharted one.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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SOME EFFECTS OF PRE-SCHOOL EDUCATION

by PAUL WIDLAKE

School of Education, University of Birmingham

ABSTRACT

A small-scale ex post facto investigation of the effects of British pre-school education established that there were still significant differences on a test of social competence ($p < .01$) between children who had attended (N) and those who had not (NN). No significant differences were found on tests that measured aspects of language.

I. INTRODUCTION

NURSERY education in Britain, though far from amounting to a system, has a proud history and has attracted the attention of some of our ablest and most dynamic educators—Robert Owen, the MacMillan sisters, Susan Isaacs, Dorothy Gardner. It would be anticipated that most research findings would support those who have believed so passionately in the efficacy of early education; but this is not so. Even the most conscientious workers have been unable to establish conclusively that nursery education has measurable, statistically significant, long-term beneficial effects. Indeed O'Sullivan (1958) was forced to the conclusion that 'the results of this study and of the many others on this topic lead one to believe that there is little difference between children who have been in a nursery and those who have not. Yet the very fact that so many people have tried to find out if there is an advantage for the nursery children shows how strong is the feeling that there must be an advantage. To anyone who has worked in a nursery it seems obvious that this is so. But all those who have tried to prove it, have found very nearly the same results'.

Following this discouraging conclusion, Harrold and Temple considered 42 children from four different infants' schools in an attempt, through observation, questionnaires and specific tests, to assess the development of adjustment in those five-year-olds who

had been to a nursery school and those who had been admitted to reception classes straight from home. They decided that the children who had attended nursery schools were better in every respect except painting and manipulative control. The differences were very small and the tests and questionnaires, of necessity, unstandardised. The study did, however, provide a welcome positive finding; and this was confirmed by Douglas and Ross (1964) who showed that even at the age of eight nursery school children perform more satisfactorily at school than controls who had not attended nurseries.

This work was more encouraging but still left much unexplained. The lack of standardised instruments was particularly noticeable. Accordingly, when Kellmer Pringle (1966) published a favourable British account of Doll's Vineland Social Maturity Scale, it was worth following-up; one of her studies was concerned with 6–7 and 7–8 year-old children and among the problems about which further research was felt to be desirable was: whether the level of social competence can be raised for some or all children by deliberate training.

2 METHOD

The present study*, was intended primarily to investigate the effects of early education on social competence, as measured by the Vineland Social Maturity Scale. It was a small-scale study (N = 22), in which a group of 6–7 year-old children from a British infants' school in a deprived area (N), all of whom had attended a high-quality, local education authority nursery school for at least a year, were carefully matched with a control group (NN) who had not attended nursery, on ethnic group, intellectual capacity, level of ability in reading and time spent in the infants' school.

On the first visit to the infants' school it was found that the eleven nursery children were in four different classes. As well as meeting the children and their teachers, the names and ages of the other children in their classes who were born between September 1st, 1962, and August 31st, 1963, was obtained. Two of them had their own children at nursery school and they thought it had made them 'cheeky': they agreed that the majority of the children from the nursery were self-confident and produced good work. Criticisms at the reception

* Undertaken by Margaret Phitts, under the direction of P. Widlake (a dissertation presented as part-fulfilment of her diploma course at the City of Birmingham College of Education).

class level were that the nursery children did not listen and that their parents tended to invade the classrooms and cloakrooms.

The groups were matched by using:

Southgate Group Reading Tests—Forms A, B, C. (A word selection test.) This group test was used rather than an individual test because there were eighty-nine children to be tested and the results were needed for an objective assessment of reading ability of the group, not for diagnostic purposes. Twelve to fifteen children were tested at a time, care being taken to ensure that each child could only see his own paper.

24 children of a similar chronological age, ethnic group and reading age to the experimental group were then tested for intellectual capacity using:

Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (book form). The first intention was to use the Goodenough Draw-a-Person Test but it was decided that this was too coarse a measure and could be affected by socio-economic background. Raven's claims to be a culture-free test of non-verbal intelligence. It is suitable for children aged from $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 11 years; and it is not dependent on the use of language. The test was administered to the children individually. Eleven children with similar standardised scores to the experimental group were then selected for the control group.

In the case of N.5, 6 and 7 they were matched with British children as their fathers had left home and they had been brought up by their British mothers. N.8 and N.N.8 had nine months discrepancy in reading age but the choice of West Indian girls of the same age, and in the same class, was limited and it was felt that it was more important to match on intelligence and ethnic group.

The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test was used to check the matching and there was no significant difference between the groups in chronological age, reading age and intellectual capacity as measured by Raven's.

The groups were compared by using:

1. *A Test for Social Competence.*

The Vineland Social Maturity Scale

This well-known scale designed by Edgar A. Doll claims to provide a means for measuring individual differences in levels and rates of social maturation. This is done by seeking information regarding the habitual performance of the subject in a variety of everyday social situations.

TABLE 1 MATCHED GROUPS

Code No.	Ethnic group	Chronological age on 1.3.70	Standard Score Raven's	Reading age Southgate	Position in family*	Time spent in Infants' School
N.1	West Indian	7 y.	112	7 y.	2/4	5 terms
N.N.1			107	7 y. 6 m.	2/2	
N.2	Asian	7 y.	107	7 y. 9 m.	2/2	6 terms
N.N.2		7 y. 2 m.	103		5/6	7 terms
N.3	West Indian	7 y. 5 m.	103	7 y. 3 m.	6/9	8 terms
N.N.3			96	6 y. 10 m.	4/6	8 terms
N.4	British	7 y. 4 m.	110	7 y. 9 m.	6/6	8 terms
N.N.4			115		2/4	5 terms
N.5	British mother	6 y. 10 m.	119	7 y. 1 m.	5/8	6 terms
N.N.5	British	7 y. 1 m.	112		1/3	8 terms
N.6	British mother	7 y. 2 m.	110	7 y. 9 m.	1/2	
N.N.6	British		100		1/2	5 terms
N.7	British mother	6 y. 7 m.	106	7 y. 3 m.	Only Child	
N.N.7	British		100	7 y. 5 m.		
N.8	West Indian	6 y. 7 m.	100	6 y. 6 m.	2/6	5 terms
N.N.8			110	7 y. 3 m.	4/4	
N.9	British	6 y. 11 m.	96	6 y. 3 m.	2/5	5 terms
N.N.9			100	6 y. 6 m.	1/2	
N.10	British	7 y. 1 m.	119	6 y. 2 m.	2/5	7 terms
N.N.10				6 y. 3 m.	1/2	
N.11	Asian	6 y. 7 m.	119	5 y. 9 m.	3/4	5 terms
N.N.11				6 y. 3 m.	5/6	

* 2/4 refers to second child in a family of four

N. = Nursery   N.N. = non-nursery

'Each item is presumed to reflect some relatively universal performance which characterises a definite stage of social maturation' (Doll, 1953). The items are stated to be independent of sex, personality, social status or special opportunities.

It was felt that the Vineland dealt adequately with the kinds of social opportunities experienced by children of the age group 6–7 years in England. The subject was used as his own informant because home visits were not possible. Doll (1953) says, 'logically this should be the standard type of examination since presumably the subject is better informed about himself than are his acquaintances or relatives'.

2. *A test of verbal ability.*

The English Picture Vocabulary Test—Test 1
Age Range 5.0–8.11

This test (an English standardisation of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test) is independent of reading ability and was designed to assess 'listening vocabulary'. It is quick and simple to administer as an individual test and was felt to give a valid measure of verbal comprehension. It does not, however, test the child's ability to express his ideas in words and if time had permitted it would have been desirable to examine their oral command of language and the way they expressed their ideas in words.

3. *Goodenough's Draw-a-Person Test.*

As explained earlier this test was originally intended to be used for matching. Having collected the drawings it was thought it might be of interest to examine and compare them.

4. *A listening and Remembering Test.*

This was based on a test described by D.E.M. Gardner in her book *Experiment and Tradition in Primary Schools.*

The test was intended to compare the ability of the groups to listen carefully and to remember what they were told for a short time. A story was compiled and read to the children, who were then asked to draw a picture about the story putting in as many things as they could remember. The story was as follows:

"There was once an old man who lived in a little cottage. It had a green door and two small windows and the roof was full of holes. The garden was very untidy and all that grew in it was an apple tree by the gate and some red poppies. He was very poor but one fine day when the sun was shining and the sky was blue, he found a curious stone under the apple tree. It was bright blue with a yellow spot at each end. No-one saw him pick it up except a blackbird perched on the gate and a brown rabbit that was hopping around the garden.'

As the object of the test was to find how much the children remembered from the story, the actual quality of the drawing was not taken into account but points were awarded for including anything mentioned in the story.

3 RESULTS

The nursery children's mean social quotient was significantly better than that of the non-nursery children ($p < .01$: Mann-Whitney U-test).

This investigation, using the *Vineland Social Maturity Scale* as a criterion measure, indicated that the nursery children still retained a significant advantage in social competence over a peer group which had not had any organised pre-school education.

There were no significant differences between the experimental and control groups on *The English Picture Vocabulary Test* and a *Listening and Remembering Test*.

4 DISCUSSION

This paper describes an experiment carried out primarily to investigate the effects of early education on social competence; the conclusion reached was that children who had attended a well-organised, 'traditional' British nursery school still manifested significant *social* differences over a non-nursery group after several years in an infants' school, but there were no significant differences on two tests of linguistic achievement.

Language development and social development are closely related but they are clearly not identical: yet most nursery schools appear to be organised on the assumption that language development will follow as the social competence of the children increases. There is obviously a case for re-examining the programmes of pre-schools, expecially those with a high proportion of deprived children, because of the well-established link between linguistic competence and academic success. It does not follow, however, that the nursery requires 'brutalising' after the fashion of Bereiter and Englemann. It certainly does not follow that a programme involving drills in 'syntactical structures' is required (Widlake, 1971). The scrutiny of pre-school procedures ought to be undertaken in a positive spirit. A more systematic approach to language work should not exclude a recognition of the importance of a well-organised pre-school's role as a socialising agency.

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MICROTEACHING: A NEW TOOL IN THE TRAINING OF TEACHERS

by W. RAYMOND MCALEESE

*Research Fellow in Education, Department of Education,
King's College, University of Aberdeen*

1. INTRODUCTION

CONVENTIONAL block teaching practice has in recent years come in for appreciable criticism (Stones and Morris, (1972). However, there has been little progress in achieving improvement; in part, no doubt, beaause of the very practical and personal nature of the activity. Over the last decade or so some attempt has been made at 'constructing' school classrooms in the University or College, and using this more controlled enviroment for teaching practice (Vlcek, (1966)). This *simulation* of the real teaching encounter has been more experimental than practical; as it did not initially solve one problem which has been a thorn in the flesh to countless thousands of prospective teachers—the presence of a supervisor at the back of the classroom.

Research into this and allied problems has been conducted at Stanford University, California, and it is from there that one major development has come—*microteaching*. A purely descriptive definition of microteaching is given by Allen and Eve (1968) as '. . . a system of controlled practice that makes it possible to concentrate on specific teaching behaviours and to practice teaching under controlled conditions'. That is, microteaching is a scaled down teachng encounter; scaled down in terms of class size, lesson length and teaching complexity. In other words, this controlled practice is a simulation of 'real teaching'; the school classroom is brought into the experimental conditions of the university or college where various environmental parameters can be controlled.

2. HISTORY OF MICROTEACHING

At Stanford, during 1961, a doctoral candidate in the Education Department, Keith Acheson, noticed in a newspaper that a portable video tape-recorder (VTR) had been marketed in Germany. This

VTR, Acheson and his colleagues foresaw, would allow *both vision and sound* recording of role playing sessions and thus provide a means of objective reference for subsequent supervisory conferences. Following this, 'take-off', workers at Stanford embarked on a research programme to test the validity of the suggestion; help from the Ford Foundation specifically to encourage the study of applications of the portable VTR to small classes proved to be the spark which generated so much further research into the potentialities of micro-teaching.

The construction of evaluation instruments to be used in analysing tapes made in the small classes and the design of demonstration teaching lessons were the next two steps. Progress was assisted by a grant from the US Office of Education commissioning research—again at Stanford—into the application of portable VTRs to a technical skills approach to teaching. Additional money came from the Kettering Foundation allowing various other aspects of the microteaching process to be investigated, including an overall rationale of the concept. It is difficult to say where the actual term microteaching originated, as the prefix *micro* is in common use to describe processes which are reduced in size or complexity. However, the term is normally attributed to Dwight Allen, now at the University of Massachusetts, but formerly at Stanford.

Investigations into the application of VTRs to microclasses is the basis of much research work, but it is important to note that while the application of television recording techniques to microteaching may in itself be an important innovation, it is *not* the presence of television which characterises microteaching. Microteaching as defined above is a matter of reduced complexity, controlled condition and the use of a theoretical model—the addition of television can be regarded in several ways, three of which will be noted at this point Firstly, to provide a common frame of reference for analysis. Secondly, to provide a permanent or semi-permanent record of a teaching encounter. Thirdly, to provide a continuous audio-video feedback channel for the student teacher, who uses this feedback to modify behavioural skills.

3. SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF MICROTEACHING

The most obvious way in which microteaching differs from conventional teaching practice is that in nearly every case the actual teaching is carried out in the training institution. Conventional

teaching practice involves novice teachers travelling to local schools and to greater or lesser extent taking charge of a class for a few hours, days or even weeks. By bringing the classroom into the college two important advantages are immediately gained. Firstly, the conditions of the classroom can be *controlled*. The precise composition of the class can be (and often is) predetermined (McAleese and Unwin, (1971)); the variables which are most often controlled here are age and aptitude of the pupils. Other such factors as curriculum area, number in class, size of classroom, facilities available, can all be manipulated at will.

In practice the simulated classroom in the college can be constructed with control over most of the variables along which a normal classroom varies, in its *natural* setting. Secondly, because of the control exerted, the microteaching classroom can be thought of as *experimental*, in fact it has often been called a 'teaching laboratory'. The description of teaching as an 'art' is a belief which has long hindered a research based approach to its study. The regular class-room environment is not easily adapted to experimentation in method, and although feedback may theoretically be generated, the opportunity to use it is limited. For example, in a class taught in a particular way on a syllabus leading to an annual examination, it is a full year before the teacher can alter his style, or change emphasis in the light of actual results achieved. In the microteaching labora-tory, the experimental conditions allow several attempts at the pre-sentation of one lesson to be made usually within the space of a few days. As a result of shifting the classroom into the college, pressure is taken off local schools, much reducing the problem of fitting student teachers into complicated time tables. There is, of course, a conflicting factor here in that the same schools will usually have to supply children for microclasses at the college. However, the inconvenience can be minimised by planning and organisation, and by the use of such devices as role playing by peer students.

Notwithstanding problems which may be generated by any new approach, and the fact that microteaching differs in fundamental precepts from conventional teaching practice it is being increasingly considered to provide a valid alternative to conventional teaching practice. For example, the Ministry of Education in Northern Ireland have seen fit to equate one microteaching session in The New University of Ulster's Microteaching Clinic to one day in classroom observation.

4. THE COMPONENT SKILLS APPROACH

Before moving on to a more detailed description of microteaching, it will be useful to examine what has come to be known as the *component skills* approach to teaching. This will supply a unified starting point for description and analysis of microteaching.

Every education tutor is faced from time to time with the task of classroom observation, typically he sits at the back of the room and seeks to look inconspicuous—probably with a marked lack of success. To clarify the observation process a functional analysis of a 'typical' lesson is set out below.

The teacher comes into the classroom and begins the lesson by taking from his pocket an orange. He asks "Who knows where this comes from?" One pupils answers "Israel".	*opening lesson*
the teacher says "Yes" and commences talking about the geography of the Eastern Mediterranean.	*exposition*
Around the walls of the room are maps and photographs—the teacher occasionally points to these to illustrate a point, or	*illustrating and using examples*
he goes to a chalkboard where he draws diagrams and sometimes writes a word or name. The class continues as the teacher brings out a loop projector, and after inserting a cassette, he operates the projector which	*use of audiovisual aids*
shows a film about the port of Haifa. While the film is being shown the teacher is silent.	*use of silence*
The loop is completed and the teacher questions the class regarding what they have just seen.	*asking questions*
When a student answers correctly the teacher sometimes says "Yes—that is correct", or sometimes "No—was that really what you saw?" While the students are answering, the teacher is looking around the room and taking note if any of the pupils seem	*reinforcement of behaviour*
to be uninterested or inattentive. He directs questions to these students, and sometimes instead of saying, "Yes, that's correct", or	*recognising attending behaviour*
"No—that's not right", he shakes his head or smiles. After some minutes the teacher stops	*stimulus variation*

a discussion which has started, draws the *closing lesson*
threads of the lesson together, and tells the
class what the next lesson in geography will be
about. The lesson concludes.

Ten functional items have been isolated as *component skills of teaching*
(these are by no means an exhaustive list); let us see how this approach
is used in microteaching.

Complex behaviour can seldom be learned in its entirety at one
attempt; it is usual to break it down into its component parts. Just as in
a football training session, the players may practise dribbling, passing,
trapping, or heading, so in microteaching classroom, the teacher is
encouraged to practise the components which go to make up the
complex behaviour pattern known as teaching. In microteaching,
skills such as are isolated above are clearly defined; the novice
teacher then practises these skills in the laboratory. It is this approach
to teaching practice which has been given most attention in micro-
teaching. Microteaching development in California was based on this
rationale, and by far the best documented microteaching projects
have been concerned with this component skills approach. The
splitting up of complex behaviour is quite a common occurrence, and
it is of particular relevance in the controlled experimental micro-
teaching laboratory.

When a teacher enters the classroom, he is confronted with an
activity which is very complex and about which, in absolute terms,
there is very little known. To ask a novice teacher to practise the
complete '*teaching act*' at once, is surely to ask too much? is what is
argued. In microteaching, the complexity is broken down, and not
until some competence is shown in the components, is the teacher
encouraged to try the complete process. Because of this method,
microteaching can be considered a *component skills approach to
teaching*.

5. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF MICROTEACHING

A vitally important element in microteaching is the provision of
feedback to the learner (teacher). It has been shown in research
studies that information provided about the effects of actions is
essential to the learning process. Knowledge of correct performance
(Knowledge of Results—KR) can be shown to rapidly improve the
learning of a particular pattern (Annett, J. (1969)), reinforcement of
such KR will increase the probability of the pattern being repeated.
With no reinforcement there may be extinction of the pattern.

When microteaching is formulated in the component skills approach, and learners are given reinforcement appropriate to their responses, correct execution of skills can be encouraged and bad habits, or the poor execution of skills be discouraged or completely extinguished. However, it is important that the KR be immediate as the delaying of feedback, even though it is reinforcement, may lead to extinction. In microteaching, where the teacher can see or hear an immediate replay of the lesson, the delay in feedback is minimized and verbal conditioning of behaviour is effective.

A further factor is the level of anxiety in learners since high levels may cause low probability of the reoccurrence of operant responses. Little is known of anxiety levels in microteaching at present, but, a priori, once the television equipment is accepted, it would seem that there should be less 'pressure' on the student teacher. This is yet to be investigated in detail, however a study is under consideration in the University of Aberdeen.

Transfer of learning is another important aspect. If a teacher can competently perform in simulated conditions as in the microteaching laboratory, it is of great importance to know whether in the real classroom, prior learning helps or hinders current learning. What evidence there is concerning the transfer of learning is concerned mainly with simulation exercises, and it shows that there is little interference between prior and current learning.

Considerable work had been done by Bandura (1962) into the effects of imitation on social learning; in particular the imitation of film mediated aggressive models and modelling of this or similar type is often used in the microteaching rationale. It is postulated that the student's behaviour will be mediated as a result of viewing the model, and thus shaping towards the desired end takes place. Problems of course arise, as to whether the models should be peer, or tutor, and other such variables as whether matching of sex is important (Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1963)).

Finally, it should be mentioned that the microteaching approach is a behaviouristic one, and is, of course, open to all the criticisms which can be attributed to this Skinnerian approach. This should not, however, stop research into the shaping of novice teaching behaviour in the microteaching environment.

The Basic Model for Microteaching

Microteaching is a process which can be examined at several levels of complexity, but no matter how complex it becomes, it can

be based on one fundamental TEACH—CRITIQUE—THINK—RESTRUCTURE model. Thus, developments can be explained using a basic cyclic framework. In this framework the student enters a closed system by preparing a short, single concept lesson for presentation to a group of, say, seven pupils. Ideally the lesson should concentrate on a specific component skill, and it should be structured around a familiar piece of curricular material. The lesson then, is made up of CONCEPT and SKILL. As far as microteaching is concerned, the skill is most important, as the aim of the exercise is to practise teaching skills; however, it would be a very poor teacher who concentrated on the skill to the exclusion of concept. When the lesson is taught the teacher will critique his performance: that is he will examine the *Teach* critically, *bearing in mind the stated goal*. At this stage a decision is taken, that is 'Is the execution of the lesson satisfactory in light of my set objective?' (i.e. has the component skill been properly executed?) If the answer is—Yes, the teacher has achieved his first goal and continues with planning for practice of the next skill. However, if the teacher does not consider that he has achieved his goal, he *rethinks* and *restructures* the lesson, using the same basic format, but changing unsatisfactory points and using different approaches to achieve the objective. The lesson is then *retaught* as soon after restructuring as possible, to a different group of pupils in its restructured form. Completing the cycle again, the teacher critiques his performance, and if he is satisfied at this stage, he continues with the next skill. If not, further cycles may be necessary until a satisfactory execution of the lesson is achieved.

The model described has two obvious drawbacks. Firstly, there is no objective frame of reference for the critique. When the teacher leaves the class he may well forget or overlook more important points, or worse still, he may remember incorrectly what happened. Going back to our conventional system, even if a supervisor had been present in the classroom, there may be difficulty in deciding exactly what took place. It often happens that so-called 'objective' criticism is in fact based to some extent on subjective impressions and opinions of the supervisor. The basic model system in microteaching does not take account of this problem. A further criticism of the basic model is that the teacher received no help during the critique, in other words, no external reinforcement. Reinforcement can be provided by a supervisor being present during the critique but this point will be taken up later. First, let us see if the first criticism can be overcome.

6. MICROTEACHING WITH AN OBJECTIVE FRAME OF REFERENCE

Undoubtedly, one of the worst drawbacks of teaching without a record being made is that feedback from the lesson itself is tenuous and soon lost. Several methods are available for the recording of the lesson:

1. One-way mirrors to allow an observer (supervisor) to record mentally or in note form what happens.
2. Having a shorthand typist make a transcript of the lesson, at times inserting cues and comments.
3. Using some mechanical means of making a permanent or semi-permanent recording.

The last has proved to be most fruitful, and neither of the other two will be given further consideration although they should not be forgotten by the researcher or teacher trainer. A sound recording is certainly the simplest method of recording a classroom situation. It is difficult, however, to make high quality recordings, but quality is seldom a critical feature, and information cues are unlikely to be distorted by poor recording. Microteaching is, nevertheless, found to be more effective if both sound *and* vision recording can be made. A purely *visual* recording can be made on 8mm and 16mm films, and in theory, sound could be recorded and dubbed on to the film. This would, however, pose serious technical and financial problems, and would introduce one overwhelming drawback; namely, the *delay* caused by processing. This could easily run to over a week and for microteaching purposes, rules out film as a viable medium. The use of videotape is the easiest and cheapest system in the long run when a temporary or semi-permanent sound and vision record is required.

Let us now examine the basic model with the addition of *audio-visual feedback*. The most obvious difference is that after the *Teach* session, the student has a Viewing session which is usually just before (or at the same time) as the *Critique*. The student can see and hear how the lesson was 'performed', and if a supervisor is present there is a common frame of reference for discussion. It can be argued that there is no need at this stage to introduce a supervisor, as trainees can be taught to be self-critical of recorded performances, and to use them for analysis.

A further stage can be achieved if a modelling experience is inserted into the cycle after the *View*, in order to show how the skill

should have been executed. The modelling experience can clearly be put into the cycle at any point, either *before* or after the *Teach*, but it seems that if it is used in a remedial fashion it is most suitable. Modelling insertion does not change radically the arrangement, and there is still emphasis on assessment of performance against a set objective. As progress is made using the reduced complexity and the controlled conditions, the length of the lesson can be increased as can the number of pupils being taught. This may be in order to more clearly simulate the real classroom, or it may be that a different approach is being taken to that of a component skills approach. One such approach is an adaption of the team teaching technique where four or five students plan and carry out in concert, a series of lessons. One teaching, while the others act as peer supervisors critiquing the *Teach* sessions, and even operating the technical equipment.

7. IS SUPERVISION NECESSARY?

The second criticism of the basic model is attended to if a super-visor is present during the View-Critique period. Allen (1968) saw the microteaching supervisor acting in a fivefold capacity:

1. A resource person
2. An adviser
3. An interpreter of student feedback
4. An assessor
5. A general morale booster.

Another wide range of roles; however, there is little clear guidance as to the importance or function of supervision. It is a moot point as to whether a supervisor serves any purpose which might not more conveniently be achieved by the trainee himself. Research by Koran (1969), Stewig (1970), Clark (1965) and Olivero (1970) provides little concrete evidence one way or another. It is not unreasonable to suppose that an experienced microteaching supervisor will focus the student's attention on to important points and thus, in addition to Allen's categories, assist in the reinforcement process.

8. FEEDBACK INSTRUMENTS AND MICROTEACHING

Three distinct approaches have developed in using objective evaluation instruments in the Critique period, namely:

(a) Rating Instruments (Allen & Ryan, (1969))
(b) Check Lists (Borg, (1970); Morrison & McIntyre, (1972))
(c) Interaction Analysis (Flanders, (1970); Wragg, (1971))

Rating instruments have long been used in teacher evaluation (Gage, (1963)) and the global Stanford Teacher Competence Appraisal Guide (STCAG) and others have been used with some success to structure the feedback to the novice teacher during the supervision. The global or in some cases Skill Instrument contains several items to be rated on 5 or 7 point scales. The rating on Teach and Reteach then serve as a 'measure' of the progress of the teacher in training. The actual rating may in itself be of little value but be used as a starting point for supervisory discussion, e.g. "Why do you think you only gave yourself 2 . . .?" However, problems exist in using this form of normative evaluation. Firstly its lack of true objectivity (no two people can say that a value of 4 on a 7 point scale means the precisely same thing). Secondly the fact that there is an implicit normative element. Even though students should not expect top ratings at the beginning of training there is difficulty in making the rating objective and not evaluative. This is particularly important where the microteaching supervisor may be the student's teaching practice evaluator. Unpublished work carried out in Trinity College Dublin (McAleese) indicated that the most important function of rating instruments was as a point of genesis in a non directive supervisory conference.

Check lists have been developed to tally various elements in skills. This approach is used extensively in the Minicourse (Borg, (1971)). It is an advance over the rating instrument although it does have its drawbacks when applied to rigorous research designs. One of these is the lack of regular observation of the components of skills. No reliable or valid inferences can be drawn about parts of lessons from irregular sampling techniques. The technique is however very useful as demonstrated by Morrison & McIntyre and Borg and may be a starting point for experimentation in the developing of suitably structured feedback instruments.

Interaction Analysis is a development of the check list technique first pioneered by Flanders and Amidon in their 10 Interaction Analysis Categories. The use of I–A in microteaching is to give a higher degree of structure to the Critique session (McAleese, (1973)) and allow for more precise shaping of teaching strategies. Using regular coding of verbal behaviour, (non-verbal behaviour can also be treated in this way) conclusions can be drawn as to patterns in microlessons. The I–A can be used in several different ways. Firstly, to give gross information as to the amount of lecturing, questioning, use of pupils' ideas, etc. This information can be displayed in either

mathematical or graphical form. Secondly, by specifying objectives in terms of expected category or cell frequency, a comparison of observed versus expected can be used to shape a particular behaviour. Using a computer's very accurate and detailed analysis of micro-lessons is possible—as long as the encoding of data is reliable. This computer analysis is relatively new and at present is somewhat prohibitive in cost but with a cheap VDU in the Supervision room, linked to a central computer, analysis of lessons at a very high and reliable level is now becoming possible.

9. SUMMARY

Microteaching is then simplified teaching practice, carried out under controlled conditions using sound and vision feedback to modify operant teacher behaviour. The two basic elements are the SIMPLIFICATION of complex conditions, and the application of a general theoretical model to CONTROLLED conditions. It is possible to operate a microteaching system without A–V feedback, if certain limitations due to lack of an objective frame of reference, and unguided critique sessions are accepted. The critique session can be enhanced using feedback instruments such as rating forms and interaction analysis.

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THIRD THOUGHTS ON DISCOVERY

by COLIN RICHARDS

Bishop Wilson, J. I. School, Warks

I. INTRODUCTION

IN 1965 B. Z. Friedlander had an article published in the Harvard Educational Review entitled 'A Psychologist's Second Thoughts on Concepts, Curiosity and Discovery in Teaching and Learning'. Though lacking experimental evidence, this was a clear, logical critique of some of the assumptions underlying discovery learning. Its author stated 'What I want to do is to express some second thoughts on some first-rate ideas that have been offered by others. My purpose is not to assault or refute.' This present article has been written with a similar purpose in mind. It does not pretend to be strictly philosophical, nor does it rest on any empirical investigation, but its purpose is to examine further the notion of 'discovery learning' in the hope that this will improve communication and thought by teachers in an area fraught with vagaries, metaphors and value-assumptions (some well-hidden, others less so). Though not intended to promote or denigrate the cause of discovery learning the article is based on a belief similar to Cronbach's—that discovery learning probably 'has value in nearly every area of the curriculum' but 'its function is specialized and limited.' (Cronbach 1966).

During the last decade 'progressive', 'child-centred' ideas seem to have become almost the accepted orthodoxy of British Primary Education, an orthodoxy epitomized by the Plowden Report of 1967. Though the dominance of the 'child-centred' movement is by no means universal or unchallenged (Richards 1972), it has certainly proved more vocal than its critics, and prominent among its battle-cries has been the plea that children should be given first-hand experiences through which they can discover things for themselves. Discovery learning situations have been seen by many as panaceas, promoting enhanced pupil motivation, more purposeful learning, stabler retention and greater transfer. Discovery is transmitted by many colleges of education as *the* accepted way of educating children: it is advocated by many as one answer to the problem of

adolescent motivation, and it has become an accepted mode in in-service training, where in centres 'teachers study curriculum develop-ment and new approaches to teaching through the child's own discovery', (Evans 1970). Despite this, there has been a dearth of English material critically examining discovery and its assumptions. Almost all the psychological research on discovery learning has been conducted in the United States. In his book of readings Stones has only one article discussing discovery and that is by two American authors dated 1962! (Stones 1970). Yet what research evidence is available is very inconclusive. Among the very few articles in English educational literature are one by Dearden in which he proposes three models of discovery (Dearden 1967) and one by Bantock which, though entitled 'Discovery Methods', is more a critique of child-centred philosophy than a critical examination of discovery per se (Bantock 1969).

In the absence of well-reasoned argument concerning the advantage limitations and assumptions of discovery learning opinions rather than facts, prejudices rather than reasoned judgements, have been aired. Discovery has become less a word describing a method of learning or teaching and more a slogan, a catch-phrase which is either brandished fervently or repudiated violently depending on the disputant's position. There is a definite need for clearer thinking about its different aspects.

At its core all discovery learning involves an individual confronting a situation 'open' in some significant respect and attempting to 'close' it by finding out for himself the one possible answer or one or more of the many possible answers. Both Dearden (1967) and Biggs (1971) have attempted to describe different models of discovery learning. The former distinguishes three such models:- the 'pre-school model', 'abstractionism' and 'problem-solving.' The latter has recently described five types: 'impromptu discovery', 'free explor-atory discovery', 'guided discovery', 'directed discovery' and 'pro-grammed learning,' some of which are not clearly distinguished from one another. The main concern of this article is to describe some of the aspects or facets of discovery learning situations in the hope that these will distinguish the different kinds of discovery situations exemplified by the models and found in curriculum development projects. These aspects are not treated in any particular logical order nor do they represent all aspects of discovery learning: for example, the vexed question of the outcomes of this type of learning is left untouched.

2 'PROCESS-PRODUCT' DIMENSION

Discovery can be regarded as either a process or a product of learning or both and it is essential in any particular situation to distinguish which of these is present. As a process it can be a way of promoting pupil acquisition of concepts, facts and principles, but it can also be viewed as an end-product of learning, when the pupil acquires the ability to discover new insights for himself in any particular field. Criticisms that apply to discovery in the former sense do not necessarily apply to it in the latter and vice versa. For instance, it can be argued that discovery is a time-consuming way of learning basic concepts and facts in a particular discipline and disregards one of man's most important sources of knowledge:- his culture. The same argument may not be nearly so valid if discovery as a means *and* an objective of learning is being discussed. It may take a long time for pupils to learn how to make their own discoveries in any particular discipline, but provided this is considered an important objective a lengthy time-element may be justified. It could well be that practice in discovering (which is time-consuming in itself) may be the only or at least the most important way of promoting this objective. Thus time as a factor may weigh more heavily against discovery as a means of acquiring information than as an objective of learning.

This distinction between process and product is crucial as far as evaluation of a particular curriculum project or unit is concerned. If for example discovery learning is used only as a means to developing more stable concepts or promoting greater retention of information, the evaluation must be concerned primarily with the concepts and information acquired by the children during the course. If the main objective is the ability to discover, a different kind of evaluation is called for: one which seeks evidence of this ability in similar but related situations to those in the course and situations too which do not require the recall of large amounts of information. Nuffield Junior Science was criticized by many teachers because it appeared to encourage children to spend a long time discovering, at the end of which they were left with only a smattering of disorganized information. This criticism was misplaced, if the prime aim of the Project was promoting children's ability to discover, with the accumulation of knowledge as only a secondary consideration.

Thus, learning by discovery and learning to discover are two different but related aspects of discovery. This distinction is a useful

one in distinguishing between recent attempts at reform in the science field. As indicated above, Nuffield Junior Science takes as its prime objective the fostering of children's abilities to discover as does Suchman's Inquiry Training programme (Suchman 1960), whereas Science 5–13 employs discovery partly as an end in itself but more as a means of promoting a wide range of objectives such as the development of basic concepts, the acquisition of knowledge and manipulative skills and an appreciation of patterns and relationships (Ennever and Harlen 1969).

3. 'ACCIDENTAL-PLANNED' DIMENSION

A second aspect of discovery situations is concerned with the nature of the starting point from which learning by discovery develops. This may be sparked off by a variety of situations ranging along an 'accidental-planned' dimension. Discovery learning may be completely accidental as in Dearden's 'pre-school model.' Such learning is not deliberately planned by a teacher or other adult, nor is it sought after in advance by the child. For instance, a child takes a straw from a box and discovers that a noise can be produced by blowing down it, and this may or may not lead on to further enquiries about how sound travels. On the other hand a teacher may provide material such as straws and cardboard tubes on a table along with other objects capable of making sounds in the hope that these will spark off children's enquiry. Here the situation is more planned but hardly planned in detail, since any child can choose whether or not to look at the table or handle the objects and even then may not use them to produce sounds. Further along this dimension would be the deliberate setting-up of a display of sound-producing materials along with questions directing attention to particular points. At the planned end of the dimension would be cards issued to the child whether he wanted them or not. What is being discussed here is not the extent of structure placed on discovery learning once it it is under way, but the starting point of the enquiry. Many criticisms of discovery situations are based on the assumption that they necessarily involve accidental generation of self-chosen enquiries. This is not necessary at all to the idea of discovery. Dearden's pre-school' model is characteristic of discovery situations at the 'accidental' end of the dimension, whilst his 'problem-solving' model is more characteristic of the 'planned' end.

Recent primary science curriculum projects have tended to emphasize starting points which are 'accidental': for example, an oak is

felled outside a school and this is the starting point for enquiries involving trees, or a spider is brought in to school to frighten the girls and this provides the starting point for work on 'mini-beasts'. The Nuffield Mathematics Project places some emphasis on developing mathematics from unplanned situations, but makes provision for some topics to be planned well in advance with situations deliberately devised so that children will want to investigate them. How else, for example, will moduo arithmetic arise accidentally in a normal classroom? 'Mathematics for Schools' (Fletcher 1970) advocates even more planning of starting points, as witnessed by the plentiful advice offered teachers on how to introduce each of the units in the two levels. Discovery may have an accidental starting point but not necessarily so.

4. 'AUTONOMOUS-DIRECTED' DIMENSION

Discovery learning situations also vary along an 'autonomous-directed' dimension and this is the distinction most frequently used in the literature to differentiate various types. Certain American psychologists have distinguished between 'autonomous discovery', 'guided discovery' and 'rote learning' in an attempt to assess their relative efficacy, but often in different experiments quite different treatments are given the same name and sometimes one experimenter's 'rote' treatment is very similar to another's 'discovery' treatment (Wittrock 1966). This makes comparison and generalization of results very difficult.

As far as the present examination of discovery is concerned, the 'autonomous-directed' dimension refers to the form and extent of the guidance or structure given to the enquiry once it is under way. As such it has to be distinguished from the previous dimension. An enquiry can begin accidentally but later be structured by the teacher, or it can be planned in advance by the teacher and left to develop autonomously (as in Dearden's 'abstractionism' model). More usually it can be planned in advance and guided as it proceeds, or it may develop accidentally and proceed autonomously.

Despite talk of 'setting children free to pursue their own discoveries', autonomous discovery involving no teacher direction or guidance is rarely advocated seriously as a method of enquiry. (It undoubtedly occurs in over-crowded classrooms where the teacher cannot find time to discuss with all her children as they pursue their various activities) In very many situations what is at issue is the extent and

form of the guidance to be given. This is further complicated because the nature of the subject matter, the previous experience of the children and their stage of cognitive development all affect the issue. Guidance can be very diffuse or very specific and take a variety of forms. Open-ended questions, closely directed questions, hints (subtle and otherwise), framing problems for children and direct instruction are all examples of guidance. These may be given by the teacher in person, by text books, by assignment cards and by programmes, each of these being compatible with the idea of discovery.

During the last two years there has been an increasing recognition of the need for greater structuring of learning experiences (Richards 1972) and recent attempts at curriculum reform are more towards the 'directed' end of this dimension compared with earlier ones. A comparison of 'Mathematics for Schools' with the Nuffield Mathematics Project, or Science 5–13 with Nuffield Junior Science, will confirm this.

This characterization of discovery learning along an 'autonomous-directed' dimension has proved useful, but in the past other dimensions have been ignored and an over-simple classification of discovery learning situations has resulted, an example of which is Biggs' typology mentioned earlier.

5. 'CONCRETE-SYMBOLIC' DIMENSION

Another important facet of discovery learning situations is the extent to which they involve the manipulation of concrete objects by the pupil. Exploring, manipulating and searching may involve pupils handling materials and moving about the class room and school, but overt physical activity is not an essential component of discovery. Some discoveries can profitably be made by pupils sitting at their desks and using pencils and paper. Many of the discovery situations in the Madison Project are of this type (Davis 1966). Moreover, as Dearden points out, manipulation of concrete objects is no guarantee that any meaningful learning is taking place. Most of the concepts taught in school are theoretical ones (Dearden 1968) and require skilful use of language on the part of the teacher if a concept is to be understood fully.

The extent to which discovery learning situations involve the manipulation of concrete objects depends on a number of factors, the main ones being the nature of the concepts or principles being developed, the stage of cognitive development reached by the pupils

and the extent of their previous experience with the materials in question. In all recent curriculum projects discovery situations for the younger age-groups have been characterized by physical activity, but this is less so as the topics become more advanced. Both infant mathematics and science place great emphasis on concrete experience, but towards the top end of the junior school mathematics becomes less exclusively practical and more 'symbolic', though practical activities continue to dominate the science curricula.

Activity (physical or mental) characterizes all forms of learning, whether discovery, reception or rote, but in the past discovery has been too exclusively identified with activity involving concrete objects, when this connection is purely a contingent one.

6. 'OPEN-CLOSED' DIMENSION

The fifth dimension along which discovery learning situations can be ranged emphasizes the end-product of the enquiries. In any particular situation there may be one definite answer or more than one; there may be one method of approach or many. The 'open' or 'closed' nature of the situation is independent of its origin or of the amount of guidance imposed on it. Open-endedness tended to characterize earlier attempts at primary mathematics reform in England, but this is in contrast to the more (but not completely) 'closed' nature of the recently produced 'Mathematics for Schools' or the widely known Madison Project in the United States. Dearden's 'pre-school' model is essentially 'open', whilst his 'problem-solving' model is towards the 'closed' end of this dimension. Open-endedness may characterize some discovery situations but by no means all.

7. CONCLUSION

Discovery learning is a blanket term that, unexamined or unqualified, hides more than it reveals. Five dimensions or facets have been discussed in the hope that these will distinguish various kinds of discovery situations. In the past such situations have been considered all of a piece, or if differentiated at all have only been differentiated along an 'autonomous-directed' dimension. Discovery learning is more complicated than this. To illustrate, guided learning (involving teacher-pupil questioning and discussion) might proceed from an unplanned starting point, involve much activity with concrete objects and be open-ended, with learning to discover as one of its main objectives. Or, it might be deliberately planned from the

very beginning, involve a minimum of physical activity and have one definite end in view, with discovery simply serving as a means. Other combinations of these factors might operate in different discovery situations.

The discovery situations found in different curriculum projects can be distinguished according to where they lie on these dimensions. With greater clarity and further examination, discovery learning may become less of a slogan and more a term describing a family of learning situations, all of which may be important in the education of children.

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BOOK REVIEWS

R. K. KELSALL, ANNE POOLE and ANNETTE KUHN, *Graduates: The Sociology of an Elite* (Methuen 1972, £3.70)

THE origins of this book were most excellently conceived, namely a nationwide six-year follow-up of 10,000 men and women who graduated from British universities in 1960. It aims 'to throw light on new areas and aspects of this survey's findings'. Whether it really succeeds in so doing will vary with the reader. For the general reader it probably does not, despite the authors' guarantee on the blurb that it was written with him in mind. For the specialist reader it may well be adjudged successful, since there is a great need for statistical analyses of this nature.

Its least satisfactory part is in the style and form of the prose which is an attempt to draw conclusions, or in some cases suggest hypotheses, from the collected data. For example, the obvious fact that 'a university degree is a key to entry to a wide variety of professional, managerial or executive positions' is hailed as the demonstrable purpose of Chapter Two whereas it is really an involved argument about social class forces. Then the style suffers from the tortuous explanations to which some sociological writing seems so prone and which confuses rather than illuminates a topic. So the information that 'graduates often marry graduates because their principal social intercourse is with one another' (my inverted commas) becomes 'people are likely to conduct the peer group relationships perceived by them as most salient with people broadly similar to themselves socially, educationally and in consequence attitudinally, and our graduates are not likely to be any exception to this fundamental sociological principle'. Social scientists are not exempt from the need for lucidity and brevity especially if, as in this case, they are avowedly catering for the general reader.

For educationalists the final chapter is likely to arouse hostility by its patronising attitude to teaching. It shows too little insight into the educational sciences, though a good deal into the married women in teaching. Whether or not teaching lacks a 'specialised and rapidly changing knowledge base' as the authors quote cannot justify the next sentence, which is that 'a large proportion of women teachers in any case work in primary schools'. Nowhere more than in the primary school have 'knowledge bases' changed. Such a statement shows lamentable ignorance of, if not prejudice against, the functioning of one of the healthier agencies of our society.

On the credit side the statistics are fascinating, beautifully arranged and a sound model for students of all ages to follow. The Bibliography is

splendid. Where this book fails primarily is in matching its brilliant statistical analyses with equally convincing explanatory and deductive skills. Such a 'mismatch' is a fairly common failing in social science reports. It might have been avoided by a rigorous précis of each chapter or sub-chapter as the writing proceeded so as to bring the subject matter continually into focus. As things stand the writing is too diffuse and lacks coherence, especially for the general reader.

GERALD CORTIS

PATRICK CREBER, *Lost For Words* (Penguin Education, 1972, 45p.)

PETER DOUGHTY, JOHN PEARCE, GEOFFREY THORNTON, *Exploring Language* (Edward Arnold, 1972, 90p.)

THESE two books have more in common than ambiguous titles. They both spring from deep concern with the role of language in learning and teaching, both as the role is actually played and as it is perceived by both children and teachers; and further, as the way it is perceived affects or even determines both learning and teaching.

Lost For Words springs from an Anglo-American seminar held at Walsall in 1968 (although the author's concern is of course of much earlier date) to discuss "the linguistic problems of those young people who in the eyes of school or society are failures". He movingly describes what he found on a programme of visits to urban primary schools (though the book is relevant to other areas of education, too) and speaks sensitively of the problems with which society presents teachers today. These are not merely listed as things "that have gone wrong" in society that make working in too many of our schools intolerable. Instead we get an unhesitating acceptance of responsibility: "Self-reappraisal, of the kind modern techniques make necessary, is a painful, even an agonizing business" (p. 20); and: "Where language has gone sour in the secondary school, this may well be the result of divorcing pastoral and academic considerations—as if caring for children and teaching them were two different things, an idea which at primary school level is eminently impractical. In many large secondary schools, however, a separation of these functions is implicit in use of the term 'teaching staff' as opposed to 'house staff'. Though administratively convenient, this appears potentially dangerous—it institutionalises a mis-leading distinction." (p. 65); and, more specifically: ". . . one must . . . assert categorically that a properly professional responsibility leaves no room for continuing ignorance" (*sc.* of the nature of standards in speech) "On the contrary, it must demand that the teacher know something both of the way language works—and here the prescriptive concept of correct-ness long since abandoned by linguists will be of no help to him—and of

the way children learn—and here again an obsession with standards will be not merely unhelpful but positively noxious." (p. 23).

It seems to me that Mr. Creber must be a man who, brought up in a powerful and much valued literary tradition, has among other things derived from that tradition a critical sense that does not flinch from critical evaluation of the tradition itself. The consequence seems to have been an exhaustive process of extensive re-appraisal of some of the attitudes and values that go with the tradition; but, predictably, there has been no wholesale over-simplification, nor crude jettisoning of the old in favour of the new. Rather, a discriminating digestion of old values and new insights together, to determine what is of value, and what is relevant to the teacher because it is relevant to the children, and is also consistent with the critical maintenance of the tradition. Hence the valuable account in chapter four of the work at Abbey Wood. Hence, too, this book itself, based on experience recollected in anger, experience exposed to critical analysis informed by recent research, an excellent book both to move its readers and to get them moving in the right direction.

Students should read *Exploring Language* later. Not much later, but after they had worked some of the units in its companion volume, *Language in Use*, and had used it with children themselves. In *Lost For Words*, the need to watch the children one is responsible for, and to sense what their responses and feelings are, is emphasised (p. 148). The point of doing this is partly to enable us to determine the most appropriate course of action; and, since that action may be largely or totally linguistic, it enables us to determine the choice of (what are usually spoken) words. Rightly, we are told, "the crucial skill lies in the *sensing*". In *Language in Use*, Unit A3, we are given a procedure (of many possible and necessary ones) for focussing upon the audience when engaged in different kinds of writing. This is an example of the way in which *Language in Use*, accepting the same responsibility for getting on with the job in the social environment the schools now find themselves in, suggests practical ways of doing so, using ideas drawn from a very wide survey of work in the schools that got good results, and relating them to theoretical foundations outlined in the Nuffield/Schools Council Programme "Papers in Linguistics and English Teaching". *Exploring Language* draws together and re-shapes some of these ideas and attempts to give the first reasonably full account of them in one book, at a level that is intended for students and teachers.

The importance of the book lies in its account of the model of language implicit in *Language in Use*. While recognizing the validity so far as they go of using psycho-linguistic models of language in educational contexts, the emphasis here is on the need to take account also of socio-linguistic models, such as those deriving from Malinowski's insight: "language functions as a link in concerted human activity, as a piece of human behaviour." The view is thus behavioural (without being behaviourist), and needs to function, as it does, within a properly integrated socio-

linguistic framework, deriving here from J. R. Firth and M. A. K. Halliday. The core of the book is the account of this framework in chapters four to seven, of which the headings give some indication: Language and Experience, Language and Relationships, Language and Society, and Command of a Language. It is important that the last of these differs from other accounts precisely because, coming after the preceding three, it can be written in the framework they provide. Although chapters five and six are very concentrated, they re-pay careful reading, and only in the context they provide can we make full use of the seventh chapter, which is central to our thinking about our work in the classroom. If it ever gains acceptance at all widely, then we can hope for that "substantial support" for "the hitherto largely intuitive procedures of many gifted teachers whose work has been attracting attention but who have often been diffident in its defence" asked for in *Lost For Words* (p. 32).

It must be admitted, though, that chapters five and six are far from easy. However, this is not surprising because they break new ground, in a context where it is more than usually difficult to specify what the readership may be able to take. This is precisely because the nature of the underlying theoretical framework (although there has been no shortage of comment on social variation in language) is only now beginning to be at all widely known. Moreover, in terms of the steps in the extension of linguistic competence (*not* in Chomsky's use of the term) given in chapter seven, i.e. Recognition, Familiarisation, Hesitant Command, and Fluent Command, Mr. Doughty himself (who wrote these particular chapters) would probably agree that he was caught between the need to write at manageable length and the need to make a great deal explicit, with the result that the writing is somewhere between the last two stages. The weight of sociological theory alone is substantial; and he is saved by the flanking chapters from detailing equivalent linguistic theory only to a relatively minor extent. Yet the dual focus is precisely what matters:

"From a linguistic point of view . . . there are two aspects to every relationship, the use of language to make contact with others and the degree to which the social context for the meeting governs its use. Our intuitions make clear to us . . . that what we say does depend upon who we say it to and where we say it, so that . . . exploring language has to begin with the familiar. . . . however the problem is a little more complicated, because the subject involves the speaker's intuitions about society as well as about language" (p. 62). "There are three aspects of 'society' that are particularly relevant to the exploration of language: the way in which people come together into recognizable groups; the powers and agencies, social, economic, political and moral, that act through them; and the means by which a newcomer can learn how to be a member of 'society'. There is one process, however, that plays a crucial part in every aspect of 'society', the process of *interaction*: for 'We have direct acquaintance only with people interacting' " (p. 84). "If social behaviour is a matter of 'interaction',

rather than simply of 'action', then a crucial element of interaction must be language. . . . How an individual uses language, therefore, not only depends upon who he is, where he is, and what relationship holds between him and the others concerned at the moment of speaking, but also upon the linguistic pattern of the interaction involved. His own choice of language will be shaped by all that is said in the course of the interaction: how it was initiated, who says what, in what manner, and to whom. As Douglas Barnes has shown, a teacher's questions can determine the linguistic pattern of the interaction to such an extent that students end up in the position where they can only say what he wants them to say" (p. 85). Or, we might add, say nothing at all, with all the consequences that flow from that silence.

The complexities of such interaction we are only just beginning to understand; and the implications for teaching, regardless of subject boundaries, are still not as well known as they need to be. It is most heartening when, as happened recently, a biologist says, immediately on taking *Language in Use* into his hands: "This I must have for my VIth Form Laboratory Library." But it would happen more often if those responsible for teacher education started exploring language, and ceased remarking that students and children are lost for words.

MARTIN DAVIES

E. STONES in collaboration with D. ANDERSON. *Educational Objectives and the Teaching of Educational Psychology* (Methuen, 1972, £4.75)

THIS book is in two parts. The first, comprising six chapters and bibliography, is concerned with objectives in education and the teaching of educational psychology to student teachers. The authors first deal with the need for specifying educational objectives although they present as well, the views of those who hold a contrary viewpoint. At the same time the characteristics of objectives, and the efforts of workers to systematise objectives are also discussed. Chapter 2 considers the justification for including educational psychology in teacher education and deals with both the viewpoints of those who take a broad view concerning the ground to be covered, and of those who focus on more precise and specific issues. The third chapter describes a schedule of proposed objectives in educational psychology which was given to college tutors, third year college of education students, and teachers. Respondents were asked to score, from 1 to 5, each objective according to its perceived importance, and the data obtained were analysed and presented in various ways. Again in the following chapter, details are given both of a Likert-type scale administered to teachers and students to assess their global attitudes to educational psychology, and of the results obtained. In the fifth chapter the authors propose a taxonomy for objectives in educational psychology in which objectives are classified by subject area, by type and by level, while the

last draws together the authors' reflections. Finally, Part Two presents eleven papers, all reprinted from various sources, which deal with educational objectives and the teaching of educational psychology.

The book possesses both strengths and weaknesses. Generally speaking, the authors write modestly and they are well aware of the difficulties in the field. The first two chapters contain useful reviews of relevant literature and the writers rightly put emphasis on the need for objectives. They are also aware of the limitations of the schedule of objectives which they administered, although they put too much emphasis on the results of the cluster analysis. No details are given of the variances contributed by the individual principal components, while it is well known that extracting factors whose roots are greater than unity gives too many components when the number of variables increases beyond about twenty. Cattell's Scree Test gives a better criterion for the acceptance of components. Readers also need to look closely at the interpretations given to the clusters. For example, on page 73 it says that Cluster 1 obtained from the student responses resembles Cluster 1 obtained from those of the tutors. Yet three (Items 35, 39, 46) of the five items given in students' Cluster 1, appear as three of the four items given in tutors' Cluster 2.

More serious are the comments that must be made about the model proposed in Chapter 5 in spite of the fact that the authors are aware of some of the difficulties it raises. Four points can be made. First, many of the behavioural objectives given turn out to be ill defined. If one takes, quite at random, page 131, Area 2, Type A, Level 3, the word 'optimum' is undefined, while 'cueing' could have more than one meaning. Second, taking a specific subject area, it is difficult to see how the discrete pockets of knowledge demanded by the many objectives could give knowledge of the area as a whole. The latter is more than that which can be obtained from the sum of the objectives specified by type and level. Third, by no means all objectives in educational psychology (or other subject) can be described as behavioural. Fourth, on page 161 the authors admit that had they followed through in all the proposed areas in educational psychology, as they had in the two areas used as illustrative examples, there would be some 30,000 words on objectives alone. Not only is the teacher or instructor not going to prepare a work of this size, but he will not use it if written by someone else. At the depth of detail suggested in the model the writing of objectives has become cancerous—its growth is out of control.

This book will certainly help teachers of educational psychology think about their objectives, but its cost is too high at £4·75

<div align="right">K. LOVELL</div>

L. E. W. SMITH, *Towards a New English Curriculum* (Dent, 1972, 65p).

THIS little book by the head of the English Department at Millfield School interestingly indicates further 'new directions' in the teaching

of English. In two brief chapters the 'old' and the 'new' English (Nesfield, apparently, on the one hand; Thompson-Holbrook-Dixon on the other) are described and found wanting. Mr. Smith believes that the English teacher is a teacher of language and must attempt to lead pupils in carefully sequenced stages through a course of study based upon a linguistic analysis of the variety of forms of language they may be expected to read, write, speak and listen to in a complex democratic society. In addition, it should be possible for the teacher to identify stages of language development leading from a 'concrete', 'child-centred' use of language to public, elaborated forms capable of sustaining those attempts to theorise which, Mr. Smith believes, mark the adolescent's arrival at the highest stages of his language and thought. Mr. Smith outlines a series of such stages in the four basic skills which might be covered in a five-year course of secondary education in English: the skills are exercised on six themes repeated each year at higher levels of conceptual difficulty, and pupils are led from a concern with 'things' to a concern with 'ideas'.

There seems a higher degree of logical tidiness in this scheme than of psychological or pedagogical truth. Mr. Smith persuasively argues that an understanding of continuities in language and thought would be of great value to the educator: he fails to convince the reader that linguistics or psychology has yet satisfactorily supplied it; nor has he given a really reliable account of recent work in these fields. His new scheme of work relies on the suggestiveness of Bruner's 'spiral curriculum' and on a simplified view of language development and its relation to conceptualisation largely based on some pages from Vigotsky. It seems a matter for regret that these chapters devoted to theory take up space at the expense of a detailed description of his work at Millfield. It should, however, be said that this book may be a very useful brief introduction to curricular studies in English for students who may wish to discuss the aims and purposes of English teaching, the problems of structuring courses and the assumptions which support current methods. They will need a full bibliography and expert guidance through thorny areas of education, psychology and linguistics, and they may come to believe that the teaching of language (and all that Mr. Smith implies by that word) is too important to be left to teachers of English.   IAN MILLIGAN

MARTIN LEVITT (ed.), *Curriculum: Readings in the Philosophy of Education* (University of Illinois Press, 1971).

THIS is a book of readings for students. It has some pieces from Mr. Plato, and Mr. Aristotle, Mr. Dewey and Mr. Buber. These aren't bad. One or two of the other pieces—Hurst, Peters, Scheffer, are useful; but the rest are pretty non-descript. Except for the two pieces by Mr. Schwab. Both have similar qualities, so we may concentrate on one, 'The Practical: a

Language for the Curriculum', reprinted from *School Review* (78, 1969).

Mr. Schwab says that work in curriculum has been too theoretical, and insufficiently practical, and we need more journals to spread our ideas about practice.

This bald statement, though it does more than justice to the content of his long article, does not convey the beauties of his style, his soaring metaphors and dignified phraseology.

Take metaphors for instance. Mr. Schwab speaks of 'six flights from the subject of the field. The first is 'a flight of the field itself'. It is difficult to know from this whether the field stays where it is, or is in movement. However, the second flight is a 'flight upwards'. By this Mr. Schwab means talking about principles rather than using them. The third flight is 'downwards' (downwards *from* the field?). By this he means trying to think out principles from the beginning, returning to a 'state of innocence'. Perhaps the metaphor here, therefore, should be flying 'backwards'. Indeed Mr. Schwab seems to have doubts for later on he does in fact speak of 'the flight backwards'. The fourth flight is 'to the sidelines'. Here at least we are sure where the field is. It's on the ground, and we are the spectators watching some rather confused ball game. After this the metaphor gives up and item five becomes a 'sign', and item six a 'marked increase'. Well, it's done very well, and we couldn't really expect the field to go on flying about indefinitely—upwards, downwards, sideways, and so on. Perhaps it might have gone in spiral though, as that's a good curriculum metaphor.

The dignified language also deserves our notice. Thus the meaning of my gloss given above on flight two—'talking about principles rather than using them' is expressed by Mr. Schwab as 'a flight upward, from discourse about the subject of the field to discourse about discourse of the field, from *use* of principles and methods to *talk* about them, from grounded conclusions to the construction of models, from theory to metatheory, and from metatheory to metametatheory.' It is interesting that Mr. Schwab should entitle his piece 'a language for the curriculum'. By 'language' he does not of course mean language—it's another of these metaphors, which it would be interesting to look at.

If Mr. Schwab's style were confined to Mr. Schwab, it would be kinder to pass it over in silence. Unfortunately it is not. Several other papers in the book display similar characteristics; and not only in this book. In fact writings on curriculum frequently display an inability to write English. They use what may truly be described as 'jargon', that is, not an essential technical language, but a language of metaphors and abstractions, which get between the reader and the ideas. Worse still they get between the writer and his ideas. The 'Language of the Curriculum' is certainly a central problem in the 'field', but it is a different problem from that Mr. Schwab sees—from above, or from below, or from the sidelines.

ANDREW WILKINSON

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INTRODUCTION

THE current trends in sociology in general, have particular consequences for the sociology of education, since the outcome has been to focus concern on the immediate day to day concerns of the sociology of teaching in contrast to a previous concern for the sociology of education. The possible application of these current perspectives relate to everyday classroom behaviour, whereas the previous concern for the sociology of education often appeared to have more relevance for educational administrators and politicians. The first paper, therefore, is an attempt to clarify some of the basic issues and to give an overview of the field.

In the second paper, Roger Dale writes about one recent set of approaches, the phenomenological perspectives, and shows how these can be applied to analyses of the school.

The paper by Marten Shipman is of a different kind since he attempts to analyse the various recent perspectives in respect of the claims of sociology to be a science and its consequential claim to be superior to intelligent speculation.

Edith King takes one theorist, Erving Goffman, and attempts to apply some of his ideas to the analysis of classroom behaviour. Goffman's 'Presentation of Self in Everyday Life' is used by Dr. King as her basis for the analysis.

Michael F. D. Young contributes an article on the perspectives he has been instrumental in developing in the sociology of knowledge, and here he tackles the problems of relativism.

The contribution of William Tyler is a critical review of sociological approaches to the organisational structure of secondary schools. He analyses the bureaucratic model, and then the contingency approach, in an attempt to clarify the issues involved.

The work of Pierre Bourdieu has recently attracted some attention and it is therefore timely to have a paper by John Kennett assessing the contribution of this sociologist.

The concluding paper by Gerald Cortis is concerned with assessing the relationship between sociology and psychology. In it he

suggests that one problem of sociology is that of attracting a fringe of uninformed followers who may spawn false or easy-going prescriptions for the social ills of the times.

This ends this collection of papers on a useful note of caution about the too hasty application of new perspectives without a thorough assessment of their consequences.

ROLAND MEIGHAN

SOCIOLOGY AND TEACHING:
A REAPPRAISAL IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT
TRENDS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
EDUCATION

by ROLAND MEIGHAN
University of Birmingham

I. INTRODUCTION

SOCIOLOGY still tends to lack a clear public identity and sociologists are resigned to having to try to define the discipline as an opening to most discussions in which they become involved. This could well be a position of envy to others however, e.g. historians, who sometimes find it necessaary to correct a false or distorted image of their subject (Marwick 1970 p. 9).

Sociology is comprised of an increasing number of perspectives. In addition, there are within the discipline a number of disputes as to the nature of the enterprise, its aims, its scope and its relationship to other disciplines, e.g. social psychology. These disputes increase the difficulties of establishing any satisfactory definition. However, a definition is necessary in order to proceed and this will be taken here as an abbreviated form of that given by Marshall (1963 p. 27). Sociology will be taken to be the systematic study of human behaviour in groups especially when this behaviour leads to regular patterns which can be investigated in terms of their origins, persistence, transmission and change.

Underlying the various attempts to define Sociology there is a key premise that anyone new to the discipline might usefully bear in mind. It is that personal conduct and social life are significantly influenced by group life (taken to include group pressures, group norms and rules, and group cultures). How strong is this influence is a matter of dispute (Berger and Luckman 1967 p. 15). Some of the radical aspects of Sociology spring from this premise since it contradicts one 'common sense' view that individuals are responsible for their actions. Since this view still tends to dominate much institutional life including schools, sociological perspectives are

often disturbing. Even so, the extent to which Sociology has recently been interpreted as a liberating study has perhaps surprised many of its practitioners. Current Sociology courses appear to attract students who expect to find intellectual tools with which to expose the hypocritical world of their elders and so construct a new society with new values and new freedoms. The methodical survey designers and providers of data for policy makers of the 'old' sociology may suddenly find themselves faced with demands to be 'relevant' or suffer the label of Academic Lackeys of the Establishment. Sociologists have currently acquired a popular press image as Gurus of the Youth Culture or carriers of revolutionary doctrine and potentially, Molotov cocktails, as one writer puts it (Berger 1971). He goes on to comment on how this is rather ironic in the light of the history of sociology in that some of the most revered figures, Comte, Weber, Durkheim and Pareto for example, spent a considerable amount of time developing anti or counter revolutionary ideas refuting Marxism and refuting the links between sociology and political radicalism.

2. THE AIMS OF SOCIOLOGY

The aims of Sociology are thus in dispute. Firstly, there is a 'pure' versus 'applied' controversy. On the one hand, there is the view that the aim of sociology is to increase understanding by suspending judgement as long as possible, with the prescription of action to change as either a by-product or a secondary aim. On the other hand, there is the view that prescription for change is the major concern of the discipline.

Another aim arouses rather less controversy although some recent comment has introduced a different perspective here (Berger and Luckmann 1967 p. 33). It is that the aim is to improve on 'common sense' or folk interpretations of social behaviour to become the new 'common sense'. Sociologists are used to the charge that their findings and observations are just common sense although the more one studies Sociology, the more inaccurate this assertion appears. Indeed the liberating influence of sociology on individual thinking and awareness is often due to its frequent refutations of folk interpretations of social reality.

That the intention is to analyse the actual behaviour in social situations rather than rely on what people think happens or claim to be the case, arouses less dispute amongst sociologists. It may

disturb those being investigated or observed and this is one of the radical aspects of the enterprise and it also raises some ethical issues about rights to privacy (Peterson 1966).

3. SOME RADICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIOLOGY

Wherever sociology is taught it tends to have a disturbing effect and there are several possible reasons for this. The first has been mentioned: it casts doubt upon the notion of individual accountability for actions and suggests an alternative insight into the complex collective, social nature of human actions.

The second reason relates to the aim of analysing actual behaviour since this requires that sociologists must refuse to take situations at their face value and are neither able to accept official definitions of situations uncritically nor those of the participants. The sociologists' task is here analogous to that of the detective: everyone and everything is open to suspicion.

Another disturbing effect of sociology lies in the intention to improve on 'common sense' since this threatens the taken-for-granted aspects of social behaviour and exposes some of the folk interpretations on which behaviour is based, as false or distorted.

A fourth reason is that in attempting to be scientific, the discipline takes on a relative, non-ethnocentric viewpoint. Comparative studies of other cultures, other groups, and other institutions undertaken in this way are threatening since they expose the accepted and familiar way of behaving to comparisons which may be interpreted as unfavourable. This approach allows one to be part of one's own culture yet at the same time out of it and the subversive nature of this perspective has been described by Postman and Weingartner (1969, p. 17) in their analysis of teaching.

The more recently developed perspectives in sociology tend to be radical in the ways considered above. This can easily lead to the error that sociology is automatically subversive of established patterns and this error can then feed the rather puritan expectation of students described earlier. That these perspectives tend to be phenomenological (Berger and Luckman, 1967, p. 34) has also contributed to the notion that the 'new' sociology has radical attributes. The alternative proposition is that sociology is conservative in its implications for established patterns. Berger (1971) offers another possibility that is perhaps more convincing. It is that sociology is simultaneously radical and conservative. Similarly all the

various perspectives are both subversive and conservative. He relates this to the view that the psychology and physiology of humans is such that they require both order and novelty in their existence. Sociology, he concludes, is only subversive in a specific way through its liberating effects on consciousness but in this process it also points up the social limits of freedom, and the importance of triviality and mere routine as necessary conditions for both individual and collective sanity. (This is an over-simplified summary of a complex argument and readers might with profit refer to the original article.)

4. SCHOOLS AND SOCIOLOGISTS

It is perhaps useful to consider at this point why schools in particular are of interest to sociologists. One of the pertinent features of schools is their position as an agency in the socialisation process. School is an inescapable fact of life for all but a few in contemporary Britain. Therefore schools are an important part of the process of becoming socialised, of experiencing the various cultures and sub-cultures, of transmitting, perpetuating and developing attitudes and ideologies.

A second reason derives from the first. Schools are a rare type of institution in that attendance is compulsory for substantial periods of time. They have some of the features of total institutions described by Goffman (1961) with interesting consequences from a sociological point of view.

Other reasons relate to the complex functions of schools. One set of functions has been described as 'people processing' (Swift 1969 p. 44). Schools screen, assess, and grade the population for occupations and therefore significantly influence their life chances (*see* Abrams 1964).

But schools are simultaneously involved in 'knowledge processing' (Young 1971 p. 25) since some knowledge is selected, deemed to be of higher status and embodied in a curriculum. The schools thus transmit and maintain a complex stratification of knowledge since first of all it is selected into high and low status, and then within that deemed to be high status, further rankings occur. In the Schools Council Sixth Form Curriculum and Examinations Project (Reid 1971, p. 35), one illustration of this is found. The acceptability of the various G.C.E. 'A' level subjects for University Entrance shows wide variation. Mathematics has very high acceptability and Domestic Science very low acceptability with the other subjects ranked

between these two extremes. A further complication is that ranking can occur within a subject. In the case of Art, the art forms of sculpture and painting tend to have high status whilst the art forms of photography and gardening tend to have low status. (A connection with the high culture/low culture dichotomy is suggested here since the art forms most popular with adults are gardening and photography and those least frequently pursued are sculpture and painting.)

Another interesting feature of schools for sociologists lies in the links between schools and other institutions within the social structure e.g. the family, the economic, political and the religious institutions. Complex reciprocal sets of relationships exist here and these have implications for social change (Bernstein 1967). It is not yet clear to what extent schools are potential rather than actual agencies of change in the short, mid or long term. At present, the consensus of opinion seems to be that other institutions tend to influence school more frequently than the reverse (Banks 1968 p. 20).

5. SOCIOLOGY AND TEACHING

The most direct relevance of sociology to teaching lies in the notion that teachers are applied social scientists. They apply some version, even if only of a folk-lore type, of psychology, economics and sociology as well as philosophy and history to the task of teaching. Teachers apply sociology since they use group situations to attempt to change the behaviour of children and are usually required to operate within an institutional setting. They teach within an intricate web of social relationships which is both internal and external to the schools (Eggleston 1967 p. 3).

Teachers may unwittingly be applied sociologists or this may be a conscious identification. So in either case they may be effective, partially effective or ineffective. A knowledge of the sociology of education holds out no guarantee of a more effective pedagogy. It does, one feels, increase the chances of an improvement in pedagogy and if it does not, the point of teaching it becomes obscure. This is a modest claim for the influence of the sociology of education, but perhaps a realistic one.

The dangers of inadequate teaching or inadequate learning here cannot be ignored and Hargreaves (1972) reminds us of the possibilities of a Sociological Myth developing whereby a fatalistic psychological view of individual causality is replaced by a fatalistic sociological view of environmental determinism where the evidence

available is distorted into the propositions that if a child comes from a 'bad' background, this is a sufficient explanation of his problems in school and that since these factors are outside the control of the school, the teacher can do little to help. Another Myth to which a distorted account of sociological material has contributed is that of Cultural Deprivation (Friedman 1967) where cultural differences are misinterpreted as an absence of culture.

A second reason why teachers may usefully take account of sociology lies in the growing body of evidence to support the proposition that although some teachers may intuitively be effective applied sociologists, many are not. What is thought to go on in schools and what is said to go on has been shown to differ markedly from the actual behaviour recorded and analysed (Holt 1964, Hargreaves 1967, Lacey 1970). Barnes, Britton and Rosen (1969) give a striking example when they show that although most teachers claim that the development of language skills in children is a major aim, many teach in such a way that this is prevented. Instead, the classroom becomes a place where the teacher gets unlimited opportunities to develop *his* powers of language particularly, but not exclusively, in secondary schools.

(a) *The Hidden Curriculum*

Other studies have attempted to show various unintended consequences of the ways in which teachers organise learning. Jackson (1971) uses the term the Hidden Curriculum to describe the unofficial three R's that must be learnt in order to survive comfortably in many classrooms, Rules, Routines and Regulations. Pupils must learn to cope with the delay, denial and interruptions that accompany school experiences. Delay occurs when pupils wait in assembly, wait in corridors, wait their turn for apparatus, wait for lessons to start, wait for the teacher to become available or wait to be invited to answer a question. Indeed it is quite startling how this mounts up so that some children may spend a majority of their time coping with delay. Denial occurs when pupils cannot talk among themselves, cannot ask questions, cannot pursue a chosen activity or cannot have a turn on the apparatus because time has run out. Interruptions occur for pupils when the bell goes, the nurse arrives to check hair, the apparatus is needed elsewhere or the teacher is called away during a discussion. Jackson (1971) concludes, '. . . . for most students some of the time, and for some students most of the time, the

classroom comes close to resembling a cage from which there is no escape.' (p. 13).

Pupils devise various strategies to cope with the official curriculum, some of which avoid confrontation with the teacher whilst reducing effective learning. These include 'resignation' or ceasing to hope, 'masquerade' or faking involvement, and 'right answerism' or reading teachers' cues to the required response.

(b) *The Social Nature of Learning*

These and other observations contribute to an analysis of the social nature of learning in contrast to the psychological analysis of the individual nature of learning. A first aspect of this is the institutional setting of school learning. A school develops conventions, rituals and routines to solve its administrative problems. It organises children into groups, classes or houses, distributes parcels of time for subjects or activities and allocates accommodation and facilities. These have been shown to have a marked influence on the consciousness of those within the school as they become taken for granted aspects of behaviour (see Bennett and Bennett 1970). The study of one organisational practice, streaming (Lacey 1970), shows how even pupils used to a best pupil role and used to being successful in school, tend to have their consciousness structured by accepting the schools' definition of the situation so that many come to accept a lower stream label, a poor pupil role, low success rates and anti-school attitudes. This differentiation is shown to be a large extent independent of I.Q. or social class.

Another aspect of the social nature of learning refers to the complex dependence on the immediate environment or situation. Pupils are not just interpreting new knowledge (itself of social origin), but the cues and attitudes accompanying it. These include the status of the new knowledge (this is mathematics not P.E. and it is deemed to be of more importance), the use of the information (with maths I can pass examinations to get a better job), the reaction of peers (our group dislikes the History teacher and his subject) and the relationship to other knowledge (my father thinks metalwork important because it is practical knowledge).

A further consideration is the use of language as the main vehicle of learning since this is a social, not an individual construct. It is external to us, created by others, and constrains our thinking. Some of the constructs were established by groups long since dead and

the ideas are all the more powerful because they are deeply embedded and taken for granted. 'Since one cannot possibly talk back to one's ancestors, their ill-conceived constructions are commonly more difficult to get rid of than those built in our lifetime' (Berger 1966 p. 101). Examples include the prevalence of dichotomies in the English language (e.g. black/white, good/bad, strong/weak) with many consequent over-simplifications of complex phenomena (de Bono 1971) and the prevalence of rural imagery in an industrial society (Seabrook 1971) and, to a lesser extent, military imagery.

These aspects of the social nature of learning in schools provide a useful corrective to the psychological models derived from animal experiments and laboratory work (Esland 1971).

(c) *The Conflict Nature of Learning*

Teachers may be ineffective as applied sociologists without an appreciation of the conflict nature of learning in school. This aspect of learning has received more attention recently (Geer 1971) and a number of propositions have emerged. One is that conflict arises because teaching involves an assault on a culture where the aim is to change one culture into another. This attempt may become labelled as compensatory education (Friedman 1967).

A second proposition is that conflict arises because of status differences. Teachers are defined as adult, superior, authoritative and relatively permanent members of the school whereas pupils are defined as children or adolescents, inferior, ignorant and relatively temporary members of the school. These status differences are re-inforced by the teachers' mandate to make children learn. Even in 'open' or 'democratic' systems, teachers are required to do this even if the means are more subtle or there appears to be less of a con-frontation.

A third proposition is that conflict arises because attendance is compulsory therefore marking off school learning as different to the incidental, personal and informal learning that takes place outside school. This latter type of learning has built-in reliefs and face-saving devices to reduce any feelings of obligation or inferiority engendered (e.g. 'what a useful idea! I shall copy that. Let me buy you a drink on the strength of it!') These devices are difficult to maintain in a situation of compulsory attendance where one person is required to make the other learn.

A fourth proposition is that conflict arises because teaching does

not normally provide for client selection. Lawyers and doctors are able to 'manage' client selection to some extent whereas a teacher's clients are usually allocated. Conversely, pupils cannot select or change their teachers easily as they can their doctors and lawyers (Geer 1966). Disputes that do arise are thereby denied one effective solution—mutual avoidance.

The alternative model of teaching to the conflict version is that it is imparting knowledge and this version is limited in its provision of explanations of actual school behaviour. The conflict model provides some important correctives. The disillusionment of some teachers with their training institutions may well be related to a tendency to the use by college staffs of the imparting knowledge model. A consequence may be the subsequent adoption of equally inadequate staffroom models of individual pupil or cultural inadequacy, to cope with the situations found in schools.

(d) *The Sociology of Knowledge*

One reason for the interest of sociologists in schools as given earlier was that they simultaneously process people and knowledge. This latter aspect has only recently received attention from sociologists (Young 1971) and the work being developed here concerns teachers in their task as applied sociologists.

The notion of knowledge stipulated here is relativistic because knowledge for this purpose is defined as what the participants believe or think is knowledge, and non-evaluative because an attempt is made to suspend judgment as to which categories of knowledge are superior. This allows the assumptions on which the categories are based to be examined. Furthermore knowledge may be taken to include information, experiences and expectations. This apparently unwieldy and imprecise definition of knowledge is proving fruitful for posing sociological questions. These include the sources of categories of knowledge, the reasons given for ranking some knowledge as superior or preferable, the interested groups promoting these interpretations, the result of a confrontation of two rival interpretations (e.g. Evolution and Genesis), the nature of ideas rejected or avoided (e.g. Social Science in Schools, Sex education), and the nature of ideas restricted by organisational features (e.g. school democracy).

The investigations and analysis undertaken so far suggest a number of interim propositions. From a study of the organisation of the

official curriculum (Bernstein 1971) it is suggested that the way knowledge is disseminated in a collection type (often subject based) or an integrated type curriculum (often theme based), has important consequences for the behaviour of teachers and pupils, for organisational decisions and for strategies of curriculum change.

From studies of classroom behaviour (Jackson 1971) it appears that the knowledge, in terms of information, experiences and expectations that pupils gain, can be described by reference to both an official curriculum and a hidden curriculum with important consequences for the behaviour of pupils and teachers.

From studies of the knowledge teachers gain about pupils, derived from informal and formal assessments, it appears that the information on which they base their pedagogy may frequently be inaccurate, inadequate or inappropriate (Rosenthal 1968, Holt 1964, Barnes et al 1969, Morrison and MacIntyre 1969 p. 169).

From studies of the knowledge the teacher has of his role, his perceptions of it and his expectations, it is suggested that there is no consensus amongst teachers about their role (Ryans 1960), no common reference to rational criteria in decision making (Taylor 1970), and an ambiguous, conflicting perception of power within the classroom as against within the school (Taylor 1971).

Finally, the complex stratification of knowledge, as outlined earlier, that results in some knowledge being deemed high status and some low status, has important effects on the behaviour of teachers and pupils (Young 1971).

6. CONCLUSION

One can discern a number of possible stages in the development of the sociology of education, and their significance for teaching. These paralleled the stages in the foci of public debates about education which appear to have moved from a consideration of equality of opportunity, to the assessment of the wastage of talent, and more recently to the curriculum (Young 1971, p. 20).

In the first stage, the consideration of equality of opportunity, the relevance of sociological perspectives for teachers were perhaps of a third order of being well informed about the apparently administrative decisions needed to cope with the social class nature of unequal opportunity.

The relevance moved to a second order of being involved in discussion and deliberations about selection and comprehensive schools related to the notion of a wastage of talent.

In the last few years, the relevance of sociological perspectives to teachers has apparently moved into a first order stage with a consideration of the curriculum and the questions raised here about subject teaching, team teaching, integrated studies and pedagogical styles since these are of immediate day to day concern in teaching.

These current trends in the sociology of education are related, to some extent, to the development of the phenomenological perspectives which are also concerned with immediate day to day aspects of experience. This is in contrast to many of the older structural functionalist approaches which tended to be looking at macro-sociological questions of a second and third order relevance in this respect.

This may also be described to some extent as a shift from concern with the sociology of education in general to concern with the sociology of teaching in particular. The sociological perspectives involved are thus essential in helping to give as full a diagnosis of the problems of teaching as possible alongside the current insights of psychology, history and philosophy. The applied sociological aspects of pedagogy can no longer be held off as relevant only to educational administrators and politicians since the notions of a hidden curriculum or teaching as a conflict situation or the school as knowledge processing are related to teacher pupil behaviour every day in every classroom.

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PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE SCHOOL

by ROGER DALE
The Open University

I. INTRODUCTION

EVEN in the widely recognised current state of flux in socio-logical theory, variously conceived of as a crisis (Gouldner 1971) or as preceding a 'paradigm shift' (Friedrichs 1970), the recent growth of interest in the application of phenomenology to sociology has been remarkable. The translation of the works of Alfred Schutz (Schutz 1962, 1964, 1966, 1967, Wagner 1970) provided access for English-speaking sociologists to the major effort to apply the principles and methodology of philosophical phenomenology (whose key exponent, for Schutz, was Edmund Husserl) to the study of the social world. There had been other, less systematic, attempts to introduce this approach to English speaking sociology, but it was still possible to say, in a book published in 1966, that 'only by indirect references or by means of a single concept (Weber's Verstehen) has the phenomenological viewpoint entered American sociological theory' (Bruyn, 1966, 61). Interest in the approach has developed rapidly, however, especially in the United States, through the work of Douglas (1967, 1971a, 1971b), and the ethnomethodologists among whom Garfinkel (1967) and Cicourel (1964, 1968) are leading figures.

It is not the aim of this paper to provide a detailed history of this movement, or to delve deeply into the problems of philosophical phenomenology and its relation to sociology, which has in any case recently received excellent treatment (Phillipson, 1972). The aim is rather to indicate what appear to be some central components of the phenomenological perspective in sociology, and how it might fruitfully be applied to sociological studies of the school. This is not to imply an uncritical acceptance of the perspective—apparent shortcomings will be considered below, and the potential value of a phenomenologically informed perspective in studies of schools (or any other organisations) examined.

2. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

What follows is only an outline of this topic and the reader may be referred elsewhere for more detailed treatment (Schutz, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1967, Berger and Luckmann, 1967, McHugh, 1968, Wagner 1970, Douglas, 1967, 1971a, 1971b, Filmer et al, 1972). Phenomenology essentially starts from paying attention to things only as they appear to us, as phenomena. This leads, in sociological applications of phenomenology, to a stress on the actor's subjective understanding of the social world. It leads, too, to a direction of sociological analysis to a micro, or social psychological level; the concentration on the social world as it appears to the actor, and his interpretations of it, leads to everyday reality being regarded as the paramount reality. Thus Schutz's energies were directed towards the goal of elucidating the interpretations people put on their actions, and he concentrated on what he called 'the natural attitude'—'that perceptual stance with which ordinary people approach the world of daily life'. The emphasis in phenomenology on 'returning to the things themselves' directs us away from much traditional sociological analysis, for, following that precept, the world must be recognised as it is directly experienced by actors and not as it is mediated through imposed sociological concepts. (An enhanced understanding of the phenomenological approach may be gained from comparing it with the behaviourist approach, something which Douglas (1971a) and Tyriakian (1968) have done most tellingly.) Sociologists using a phenomenological approach recognise a primary duty to develop an understanding of, and to describe, the subjective meanings of human action.

The aim is to be realised through the phenomenological method. This involves 'bracketing', holding in suspension all beliefs and preconceptions about the social world, (by no means the same as 'declaring our biases') and attempting to discover the meanings imputed to their words by the actors present in them. Nothing is to be taken for granted about the social world—sociologists must rather seek to understand the processes by which the actors in the situation make sense ot it. The sense of, and the need for, thus holding our preconceptions in suspense in our studies of schools has been provided by Howard S. Becker.

'We may have understated a little the difficulty of observing contemporary classrooms ... I think ... that it is, first and foremost a matter of it all being so familiar that it becomes almost impossible to single out events that occur in the classroom as things that have

occurred, even when they happen right in front of you . . . it takes a tremendous effort of will and imagination to stop seeing only the things that are conventionally "there" to be seen.' (quoted in Wax, 1972, 10).

Two examples drawn from the context of the school may illustrate the importance of this point. When we observe children in schools, we may speak of, and think of, them as 'learning', or 'playing'. Yet both these descriptions of children's activities represent the imposition of our categories as observers on the children's activities and may not be seen by them in the same light at all. Philip Jackson has made the point with regard to learning that we should cease going into classrooms and saying 'these children are learning arithmetic or English or whatever, how are they going about it?', we should rather go into classrooms and observe what the children are actually doing, and then ask, 'what are they learning?' (Jackson 1968).

Similarly, activities which classroom observers characterize as 'play' may have none of the same meaning for the observed children which 'play' has for adults. If the adult performed the activity he calls play when he observes the child performing it, then indeed he may widely be recognized by adult observers as 'playing'. But he then goes on to tell the child that he is 'playing' when performing that activity and so a self-perpetuating process is set in motion. The importance of this point is not confined to these two examples, for there is a powerful tendency for all studies and analyses of actors' behaviour made by sociologists to be set out in terms of what they would mean to the sociologist if he were performing that particular action.

The major task of the phenomenologically inclined sociologist, then, is that of description, and a major criterion of validity of such descriptions is that they be acknowledged as valid by members of the social world being described. A second major phenomenological imperative is that of constitution. Phenomenologists see man not as a mere passive recipient of his world but as an active interpreter and constructor of it. The phenomenological sociologist must therefore seek to elucidate the process whereby actors generate and maintain their view of the social world. This has been a chief aim of the ethnomethodologists (Garfinkel 1967, Cicourel 1968, Douglas 1971a); they have sought to lay bare the rules, conventions, procedures and so on in terms of which social life operates, often by assuming the existence of such a rule or convention, and then

'proving' its existence by deliberately disrupting it (see especially Garfinkel 1967).

This concern with constitution, with the process of world shaping, leads to consideration of the key phenomenological concept of 'inter-subjectivity', which contains the notion that much of what each individual takes for granted is taken for granted by others, too, that most of the meanings he imputes are *shared* meanings. Intersubject-ivity assumes that different actors will act in similar ways in similar circumstances. Persons take it for granted that others are basically like themselves and that under normal circumstances there exists a sufficient congruency in their definitions of the situation for all practical purposes. This leads to an apprehension of objects and aspects actually known by me and potentially known by you as everyone's knowledge, which comes to be conceived of as autonomous and absolute. This notion of the intersubjective holding of meanings introduces discussion of two further concepts, neither of them initially developed within phenomenology, but both of them extend-ing and enriching the perspective, reification, and the definition of the situation.

The actor does not suspend belief in the properties of his social world as the social phenomenologist does; rather he may be said to suspend disbelief, what Schutz calls 'the epoché of the natural attitude.' The actor sees the world as largely given and immutable. As Silverman suggests 'the reification of social phenomena is part of the "natural" attitude of everyday life in which the world appears as a collection of objectified typifications both solid and real. A phe-nomenological consciousness leads to a suspension of belief in the reality of these objects and an analysis of the social processes through which human definitions are objectivated by members' (1972, 168); while for John Horton, 'from the phenomenological viewpoint, the reified and objective character of social reality are human accom-plishments yet to be described.' (Horton 1971, 180).

Thus, it is not only sociologists' categories which the phenomenolo-gist must elucidate, but those of members, too. The constitutive imperative directs the phenomenologist to the process by which members' typifications are formed. Analysis of this process provides important insights into what it is that characterizes a particular group. What aspects of the social world which confronts them do they typify in a manner peculiar to their group, and in what degree of detail are their typifications elaborated? The areas of a group's activity described by them in 'out of the ordinary' terms point to what it is

that makes group a group. Such an approach to the different level and detail of teachers' and pupils' intra and extra-school accounts of the same objects or experiences would provide valuable pointers to what it is that characterizes schools as organizations in the eyes of their members. Its emphasis on the necessity for dereification seems to us one of the major strengths of the phenomenological perspective in the analysis of schools. Many existing sociological studies of education describe what happens in terms of a reified social system rather than in terms of the actor's own view of his situation. Thus, for instance, the 'system' is seen as 'warming up' or 'cooling out' individuals in schools (Smith 1973); it is at least conceivable that the individuals involved may see the situation rather differently. Employing a phenomenological perspective, 'a profession, an organization, an ability range are no longer treated as "real" things or as objects which (in the case of the first two) take action to meet their need; they are viewed instead as labels which members are to make sense of their activities and as ideologies used to defend these activities to others' (Silverman 1972, 168).

3. THE DEFINITION OF THE SITUATION

A somewhat different tradition in sociology has produced the idea of the analysis of actors' definition of the situation as of central importance in understanding the social world—its central tenet is W. I. Thomas's famous dictum: 'if men define situations as real they are real in their consequences' (Thomas 1928, 572). Quite obviously, this perspective has a great deal in common with the phenomenological perspective briefly outlined above. There are clear similarities, for instance, between the concepts of the definition of the situation and 'the construction of reality' and Donald Ball has recently suggested that 'Thomas is basically arguing (through the theorem and elsewhere) that in order to understand social conduct we must look to existential causality, that is to the meanings of situations and the situated meanings within them as they are phenomenologically experienced by actors located within them' (Ball 1972, 62). However, the concept of the definition of the situation does involve the consideration of a number of areas not usually emphasised in the phenomenological perspective, areas which can extend and enrich the phenomenological perspective.

The definition of the situation leads to a greater concentration on the nature of the situation the actor is involved in than does a

strictly phenomenological perspective. The situation is implicitly viewed as existing prior to the individual and thus of having a history. Similarly, whilst a strictly phenomenological method involves setting oneself 'outside history', at the same time it tacitly acknowledges that the actors in the situation too, have personal histories. Sociologists strive to enter a situation without presuppositions; they must not assume that the actors they study there do so.

This implies that the way actors define situations, the meanings they attach to them, are not chosen from an infinite menu of all possible definitions of that situation, but are restricted by the range of presuppositions they bring to the situation as products of their personal biographies. Furthermore, to come much closer to 'mainstream' sociology, these presuppositions are not randomly distributed across the population under study, but are systematically linked with other facets of actors' personal biographies. As Becker and Geer have pointed out 'people carry culture with them, when they leave one group setting for another they do not shed its cultural premises' (Becker and Geer, 1960, 305). This proposition is graphically evidenced in Dumont and Wax's (1969) study of a Cherokee Indian classroom where the cultural presuppositions white teachers and Indian pupils had of each other, the tools with which they constructed their definitions of the classroom situation, were incompatible. Similarly, aspects of any situation are so historically determined in a number of ways as to act as constraints on possible definitions of the situation. There are, for instance, a number of characteristic features which severely delimit the possible definitions of school situations, their legal constitution being only the most formal of these. (Dale 1972). Consideration of the possibility of individuals or groups of actors ignoring the situational constraints on the definition of the situation and defining it in ways of their own raises the central question of power, which much phenomenological sociology appears to neglect.

The power aspect becomes most visible in the recognition that definitions of situations are *negotiated*—they are not preformed, though the cognitive and affective building blocks from which they are constructed are, like all material goods and symbolic meanings, socially distributed in various ways. Negotiation takes place as much in areas of social life covered by rules as it does in other areas. Though the implications of the negotiation of definitions of the situation have been most fully considered in the area of psychiatric diagnosis (Scheff 1968), sociologists have fruitfully employed this approach in the study of the workings of complete organizations (Strauss

et al 1964), while some preliminary ideas about the value of the notion in the analysis of schools have been adumbrated by Esland (1972) and Dale (1972).

4. THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE SCHOOL

In a number of respects, schools are particularly appropriate foci of a phenomenologically informed sociological perspective. For schools, more than most organizations, are consciously seen by those acting within them as constructed, as different and temporary worlds. The centrality (Dawe, 1970) of their life in schools in members' systems of priorities, and thus the consciousness of its difference from other more central, taken for granted worlds, varies within and between categories of members. One category of members, the pupils, is present involuntarily and may thus be led to a greater awareness of the constructed, imposed nature of the school world—pupils come to the school to some extent as strangers (see Schutz, 1964, 90–104; Esland, 1972), and may themselves invest a different level of belief in the school world from that they invest in other of the social worlds they inhabit. They interpret the school world through the meaning systems of the groups they come from and see as more central. For the other main group of members of the school, the teachers, the social world of the school may be no less consciously constructed, though seen as more central in their system of values. Teachers may not only 'carry over' from their other social worlds basically different meaning systems, but may also find greater areas of those meaning systems relevant, due to the greater centrality the school world holds for them than for the pupils. A key question for the sociology of the school then becomes 'which members "carry over" what meanings from what other social groups?'

Beyond this, there is a tendency, neatly encapsulated by Howard Becker in the quotation above, to assume that we know most of the important things about schools. We 'know' broadly what they are for, broadly what goes on in them, and so when we seek to explain differences between them, in, say, the attainment of the goals we know they share, we are led to look at how effectively and efficiently they carry out their tasks, and at how the raw material they have to work on influences that process.

A phenomenologically informed sociology of the school, on the other hand, leads us to scrutinize and locate the very labels 'school',

'teacher' and 'pupil'. In everyday educational discourse, 'the school' is regularly referred to as having this, that, or the other characteristic, as being 'good' or 'bad', as promoting this but forbidding that, and so on. What 'the school' means in any of these contexts becomes, upon the slightest examination, by no means clear. In one case it may be synonymous with 'the headteacher'; another usage of it may be as a shorthand term to denote a complex process whose features are well known to everyone involved. But, even granting the validity of either of these substitutions, which a phenomenologically in-formed perspective would not, there remain uses of 'school' which defy description or elucidation even by those members who use them, and 'know what they mean' when they do so. Such description and elucidation is a major task of a phenomenological sociology of the school—and it indicates also one way in which such an approach can extend and improve upon members' descriptions, without distorting them or being 'untrue' to the data themselves. To pass the test of 'member acknowledgement of validity' it is not necessary that sociologists' accounts be *identical* with members.

There are further aspects of the very basic labels 'teacher' and 'pupil' which would profit from careful analysis. We take them so much for granted as an essential part of the school scene (and indeed they may be essential—for it may be that what ultimately defines school and separates them from other social organisations, is the distinction between teacher and taught. Whether or not this is so, the point under discussion holds) that we come not to see them as labels at all. And we thus do not follow the precepts of labelling theory, which as Schur (1971, 131–6) has pointed out has a great deal in common with a phenomenological approach—though see also Douglas (1971b, 145–7) and investigate how and where these labels are conferred, and how the labelled react to them.

Existing British studies in the sociology of the school have rarely used a phenomenological perspective and have tended to accept as valid and consistent 'what everyone knows' about the school, and what 'the school' says about itself.

There have been a number of studies of the school as a social organization. These have largely sought to apply concepts developed in the studies of other forms of organization to the school, and have thus largely tended to take for granted the validity of the educators' problems (Young, 1971, introduction) and apply these preformed analytic concepts to the school. They do, in fact, use as resources what a phenomenological perspective would take as its topic; that is

they take as a starting point the school's own account of itself, rather than treating it as problematic and asking how that particular structured account of the world came about, what purposes it serves for whom within the school, and what versions of it are seen as useful rhetorics (in Ball's (1967) sense) to offer to the school's various interested audiences.

Another approach to the sociology of the school more compatible with, but pointing up clearly some important features of the phenomenological perspective by its difference from it, was employed in the parallel studies of Hargreaves (1967) and Lacey (1970). Both used participant observation as their major methodological tool, and studied their schools 'from the inside' for prolonged periods. This did not lead, however, to the sorts of account which a phenomenological approach would have produced. Instead, these authors, too, employed concepts developed prior to their studies, or regarded as unproblematic important aspects of the school's day to day functioning. An interesting parallel may be drawn for instance between Lacey's account of the process of allocation of pupils to streams and those of Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963, 1968). These studies remain, however, much the most useful we have on the sociology of the school in Britain.

Though there are considerable similarities between participant observation as a technique and a phenomenologically informed approach to sociology, as Bruyn (1966, Appendix B) has shown, we should not assume that the common appropriateness of an investigatory technique means that all the theoretical approaches informing that technique are identical, or even compatible. Consider, for instance, the relationship of the phenomenological perspective and the popular 'Flanders' type interaction analysis (Flanders, 1970). As Walker (1972) has pointed out, the atomising of the classroom inevitable under such analysis leads to a disregard of the context boundedness of the meanings of statements. He exemplifies this by the various meanings imputable when a teacher asks a child 'what are you doing?' The meaning of the words will be different if asked of a child day dreaming in the back row, than if asked of a child grappling with a laboratory experiment.

We can take this critique further by picking up Cicourel's (1971) use of notions of deep and surface structure. What the interaction analyst sees is the surface structure of the situation; he records the outsider's view of the communications and modes of communication in the classroom situation. He explicitly rejects, for instance,

the paralinguistic mode. He thus misses all of the 'non public' communication amongst the group. He does not attempt to seek out the 'interpretive procedures' (Cicourel, 1971), which enable members of the group to, literally or metaphorically, 'complete each others sentences', and which provide the actor with a basis for making sense of his environment, and a sense of social structure which orients him to the relevance and situational appropriateness of surface rules. We can perhaps see this most clearly in schools in the ready ability of teachers and pupils to co-operate in putting on a 'perform-ance' for a visitor. The possibilty of doing this rests on a common understanding of the deep structure of the classroom world, as well as of perceivedly more acceptable meanings which can be switched without the observer recognizing the process.

Recently, the phenomenological perspective has informed a number of theoretical discussions of the school. Keddie (1971) has made an important attempt to employ this perspective in a partici-pant observation study examining 'what teachers know' about their pupils and how that knowledge is related to the organization of curriculum knowledge in the classroom. Esland (1971, 1972) has suggested a study of teachers' pedagogic, subject and career perspec-tives, and ways of analysing the ways in which teachers and pupils jointly construct the social reality of the school, a topic developed also by Dale (1972). Young in the introduction to a collection of readings heralding new directions for the sociology of education (Young, 1971), makes a number of suggestions for the kinds of research area opened up by a suspension of the acceptance of the taken for granted categories of the actors in the school situation. A most important feature of much of this work is its explicit link to the sociology of knowledge. It does not assume an a-historical situation populated by anonymous actors, who do not exist outside that situation, which is a very real danger of the phenomenological approach. Further, it makes explicit that much of what happens, much of what is assumed about social situations by those interacting in them, is accountable for only in terms of the actors' biographies and their own identities. And it seeks by the use of phenomeno-logical method to make clear the processes by which these links are articulated.

There remain clearly, vast areas of life in schools which might fruitfully be illuminated by the case of the phenomenological per-spective For instance, we might begin to study the phenomenological impact of the school on the child. It has recently been argued

(Kanter, 1972) that this impact is bureaucratic, even at the nursery stage—that is to say that the kinds of experiences the school provides for children adjust and attune their world orientations to bureaucracy. It is clear that there are many other facets to the impact schools have on children. The appearance and spatial layout on the school and classroom, for instance, provide cues for the child to the nature of authority and the structuring of interaction in a bureaucracy. The modes of address typical of interaction between different categories of members are one indication of the need for compartmentalization of the self and control of revelation of aspects of it, whilst typical paradigms of interaction in bureaucracies are contained in such things as what it is considered worthwhile to record in the school, and the means of recording used.

5. CRITIQUE

The great strength of a phenomenologically informed sociological perspective lies in its point of departure. It sets out to describe the experiences of the world of everyday life. It insists that sociologists be 'true to the data', that they do not indulge in intellectul games creating grand theories about the social world and then squeezing the social world into their categories. It saves us, too, from merely superficial findings through its emphasis on constituion as well as description. But it is hard to avoid feeling that for many sociologists using the perspective the provision of an 'insider's' description of a slice of the social world is sufficient. I have suggested above that to be acceptable to members the sociologist's description need not be identical with theirs, and that it could, and should, improve on theirs—as Tom Burns (1967) has written,

'The purpose of sociology is to achieve an understanding of social behaviour and social institutions which is different from that current among the people through whose conduct the institutions exist; an understanding which is not merely different but new and better. The practice of sociology is criticism. It exists to criticize claims about the value of achievement and to question assumptions about the meaning of conduct'.

The major weakness of the phenomenological approach is that it is concerned with the 'how' and not the 'why' of the social world. As John Horton (1971) has argued, phenomenological sociology is culturally, not politically, radical. In concentrating on the process of the construction of rules and conventions, phenomenologists tend not to ask 'why these rules and not others?' Somewhat ironically, it

can be argued that phenomenological sociologists concentrate on the surface structure rather than the deep structure of social life. They emphasise the immediate experiences and subjective meanings of everyday life; they do not seek to reveal the nature of the system of social relationships which governs the way those meanings are distributed within societies.

Allied to this concentration on the immediately observable features of everyday life is a lack of a sense of history in phenomenological accounts. Situations are, at least implicitly, assumed to have always existed as they are when the observer came upon them. As it is assumed to be given for the sociologist, so it is assumed to be given for the actor. Barry Hindness (1972) in the course of a fierce critique of Schutz, has drawn attention to this point. 'The effect of Schutz's humanism is a speculative empiricism of the surface phenomena of social formations in which social structures and historical events are reduced to given which govern but do not appear in the analysis'. (p. 23).

6. CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper has been to produce a brief summary of the phenomenological perspective in sociology and to show how it has been, and might be, applied to analyses of the school. Implicit in the account, and explicit in the previous section have been a number of criticisms of the perspective. It should not, however, be inferred from these criticisms that a phenomenologically informed perspective has no value in sociological studies of the school. It should be noted that almost every criticism of the approach involves its scope, not its basic tenets. The view taken here is that the detailed and sophisticated descriptions provided by phenomenological sociology are essential prerequisites of any theoretical work. As Jack Douglas (1967, 256) has written,

The *ideal* of this approach is to go from what people say and do in the real world situation upward toward an analysis of the patterns that can be found in their actions and the meanings of their statements and behaviour; then, only when the problems of these levels of investigation have been solved, to proceed to develop theories of the social meanings.

A phenomenological perspective, then, though not sufficient in itself, should be seen as a necessary precondition to any worthwhile sociology of the school.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

BIAS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION

by M. D. SHIPMAN
Senior Lecturer in Education, University of Keele

I. INTRODUCTION

THIS article is addressed to those involved in Education who form the audience for sociologists. It is an attempt to assess the contemporary contribution of the Sociology of Education as it has become involved in the rapid and radical changes within Sociology itself. In the sixties and seventies several new or revived sociological perspectives have proliferated. These include symbolic interaction, social phenomenology, ethnomethodology, dramaturgical sociology, reflexive sociology and the sociologies of science and knowledge. There is no space to discuss these approaches individually. The intention is to analyse the consequences of such a proliferation on the claims of Sociology to be a science.

Behind this assessment lies the view that the credibility of evidence depends ultimately on agreement among the professionals who practice the science in question (Ziman, 1968). Scientific knowledge is that confirmed by a scientific community. This confirmation is itself based on the exercise of discipline within that community.

Sociologists of Education have selected from these new or revived approaches *a la carte* to focus attention on a range of problems which were not previously considered problematic. These approaches have revitalised the Sociology of Education. But the variety of perspectives used and the way these have often been divorced from the sociological theories in which they originated makes it necessary to question the dependence that can be placed on the evidence presented.

The fundamental question is, 'do those who practise the discipline know more about the relevant aspects of the world than laymen'? It is not sufficient to show that Sociology increases understanding or brings insight. To be superior to speculation there must be some basis in evidence that can be relied on and this depends on the discipline exercised by sociologists. If the source of a discipline lies in the acceptance of standards of practice and of criteria of proof agreed

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among the professionals concerned, the scientific status of sociology can only be assessed by looking at the state of the scientific community of sociologists itself.

2. THE VALIDITY OF THE NEW PERSPECTIVES

There have been two important benefits from the new perspectives. First, arising out of the focus on interaction, on the different perspectives of those involved, the picture of the school and classroom appears real and convincing. The work of Young and others at the London Institute of Education and of the Open University, School and Society team rings true because the conflicts, compromises and charades of the classroom are familiar to those actually involved in teaching. Second, the range of questions about Education have been widened. What was taken for granted comes to be seen as a problem once the focus is shifted to the assumptions and definitions of all those involved in interaction within various forms of schooling. The critique that follows is a caution against a possible freezing of these new approaches. Their impact so far has been liberating. But all revolutions are prone to end in stagnant dogmatism.

The need for caution in interpreting the evidence presented can be demonstrated by applying to these writers the same approaches that they use themselves. If a question for teachers is, 'what right have you to define this curriculum as important for those children', so it is legitimate to ask what right sociologists have to assume that their version of what is going on is superior to that of other observers, particularly the teachers who are most involved.

The difficulty can be illustrated from social phenomenology, the biggest single influence behind these new approaches. The basic assumption is that man does not discover a given reality, he constructs it for himself. But a course (Open University, 1972), that starts with the proposition that 'reality is what an individual defines as real', is doomed to be contradictory. Thus when social class is later used in explanation it is taken as a given fact of life, not something that is real only because individuals define it as real. The idea of a socially constructed reality is applied selectively to avoid having to agree with lay critics who argue that social class does indeed exist only in the mind, particularly in the minds of sociologists.

This example reveals an unresolved difficulty in using social phenomenology. The sociologist concerned is only able to use the

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very concepts which he is analysing. As he produces ideas about the social origins of knowledge, the origins of his ideas are open to challenge. Yet sociologists, like other scientists, manage to preserve a public image of detachment, while promulgating the view that all knowledge is tainted with the values and interests of particular, and usually powerful social groups. In practice, those using phenomenological and interactionist perspectives should be the first to acknowledge publicly that their evidence is the joint product of the scenes they observe and the eyes with which they do the observing. Social phenomenologists in particular, having exposed the ideological bias in the Sociology of Education and among teachers, have then used phenomenology as a screen for their own slanted views.

This danger that sociologists may exclude their own motives from their interpretation of the social construction of reality is an example of the gap between public image and private substance. Within the professional community the views and affiliations of X and Y are well known and are discounted in their work. But the public rarely has access to such knowledge and the form of the scientific paper and the language used act as a barrier to ensure that the appearance of the detached, informed scientist is preserved (Shipman, 1972). This is particularly unfortunate when a growth area is reflexive sociology. It may be uneconomic for part of the rapid increase in numbers of sociologists to become patricidal experts in reflecting upon the actions of other sociologists, but it should have resulted in greater public knowledge of the way evidence is coloured by the allegiances of the writer. Once a new direction is marked out it tends to be 'eyes front and quick march'. Sociology, like pop culture, has its fashions that attract an immediate following, give many opportunities for commercial enterprise and suffer rapid obsolescence. Nothing is more certain than that today's interpretation will be in tomorrow's dustbin, even if in the next generation's pantheon. A curious characteristic of sociologists is their ability as a species to practice both patricide and ancestor worship.

I am not qualified to go deeper into the philosophical problems involved in the sociology of knowledge. However, the attempt to account for the production, dominance and maintenance of particular forms of knowledge of the curriculum through reference to the interests of social groups is unlikely to give an accurate analysis and certain to give an incomplete one. Imagine an account of the development of the theory of relativity based on Einstein's involvement in some socially based thought system. There may be cases

where the persistence of some school subject can be traced to the actions of a particular social group protecting its interests, but the way the knowledge incorporated into that subject was produced and packaged is beyond satisfactory analysis in social terms. This may not be important if the object is only to show that the distribution of knowledge is an important means of social control. But it does mean that it is impossible to pass judgement on particular subjects or curricula on the basis of sociological analysis alone.

3. THE RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE

The most common accusation against the new perspectives is that they are not backed by empirical evidence. This is however applicable to most sociology. There may be a mass of empirical evidence from investigations, but very little of this reflects on theoretical insights. The more important accusation is that the new perspectives, while rejecting conventional scientific methods and forms of proof, do not advance any alternatives. Again, this is not to deny their accusation that conventional research in sociology is often concerned with non-problems using methods that may appear objective but are actually loaded with the bias of their users.

Supporters of the new approaches are opposed to the attempt to measure, to control, to test, to categorise and to produce statistical data. In articles by Esland and Keddie in Young (1971) there are references to their own empirical work, but little description of it. Observational studies, the use of tape-recorders, and even the use of questionnaires are mentioned, but there is no detailed description of how evidence was actually obtained. The reader is given no opportunity to assess the reliability or validity of the evidence put forward. The views of the author seem to be the criteria against which evidence is measured. Given their concern with the percolation of values into evidence this makes such authors vulnerable.

This anti-empiricism is reinforced by the frequent use of sources and evidence that may, for all the reader knows, be fictional. An example is in the writing of Holt (1969 and 1971). Holt is an imaginative, stimulating and perceptive writer. His work seems to ring true to anyone who has taught. But Holt never tells the reader how he obtained his information. His books are written in a discursive style, and in lectures he will not answer questions about the way he obtained his information. But this reluctance to discuss the reliability of evidence pervades the work of even a brilliant sociol-

ogist such as Goffman. Once again his work rings true. He is posing crucial questions. He is showing the shallowness of previous approaches which ignored the subtlety with which men interact. But to the reader, he may as well be guessing at what is going on, for little information is given about the way the situation being studied was approached, nor the conditions for investigation controlled. Above all, how did he find out what mental patients think?

The defence against these accusations is to deny that objectivity is crucial in the production of valid evidence. Thus Silverman (1972) uses Carl Rogers' support for subjective and interpersonal means of knowing in addition to objective means to counter the attack on the failure of phenomenologists to provide means for validating knowledge. However, while the attack on the synthetic, distorting nature of much sociological research is probably justified, the appeal to subjectivity and to intuition about what other people are thinking is legitimate only if combined with an acknowledgement that the sociologist is no longer acting as a conventional scientist. His views on what is going on may have no more reliable basis in evidence than those of laymen. In any case, the sociologist has no way of showing that he is in a superior position once he surrenders rational forms of proof. His statements are not falsifiable. It is not the absence of empirical evidence but the failure to provide testable hypotheses that matters. It is always easy to muster supporting evidence. What matters more is the controlled testing of hunches defined in advance.

If the sociologist comes to depend on his interpretation of situations without carrying out any controlled investigation, his claim to know more about social life than the layman is suspect. But social scientists who look at what goes on in classrooms and schools do not make this public. This can be seen in the attitude towards teachers. The implication of the interactionist writings is that while children just go through the motions, or ignore the teacher, or play some other game, the teacher goes on blindly trying to give them knowledge which is irrelevant and out-dated. The teachers do not seem to be able to detect any of the rich interpretation and interaction which is going on under their eyes. It is possible that an outside observer visiting a classroom a few times may be able to see far more of what is actually going on than a teacher who has been there the whole year. The implication is that social scientists can interpret the meanings teachers give to the classroom situation better than the teachers themselves. The question arises, are teachers blind, misled, or suffering from some brand of false consciousness? The way

a body of apparently intelligent persons become so oblivious to what is going on before them is never fully explained. Usually there is reference to professional socialisation, implying that the training of teachers in some way makes them incapable of analysing their own failure. This may be true, but giving it the label professional socialisation explains nothing. The teachers could equally argue that the professional socialisation of the sociologist makes him blind to what is actually going on in the classroom. If there is no empirical basis for the views being put forward, one is as good as the other.

This raises the issue of the selection of evidence. In the space available it is only possible to take one example. The most controversial book in recent work on the sociology of science is the 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' by Kuhn (1970). This book was first published in 1962. A central idea within it is that scientists work within paradigms. To Kuhn, scientists work within a set of assumptions, theories, technologies, within which he will find problems that need solution, methods for their investigation, and criteria for validation. Normal science to Kuhn consists of problem-solving within these paradigms. The solution to each problem provides another piece in the jig-saw which is the paradigm. Kuhn is suggesting that the scientist is limited in his horizons within this paradigm. His training is an initiation into its ways. He and his colleagues resist any attempt at radical change. Science therefore develops through revolutions and the overthrow of paradigms, rather than the steady accumulation of new knowledge based on the old.

The application of this idea within the sociology of education follows from the parallels between the teacher and the scientist. Practices within teaching also seem to be accepted without question. Existing knowledge is considered as legitimate and innovation is resisted. In Unit 5 of the Open University, School and Society course (1972) two pedagogical paradigms are advanced, the psychometric and the phenomenological. These are commonly known as the subject-centred and the child-centred. But the selection of Kuhn's version of the paradigm ignores the many criticisms of this idea and the limitations upon its use advanced by Kuhn himself.

A full critical analysis of Kuhn's ideas can be found in Lakatos and Musgrave (1970). The most important criticism for the purposes of this article revolves round the definition of paradigm and its relevance to modern scientific activity. Indeed, Masterman (1970) found twenty-one different uses of the term by Kuhn. Significantly,

Kuhn, a historian, chooses his examples from the early establishment of science. But modern science does not seem to change through revolution. Innovation seems to come principally through the movement of scientists from one area of concern to another. There may be groups working within scientific paradigms, but on the margins of all these groups are scientists who move from one area to another as the possibility of exciting new work develops. As the membership changes, as individuals seem to move freely from one paradigm to another, as scientists from different disciplines cooperate to tackle new problems, the idea of the paradigm as a form of strait-jacket insuring intellectual conformity becomes difficult to apply.

The application of the concept of a paradigm to education is even more dubious. The implication that teachers belong to and are constrained within a psychometric or phenomenological paradigm as defined by any of Kuhn's twenty-one versions is not only dubious but is contrary to the other evidence presented. Teachers, like sociologists, are child-centred one minute, teacher-centred the next. Indeed one insight produced by Jackson (1965), an influential writer of this new school, is that teachers derive their satisfactions from the class before them through rapid shifts of behaviour based on their intuitions about the response of the children. Teachers are the despair of curriculum theorists, not because they adopt a consistent teaching style, but because they play the game by ear. It is highly unlikely that any teacher has been so brain-washed during his professional training, or so subdued by the strains of class-room teaching, that he uncritically accepts the notion that everything should be tested, examined or measured on the one hand, or that the only worthwhile knowledge in the classroom comes from the children, not the teacher. This is a crude form of labelling. Yet this labelling is the very process which the new perspective not only singles out as a primary target for criticism but maintains is a tendency among teachers. What is strange here is that the perspective being used is concerned with the very distortion which seems to be practised by the authors.

There is one other, and more obvious bias in the selection of material. Contained within these new approaches is not only a concern with a trend towards the integration of subjects, but an attack on the division of knowledge into subjects. In practise the trend towards integration is very hard to substantiate and in sociology itself the trend has been the reverse, towards greater differentiation,

or, to be malicious, disintegration. Education is, quite justifiably, described as being concerned to spread a particular set of values, labelled as middle class, and acting as a means of social control. The writers who are quoted are those concerned with the way knowledge is unevenly distributed, and hence leads to an uneven distribution of power, rather than those who stress that what is worthwhile in our culture has been built up, and is preserved, within a number of subject boundaries. Passing reference is made to the Black Papers, but there is little consideration of the arguments within. Writers such as Leavis and Eliot are given brief mention. Significantly while many of the papers read at the 1970 Annual Conference of the British Sociological Association have been published three times, the paper by Bantock (1970) is ignored. I do not happen to share Bantock's views. But his paper is concerned with just the same problems as others using the work of Alfred Schutz, but from a different viewpoint. Once again, this bias in selection does little harm to those who attend conferences of professionals. But the public presentation of one side of the evidence only does not open up new directions for the layman, it closes them.

4. THE NEED FOR CONTINUITY

Perhaps the most serious weakness of the approaches using symbolic interactionism and phenomenology is the difficulty of reconciling studies of the meanings given to situations by individuals with the larger problems of the distribution of power in society, with the nature of the class system and the structure of the economy. The new perspectives are in danger of over-involvement in the analysis of trivia. This can be illustrated from the attack on functionalism, the dominant sociological approach up to the sixties. The first attack on functionalism was often to parody it. Functionalism was accused of being incapable of accounting for social change, of supporting a consensus view of society, of neglecting problems of power and of incorporating some form of hidden hand shaping society. In practice many of the charges were unjustified. There are versions of functionalism which deal with one or more of these aspects. Furthermore, functionalism shared with the various versions of Marxist social theory, a concern with the relation between institutions. This concern is a necessary antidote to the new approaches which are in danger of dealing with the school without reference to the many institutions that make up education.

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THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN THE CLASSROOM
AN APPLICATION OF ERVING GOFFMAN'S THEORIES TO PRIMARY EDUCATION

by EDITH W. KING

Associate Professor of Educational Sociology, University of Denver

THE analogy of life as a stage with individuals playing out their roles as actors in a setting is an old one. Occasionally in the literature teachers have been referred to as actors playing out their dramas in the classroom. Much like the actor on a stage the teacher's major assignment is to keep the attention of his audience. Unlike the actor on the stage, however, the teacher has not been given an exciting script written by a great dramatist. He has not been given the benefit of makeup and costumery, and he has the additional handicap of having to appear before young people day after day after day in a setting which does not have the aesthetic enhancements that most good theatres possess. Yet the teacher, like the actor, is expected to 'keep' his audience. An examination of the literature on teaching methodology and practice, however, reveals that rarely is the mundane, day to day experience of teachers and students described in the framework or the metaphor of theatrical performance.

It is apparent that a framework or a body of concepts and theories would be immensely helpful for categorizing and analyzing just what *is* going on between individuals. It is at this point then, that this writer turns to the work and the theories of sociologist, Erving Goffman, as a meaningful and extremely pertinent model for examining life in classrooms. Goffman's theories were originally developed to view men and women in everyday social intercourse. Goffman has employed the theatrical metaphor or the dramaturgic approach in sociology to examining people as they present themselves and their activities to others and try to guide and control the impression they create. The sociologist sees the individual employing certain techniques in order to sustain his performance, just as the actor presents a character to an audience. This dramaturgic sociology has been

built upon detailed and painstaking research and observation of social customs in many regions of the United States and in Europe as well.

'In Goffman's theory the conventional cultural hierarchies are shattered: for example, professional psychiatrists are manipulated by hospital inmates; doubt is cast upon the difference between the cynical and the sincere; the behavior of children becomes a model for understanding adults; the behavior of criminals becomes a standpoint for understanding respectable people; the theatre's stage becomes a model for understanding life,' writes Alvin Gouldner in *The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology* (1970, p. 379). Gouldner goes on to note that Goffman's dramaturgical sociology advances a view in which social life is systematically regarded as an elaborate form of drama as in the theatre where men are continually striving to project a convincing image of themselves to others.

I. APPLYING GOFFMAN'S THEORIES TO EARLY CHILDHOOD CLASSROOMS

In order to apply Goffman's theories to the everyday life of teachers and students in early childhood classrooms, it seems necessary to delineate the terminology and concepts that the sociologist has developed to examine groups of people and their social customs. The following definitions of terms and concepts as used by Goffman have been taken from *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, one of the earliest and seminal writings of the sociologist. (1959).

PERFORMANCE—'refers to all the activity of an individual which occurs during a period marked by his continuous presence before a particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers.' (1959, p. 22)

FRONT—'that part of the individual's performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the situation for those who observe the performance. It is the expressive equipment of a standard kind intentionally or unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance.' (1959, p. 22)

SETTING—'a standard part of FRONT involving furniture, decor, physical layout, and other background items which supply the scenery and stage props for the human action played out before, within, or upon it.' (1959, p. 22)

PERSONAL FRONT—'refers to the other items of expressive equipment, the items that we most intimately identify with the performer himself; his insignia of office or rank; clothing; sex; age; racial characteristics; size and looks; posture; speech patterns; facial expressions; bodily gestures; and the like.' (1959, p. 24)

DRAMATIC REALIZATION—'the individual typically infuses his performance with signs which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory facts that might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure. For if the individual's activity is to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will express *during the interaction* what he wishes to convey'. (1959, p. 30)

IDEALIZATION—'describes a performance that is "socialized", molded and modified to fit into the understanding and expectations of the society in which it is presented. . . . Thus when the individual presents himself before others his performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society, more so, in fact, than does his behavior as a whole.' (1959, p. 35)

MYSTIFICATION—is the 'maintenance of social distance that provides a way in which we can be generated and sustained in the audience.' (1959, p. 67)

AUDIENCE—the observers who view the performance.

How can we then apply Goffman's model to teachers and students, and more specifically to education in the early childhood setting? We begin with the PERFORMANCE. The teacher is providing a performance in the classroom when he or she is engaged in an activity—teaching, during a period of time—the school day (in early childhood programs this can be a half day or a full day session). Further, the teacher is in the continued presence of a set of observers —the students, and is influencing their behavior.

The performer, the teacher, constructs a FRONT which incorporates a PERSONAL FRONT and is enacted within a SETTING. The setting in which the teacher plays out the performance is a classroom whose decor or physical layout includes walls, bulletin and chalk boards; furniture—the teacher's desk, the smaller, child-sized tables and chairs; the book shelves, cupboards, and closets stocked with materials; the doll corner or Wendy house; the games area, science corner, etc. These elements have been carefully arranged by the teacher. The teacher's personal front consists of far more maturity in age, greater size and strength, greater wisdom and

experience than the young students before whom the performance takes place. The teacher's personal front might also include the dress, mannerisms, style of speech and expressions that have been cultivated for this performance, the instruction of young children.

Goffman turns to the medical profession to give an example of the arbitrary nature of the setting for the performance. He notes that it is increasingly important for a doctor to have access to the elaborate scientific stage provided by large hospitals, so that fewer and fewer doctors are able to feel that their setting is a place that they can lock up at night. (1959, p. 23)

Much the same comments could be made about the elaborate setting of the current primary education programs with the ever-growing range of educational toys, games, curriculum materials, Montessori and Piagetian materials, blocks, water toys, building tools, manipulative apparatus, large and small muscle toys, as well as picture books, workbooks, alphabet cards, art materials, rhythm instruments. In order for the teacher of young children to adequately perform in the setting, some educators today are advocating such an elaborate set of scenery and props that the impact of the teacher's personal front, style, personal charm, warmth, knowledge and ability in working with youngsters, are all but forgotten.

When we think of a teacher of young children we invariably picture a *woman*—youngish or older, with a sweet smile and a gentle demeanor. Goffman points out that a given social front tends to become stereotyped and institutionalized. This expectation of front, social or personal, of the teacher of young children is certainly characteristic of American or English society. Now recently when men, usually innovative, dynamic, creative, open-minded young men, choose to become teachers for groups of children under eight years of age, they must establish a personal front that is part of a new performance in the society, while also counteracting a long-standing stereotypical role, the old, unmarried woman teacher.

We have used Goffman's concepts of the performance, front, setting, and personal front in application to teachers of young children. Now let us see how his terms dramatic realization, idealization, and mystification fit into life in classrooms. DRAMATIC REALIZATION has been outlined as a technique which the performer uses to infuse his performance with dramatic highlights, emphasizing what might otherwise remain obscure. He has to underscore his activity to impress upon his observers or audience aspects of his performance. Goffman uses an anecdote from the

school setting to illustrate the concept of dramatic realization. Borrowing from the writing of Sartre, Goffman recounts how students try to impress teachers by being extremely attentive. The student rivets his eyes on the teacher, his ears are open wide, so that he exhausts himself in playing the attentive role, and ends up by not actually hearing anything. (1959, p. 33)

To illustrate dramatic realization with the teacher giving the performance we offer a description of an early childhood teacher who keeps a mirror in a stand on her piano. The mirror is arranged at an appropriate angle so the teacher can see her four-year-olds even though her back is turned to them while she plays the piano. As the children sing and request numbers the teacher merely glances in the mirror to see whom to call on next. This teacher has developed the techniques of *actually* being able to survey her pupils' reactions even when her back is turned to them. As Goffman describes dramatic realization if the activity is to become significant to others, the performer must mobilize his actions *during the performance* in order to heighten what he wishes to portray. This individual provides dramatic realization of the role of the young child's teacher by being ever watchful (even in her mirror) of the needs, reactions, and feelings of her pupils.

Another term that describes performance in degree and kind is IDEALIZATION. Idealized performances refer to those that fulfil the expectations of the society. When the individual presents himself to others he will tend to incorporate and exemplify the actions that the audience values and even admires for the particular role. Here Goffman discusses middle-class housewives who, among other performances, will set out appropriate magazines such as the SATURDAY EVENING POST on their livingroom coffee tables while hiding their TRUE ROMANCE (or more recently sex magazines) in the bedroom dresser drawer. So too, do some teachers of young children put on an idealized personal front as part of their performance of dedication to the job of tending and educating little children, but not give up the weekly two p.m. hair-dresser's appointment!

Then we look at MYSTIFICATION which also describes an aspect of the performance being given for the audience. Mystification involves maintaining social distance so awe will be generated in the audience. This readily applies to the classic stereotype of the nursery school or infants teacher who traditionally has stood as an authority on all things pertaining to young children. Here the audience could

be parents, the headmaster, other lay personnel and the young pupils, who viewed Miss Brown, the teacher, as the Oracle of Delphi.

2. THE SINCERE OR THE PHONY PERFORMANCE

Teachers of young children realize that their audience, their pupils, the parents, their colleagues—including the headmaster, really expect them to be knowledgeable and assured in the handling of very young children. This is considered a highly specialized task in our society, just as medicine and care of the mentally and emotionally ill are considered specialized tasks in our culture. Most of Goffman's anecdotal material comes from the medical profession. This writer feels that teaching also offers meaningful situations for analysis by Goffman's sociological model.

Goffman points out that individuals engaging in a performance may be 'sincere,' that is they firmly believe that the impression they are creating represents the 'real reality'; or they may be 'cynical', that is, they have very little belief in their own act. Naturally, most performances are not totally one or the other extreme, but contain elements of both. He describes several conditions under which concealment of one's inadequacies takes place. Of these conditions, one applies particularly to teachers of young children. 'We find that errors and mistakes are often corrected before the performance takes place, while telltale signs that errors have been made and corrected are themselves concealed. In this way an impression of infallibility, so important in many presentations, is maintained.' (1959, p. 43)

Teachers of four, five, and six year olds develop a technique of bringing groups of noisy children to quiet attention in a few seconds by the playing of a chord on the piano and a simple finger play such as 'open, shut them,' or 'hands on your head, hands in your lap.' They do this with what seems miraculous ease to the visitor in the early childhood classroom. One minute thirty to thirty-five little bodies are scurrying about the room in noisy confusion. Next minute it seems one could 'hear a pin drop'. The casual visitor to the classroom is amazed and awed at this outstanding performance of discipline and is often heard to remark about it to others. The observer does not know of the days and months of 'practice' that have gone into such a performance and the skill and attentiveness of the teacher in knowing just the crucial moment to play the chord

and go into the routine before the children have gotten 'out of hand'.

In *Humanity and Modern Sociological Thought* Cuzzort brings new insights into the application of Goffman's theories to education.

Concealment is a necessary element in practically all social performance, and it poses a rather trying dilemma for the actor. If he is honest and open that is, if he refuses to engage in concealment, then he risks losing his audience. If he engages in concealment, then he is practicing deceit. All human social performances, from Goffman's perspective, involve a constant weighing of the costs of losing one's audience against the cost of losing one's integrity by behaving in a deceptive manner . . . Goffman would suggest something different: 'phony' behavior is a product of the relationship existing between the performer and those who observe him. If retention of the audience is important, then deceit may be necessary. Thus, the teacher who is committed to the ideal of educating youth can do so only by retaining the attention and the acceptance of the students who become his immediate concern. This can be achieved only through performances which convince the audience of the worth of the performer. Such performances will necessarily conceal errors, hidden pleasures, 'dirty work', and tedium. On these occasions the performer often cannot escape the sense of deception that he is practising. (1969, pp. 179–180)

Hence, Cuzzort's description of concealment or the 'phony' performance in the teaching profession applies extremely well to teachers of young children. Some primary school teachers are sincerely convinced of their ability to cope with the education of young children. They conceal the errors, the mistakes; and certainly the tedious and routine nature of the job that requires continual patience and forebearance when dealing with their pupils. On the other hand, it is not unusual to hear the remark, 'Oh, I am only an infants school teacher', 'I'm *only* a primary teacher', revealing a cynical view of one's effectiveness in dealing with very young children, and also, apparently the low prestige this job carries in the eyes of the audience.

(a) *Others Join in the Performance*

Now the performer can function alone or be a member of a troupe or cast of players. Goffman defines a 'performance team' as any set of individuals who co-operate in staging a single routine (1959, p. 79). He draws an example from family life in American society: 'when a husband and wife appear before new friends for an evening of sociability, the wife may demonstrate more respectful subordination to the will and opinion of her husband than she may bother to show when alone with him or when with old friends. When she

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assumes a respectful role, he can assume a dominant one; and when each member of the marriage team plays its special role, the conjugal unit, as a unit, can sustain the impression that new audiences expect of it' (1959, pp. 78–79).

Another example comes from proper business etiquette. One addresses his co-workers in the office or his secretary by Mr. or Miss when outsiders are present, although everyone in the office may be on a first name basis during the daily routine of activities. The school, primary or secondary, is also a type of business setting. Teachers greet each other by their first names in the classroom, the hall, the office or the staff room when no children are present or at least within hearing. Yet, if one child appears on the scene it constitutes a breach of etiquette to refer to Miss Green, the art teacher, as Blanche. One way to refer to a member of your clique or particular ingroup on a large school faculty is to refer to the individual always by their first name (before other teachers, *never* before the students) when that individual is not present but is involved in the conversation. These small, but really significant actions, reveal the subtleties of the 'performance team'; who are considered the members, who are labelled outsiders, or the audience for the team.

Performance teams are flexible and the cast of characters in the troupe can shift and change. There are times when the teacher and the students become a team and the outsiders or the audience can consist of parents, other teachers, supervisors, the head master or other administrators. The writer is not referring to the traditional school performance situation where mothers and fathers (if they are around) are invited to the assembly on Tuesday morning to see the rhythm band play several numbers just before Christmas. Rather let us look at a more subtle but common place situation in the school setting. A teacher new to the system must be evaluated by superiors. It is known that the co-ordinator, supervisor, or head will be coming around to observe the classroom. The teacher allies the students to perform in the manner that will be expected by the evaluator, even to the extent in some cases, that the threat of the teacher's classroom evaluation is used as a means of discipline for the pupils in the classroom. This is especially effective with young children. The teacher may say, 'Oh, you know Mr. Brown, our head, is coming in one of these days and he doesn't like to see messy tables and noisy children'. And when the headmaster does arrive for a brief inspection, the cast of characters, children and teacher alike, are alerted to provide him with the performance he seems to be expecting.

3. NEW PERSPECTIVES IN TEACHING YOUNG CHILDREN

In this brief article we have presented an introduction to the power and potential the sociological perspective can bring to the educational scene. We have used the theories and concepts of dramaturgic sociology, mainly those developed by Erving Goffman, to study the interaction between students and teachers. We have drawn upon analogies and incidents in .classrooms of young children and with teachers of young children to illustrate Goffman's concepts in dramaturgic sociology. These new perspectives in primary education tend to emphasize the emotional and social life that is a part of schooling, that hidden curriculum, the experience of schooling. The theatrical approach of dramaturgic sociology enables us to see the view from the individual's position, as well as the broader scene where groups of people and the values and attitudes of the wider society come into play and influence the actors. This new direction in sociological theory, dramaturgic sociology, provides the educator with exciting new research techniques for understanding the process of education.

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TAKING SIDES AGAINST THE PROBABLE PROBLEMS OF RELATIVISM AND COMMITMENT IN TEACHING AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

by MICHAEL F. D. YOUNG
University of London, Institute of Education

THE occasion of this paper is to focus several concerns of the writer, and an opportunity therefore to work them through publicly, albeit in a tentative and often inchoate form. The first concern arises out of the increasing relevance for redefining our problems, that many of us working in the sociology of education, have found in what for the moment I shall refer to as 'The sociology of knowledge'. The enthusiasm with which I certainly have accepted this redefinition, has perhaps allowed the problem of relativism to be too readily dismissed (often as 'just the philosophers' problem'). The problem here is of cultural relativism, where if all knowledge is a social and historical product, then we have no grounds for deciding the worth, truth or value of anything—something both as teachers and ordinary men and women we have to do all the time. That then is the first concern. The second concern is with teachers, who can read this relativism, and in fact much sociological enquiry in education (as it becomes free from the isolating of children's 'background' attributes as determining educational achievement) as not so much redefining problems but 'undermining action'—their action, as teachers. These issues lead finally to reconsidering the relationship between sociological enquiry and the practice of teaching. This is taken up in the last section through a reading of Merleau-Ponty. What I want to suggest is that far from leading to the despair often associated with relativism, a sociology of knowledge, or as, it seems better to call it, a reflexive sociology (O'Neill 1972), in recognizing that the grounds of its commitment are those of our common humanity, points to the possibility of collaboration which transcends institutional categories such as research and teaching. To the extent that this commitment is, in whatever social or historical context, to an idea of human liberation this, as I see it, suggests following

through, with those involved, the alternatives that enquiry might point to.

The paper, therefore is divided into five sections:

1. Conceptions of the sociology of knowledge.
2. Sociologists' and teachers' predicaments.
3. 'knowledge as truth criteria' or 'knowledge as power'?
4. Merleau Ponty and the contingency of social life.
5. What's it to do with us?

CONCEPTIONS OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

It is possible to view a term or category like the sociology of knowledge as having two very distinct kinds of meanings which would generate very different kinds of 'problem'. Since Mannheim and Scheler, and particularly in the U.S.A. it has been seen as a fairly distinct body of writing concerned with the social character of knowledge; within this body of writing, several loosely conceived traditions can be discerned. They can be distinguished, broadly, by how they characterize 'social', 'knowledge', and the implications of viewing knowledge as social. Often it has been later interpretors who have incorporated earlier writings into their new category 'the sociology of knowledge'—we nowhere find the term in the work of Marx or Schutz, who was late enough in time to refer to a 'so-called sociology of knowledge'. I shall make brief reference to rather than review what are commonly labelled perspectives or approaches in the sociology of knowledge, and the kind of enquiries into education they either have given rise to or have been called on to legitimate. The 'body of knowledge' notion of a sociology of knowledge, which such a review implies, is unsatisfactory in many respects that I have not the space to elaborate on here. The unexamined assumptions that there are implications for the sociology of education, and that what emerges *will* be significant for educational practice beg just the questions that we need to raise. In failing to treat the sociology of knowledge as social, such sociology fails to be reflexive about the grounds of its own activity. The emergence and sustenance by practitioners in their own writing, teaching and research, of categories such as 'sociology of knowledge' and 'sociological theory' which have implications, relevance etc. for a sociology of education, would seem an important topic for a history of ideas, which I shall not try to deal with. Phrases like 'implications for' and 'relevance of' in this context, suggest assumptions about the character of the

sociology of education as a form of enquiry; in particular that such an enquiry is atheoretical, and does not operate even implicitly with notions about the social grounds of all knowledge. Both seem to have unfortunate consequences; one of which is the hiving off of 'curriculum' or 'knowledge' as a topic in the sociology of education. Thus 'curriculum' is perpetuated, as Maxine Greene puts it, as 'a structure of socially prescribed knowledge . . . external to the knower, there to be . . . mastered, learned' rather than 'a possibility for him (the learner) as an existing person, mainly concerned with making sense of his own life world' (Greene 1971).

There are important issues that I shall only be peripherally concerned with, such as the ongoing debates about the inadequacies of Durkheimian, Marxist and phenomenological perspectives. Durkheim is challenged for being concerned with the 'reproduction' rather than the production of knowledge, phenomenologists for an emphasis on *how* knowledge is constructed, how the world is made real, rather than why it is made real in particular ways, and Marx for an ambiguity over the status of science and technology. One reason for avoiding such debates is that they depend on holistic and reified notions of the writer or perspective under discussion; depending on how one reads a work, demonstrations of inadequacies are always possible. A different and to me more fruitful view is to see a sociology of knowledge as not distinct from a sociology, in the sense that all sociology is a sociology of knowledge. The notions of everyday, common sense or tacit knowledge, the knowledge that we draw on whatever we are doing are not then viewed as distinct from the formalized bodies of knowledge such as philosophy, science and literature. In operating, even implicitly with such a distinction, as say Berger and Luckman (1966) appear to, unavoidably one takes over the view that religion, philosophy etc. *are* the thought systems produced by small groups of 'experts', and thus the nature of the thinking of the rest of humanity is different and, to the extent that it is non-philosophical, non-scientific etc., known.

If then the sociology of knowledge becomes taking a theoretical stance to the character of social life—whether it is setting essays, marking exam scripts or what ever, there will be no necessary implications, relevance etc., except in so far as those involved in such activities perceive them. This would suggest a rather different kind of question which emerges as much from a reflexive view of teaching as from a reflexive sociology (the link between this notion of reflexivity and a conception of commitment which is raised later

is explored in Keddie and Young (1973)). For instance, how do teachers discover and use what they 'know' in the day to day situations of the classroom? This kind of question can be illustrated by referring to a familiar discrepancy between 'academic' and 'teacher' perspectives, represented hypothetically here:

A. *My ideas are always oversimplified and misunderstood.*
T. *Even if I had the time, I cannot understand the language.*

In the light of what has been said these comments could be interpreted as follows. If we recognize the 'contextual' or 'situational' character of what we know, then an idea, finding etc. will have quite different relevance for different users—in this case academic and teacher. One might well go on to ask then, why are teachers, typically, so uninterested in treating their own activities critically? And, equally, why are most writers on education (but not only education), more concerned with communicating to other 'so called' theorists than with the practitioners about whom they claim to theorize about?

2. SOCIOLOGISTS' AND TEACHERS' PREDICAMENTS

The issue then is, first, the predicament of the sociologist who takes the social character of his as well as all other knowledge, seriously. Such a position appears to argue for a total relativism, and the destructive nihilism that is its possible conclusion. The only possible alternative that follows from a rejection of this relativism appears to be to ground one's critique of relativism in an epistemological position that makes it 'philosophically untenable'.

It is a paradox that while the 'radical doubt' of relativism has posed the most challenging questions of recent sociology, this 'doubt' is a 'theoretical' and not a 'practical' possibility, whether the practice is 'doing sociology' teaching, or anything else. More specifically what I mean here is that as one can only retrospectively, and even then partially, provide for the grounds of any action, it may be that the notion of reflexivity whether in relation to sociology or teaching is then necessarily collaborative or in other words involves others. This may be the same dilemma that arises from a commitment to call into question 'members' categories' (in Garfinkel's sense) that at the same time we find ourselves using—education and ability are just two of many examples. It is possible therefore that the 'crutches' offered by 'objectivist' theories of knowledge may be seen as an attempt to evade something fundamental like being a person, historically and socially situated, and as such, oneself, responsible.

Parallel to the predicament just outlined is that of the teacher, or other practitioner—confronted with a sociological account which calls into question the grounds of his or her activities. Such an account is one thing in an ongoing debate between groups of sociologists with different perspectives, but quite another for the teacher in a context where these grounds are part of what he shares with other teachers and which make his own activities possible. This predicament might be made more explicit (and not just, though certainly quite plausibly, as a teacher's defence mechanism), by conceiving of the imaginery teacher calling into question the grounds of the practice of university or college sociologists. But let us elaborate this with some typical examples from what has, in a recent article, been called 'the new sociology of education' (Gorbutt 1972). This starts by rejecting the assumption of any superiority of educational or 'academic' knowledge over the everyday commonsense knowledge available to people as being in the world. There is no doubt that teachers' practices—lecturing, syllabus construction, examining, writing textbooks etc.—are predicated on just the assumption of the superiority of academic knowledge that is being called into question. Practical recognition of this is to be found in the 'educational' arguments for raising the school leaving age, and the academic credentials demanded as 'necessary' by those selecting people for various kinds of work. Nowhere is this discrepancy between the assumptions of educators and of sociologists more apparent than in the accounts sociologists and teachers give of school failure. Whereas teachers 'know' that some children are 'less able', 'not trying', 'come from bad homes' etc., sociological accounts suggest that such knowledge generate from 'hierarchical notions of ability', 'pathological views of working class family life', and an identification of minority class culture as 'the culture' of which such children are deprived (see Keddie, 1971 and 1973). The point at issue is the significance of this discrepancy. To the extent that sociologists (and others) view their activity as in some way helping the student—or practising teacher, these accounts will be seen as undermining and in a real sense 'not relevant'. However this, I would suggest, is to misconceive the sociological enterprise in two ways. Firstly, though calling into question the superiority of 'academic knowledge', the sociologist is not raising the same question about sociological knowledge; and secondly the lesson of Marx's 11th Thesis on Feuerbach has not been learnt. 'Philosophers (and here read sociologists) have only *interpreted* the world . . . the point is to *change* it', (translation

1970) and as Alan Blum (1972) puts it 'theorizing (or sociology or philosophy) is not designed to save worlds. . . . It is ordinary men who try to save worlds . . . through their ordinary practical notions, sometimes aided by theories, but usually in spite of them'. However though Marx and Alan Blum point to change as a practical activity, Marx in particular is reminding us that a theory has significance only in so far as it is lived through in a course of action; and as his own life exemplified, sociologists, philosophers and teachers are ordinary men and women as well and more importantly, first.

To return to an earlier point, if as was suggested earlier, relativism is a practical impossibility in sociological enquiry or anything else, it may be that certain familiar distinctions are oversimplified. I am thinking for example of those who find the notions of 'relativising' and 'radical doubt' challenging and exciting, and those who reject such notions and rush to the security of various kinds of epistemology, vulgar marxism, notions of 'structure', or perhaps that radical doubt is an academic luxury that involves a denial of moral and political concern. If the former, at some point implicitly have to reject their own radical doubt, because all doubt is from a starting point, then they too make reference to some criteria or grounds, however uncertain. The difference may only be that whereas for the former this uncertainty is recognized as part of the fate of being human, for the latter it is a kind of terror where everything seems in danger of collapsing.

In trying not to resolve but confront the meaning of these issues in teaching and sociology, I turn to what I call versions of 'the philosophical escape'.

3. 'KNOWLEDGE AS TRUTH CRITERIA' OR 'KNOWLEDGE AS POWER'?

I start from Wright Mills' (1940) sociological critique of knowledge. He argues that logics, truth criteria and rules of proof are, like all we know, grounded in common cultures, rather than anything external to those who use such rules. Thus what is logical is a question of how in a particular context a particular rule is used. Rules, then, are viewed as members' categories, and members call on others' knowledge of a common culture of logic, which provides them with normative criteria in terms of which they can give meaning to statements about logicality and identify the illogical, the non-logical, the false, the probable and the true. To put it another way—logic is far from

being abstract, but totally relativised, to the situation of its use. Mills tackles the argument that in undermining its own position such a view of knowledge is self contradictory, by saying that this only holds if one already starts with external criteria of truth. However there are problems in Mills' analysis and Dewey's pragmatic logic that he draws on, which are raised in a paper by Rytina and Loomis (1970), though they for quite other reasons deal with Dewey and Marx, and in fact use Mills' critique of pragmatism for support. In accepting, as pragmatic and dialetical theories of knowledge do, that truth criteria are 'developing things', not external to the enquiry or the practice, Rytina and Loomis argue that these are, in effect, no criteria at all; Marx, Dewey, and by implication Mills, they claim, operate with what they call 'activist criteria of truth'. Such criteria, in relying on the *method* of enquiry, without 'external' checks, depend inevitably on those who use them. The guarantee for Dewey is a naive faith in the toleration of open ended enquiry, and in an optimism that this will lead to progress towards the 'good society'. Such a toleration of enquiry neither was nor is a characteristic of American or any other society, thus opening the way, as Rytina and Loomis see it, to a situation, as in the Soviet Union, where those who have power define the truth.

Whatever the crudities of Rytina and Loomis's account of Marxist theory, they raise serious issues for a sociological conception of knowledge as exemplified in Knowledge and Control (Young 1971), at any rate the introduction, which relies very much on Mills. The implications of treating what counts as knowledge as problematic is inevitably to abandon notions of formal logic and to offer no explicit epistemology or truth criteria. The question, quite plausibly, becomes what status and validity (if any) can one give to the results of such a project?

It is understandable therefore that some kind of alternative to what might be characterized as a combination of naive idealism, extreme relativism and thorough going pragmatism that can be readily seen as resulting in a solipsistic view that makes no sense of sociology or any other kind of enquiry. In exploring the issues raised, I do not see this as an academic argument in the normal sense of the term, but as offering the grounds of a project which does not divorce sociological enquiry from political action. (I use political in Paulo Freire's sense that all action is political (Freire 1972)).

Early on in their paper Rytina and Loomis make the point that 'the methods prescribed (by Marx and Dewey) have an important

defect, in that they permit although they do not require those in power to define truth'; the assumption must be that other methods (presumably versions of formal logic) neither permit nor require such a possibility. To conceive of the possibility of such methods is necessarily to conceive of remedying the indexicality of rules, of reconstructing rules of logic that are also logics-in-use; rules that in some way do not need interpreting as applicable in any particular situation. Contrary to this I would argue that *all* methods, pragmatic, marxist, scientific, formal, whatever, have just this 'defect' if such it is to be called, that is irremediable—that they have to be 'used', and only take on their meaning in the context of their use. This then is not so much a defect of certain methods, but a claim to deny, on behalf of some formal systems, the fundamental contingency of their use. The merit of the Rytina and Loomis paper is that in considering Marx and Dewey, they take two notions of truth that explicitly do not try to claim their version of truth as grounded in logic or science (though some versions of Marxism do). Truth for Dewey is grounded in 'rational enquiring man', and for Marx in the unique humanity of the proleteriat, though the significance of this is blurred by Rytina and Loomis through their propaganda-like characterization of 'goodness to fit' models for pragmatism and American society and Marxism and soviet society, and a naively mechanistic view of power determining knowledge as exemplified in the 'Lysencko affair'.

However it is my contention that the problems of validity of truth criteria or relativism in the sociology of knowledge are still evaded rather than confronted, whether one turns to one of a variety of objectivistic views of knowledge, to Dewey's 'rational man' which has the same kind of limited historical specificity that Marcuse demonstrated in Weber's 'rational actor', or to Marx's proleteriat "the one class capable of recognizing one another and therefore of founding humanity" as Merleau-Ponty puts it.

4. MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE CONTINGENCY OF SOCIAL LIFE

In *Humanism and Terror* (1969) Merleau-Ponty is concerned to try and understand, not judge, the Stalinist purges in Russia in the 30's. I want to suggest that he may provide a way of looking at the issues raised in this paper that recognizes them as experienced—that does not treat such an activity as an academic exercise, but as an acknowledgement of

the contingency and openness of history—'what happens is never inevitable, but is made to happen'—a statement as true of Lenin and Trotsky, who, though they had 'theories of revolution' still had to *make* it themselves, as of anyone else. In this early study Merleau-Ponty seems to face the contradiction involved in the search for certainty in an uncertain world where as he puts it 'we have to work without certainty in confusion towards truth'. I see this as the human dilemma that was presented as so-called epistemological arguments in the previous section. It must also be a critical question for both sociologists and teachers, who are I take it, concerned both to understand the social world as a world of human beings, and at the same time to treat those we seek to teach or understand, as themselves human. In dismissing Koestler's moral abhorrence of the purges, their portrayal as 'justice' by the Soviet State, and as 'necessary' by the French Communists, Merleau-Ponty argues that each limits us from understanding what it was to be human in a particular historical context. Such a conception appears, to me, as the beginning of a way beyond the destructive nihilism that the relativism of the sociology of knowledge can imply, as well as avoiding the dependency on external criteria that appears to remove responsibility from the person, whether teacher or researcher. The next section will not try to summarize the book, but rather raise the issues that seem relevant to the previous part of this paper; its themes come alive much more in the characters of Stalin, Bukharin and Trotsky and their interpreters Koestler and the author, than they can in my brief comments.

The violence and uncertainty that for Merleau-Ponty underly the fragile stability and order of our lives only become apparent in times of conquest and revolution—when the French State collapsed in 1940, all notions of heirarchy, legitimacy and legality, that had been taken as given, collapsed too. In this kind of situation, people cannot avoid choosing and taking the consequences of their choice, in a future they cannot even think they know; such are the fundamental characteristics of history and social life all the time, though it is usually possible to live as if they were not. Men are seen as normally justifying their actions with claims to know their likely consequences; to do so they call on criteria of rationality, morality and necessity; and the whole range of theories, laws and sciences. It is questionable then whether the sciences of man, such as sociology, do little more than confirm these 'believed' necessities, thus helping to avoid what are for Merleau-Ponty the specifically human elements of human life— its contingency, its risks, its involvement with others and, as is the

concern of most of his work, the primacy of our own perception of the world. The risks and contingency alluded to stem from a recognition of how the perceptions in terms of which we act are inevitably partial and limited socially and historically. However in a curious way which takes us back to the earlier discussion, in being the only grounds for action we have, these perceptions are also, for the person, absolute. In these terms the relativism of any human grounds becomes an absolute, not an absolute of certainty provided by some external agency or rule system, nor a solipsistic absolute which implies a 'can do anything' nihilism, but an absolute that implies a recognition that what ever one does involves commitment, risk of failure and disillusion, whatever our intentions.

Events, for Merleau-Ponty, are how they are interpreted—this is not the naive idealism it may appear, because, with no science of the future they may always be different, and with no destiny a future may be believed in with a theory like Marxism, but this can never remove the inevitability of choice, to make that future happen, when confronted with the unknown exigencies of others. No situation, then, even physical violence, is absolutely compelling, in the sense that the compulsion is not perceived; thus the sciences, logics, and ethics, may be guides, but the action, whether in research, teaching or whatever, is a decision, not a private decision, but a public or political one, to 'insert ourselves in a course of events'. Such distinctions, so favoured by liberal philosophers as circumstances and will, intention and action, object and subject are, Merleau-Ponty argues, merely super-impositions on the experience of 'having to act when we don't know what we are doing'—when the future is always uncertain, and when the conflict between consistently acting within our worth as we experience it and not wanting to disavow what we are to others is always with us. Commitment, choice, responsibility, contingency, future unknown and future to be made— these are some of the words and phrases that echo through *Humanism and Terror*, from a Marxist who realized that a Marxist theory even for Marx was not enough, and from a phenomenologist who recognized that what men perceived, though all for them, but was far from all in terms of history or social life.

It is possible, though inevitably oversimplifying to extract three specific points that sum up this brief account and refer directly to the issues raised earlier in this paper. First there is the rejection of the crutches of bourgeois or marxist scientism, or any kind of external logics or moralities; not for themselves, but as ways of avoiding

specifically human and personal commitments. Second, there is the explicit recognition that all acting is 'acting at risk', and therefore of the 'bad faith' of the academic spectator in mental isolation reviewing others' commitments, or as he puts it 'the peculiar intellectual prejudice of trotting through perspectives without setting on one, thereby understanding everything but that others too have perspectives'. Thirdly, in his description of the French resistance fighters as 'taking sides against the probable', which suggests a direct challenge to much of our social life which is concerned with 'living with the probable', and much of our social science, concerned as it is with discovering the probable.

5. WHAT'S IT TO DO WITH US?

This paper may appear to have taken us far from the original concerns about teaching and the sociology of knowledge—I don't think so, and I want to finish by tentatively suggesting some of the reasons why. If we recognize the absolute character of anyone's actions, however partial and relative the knowledge one has, then it would appear that the problematics of the sociology of knowledge are not distinct, except as institutional artefacts of the academy, from the problematics of social life. In other words, the epistemological problems raised earlier are fundamentally human ones; for, to the extent that one recognizes that we are unavoidably committed as persons, such a recognition, though with all the risks of being a person that are expressed in fears of *nihilism*, also involves all the possibilities, that are expressed in the title of this paper, of 'taking sides against the probable'. Though Merleau-Ponty's book addresses itself to 'political man', whose fate it is to 'do nothing or be criminal', no less is it addressed to the sociologist, the teacher or the researcher, for each of whom 'action is impure', and groundless in the sense that the rules of logic, science or morality may be guides, but are never grounds. By depending on or searching for external criteria outside of what we do, we avoid the experiential truth of still having to choose, of unavoidably being 'engaged with others in a common history'. It is this last point that leaves the discussion open, not closed, for each of us has to discover what, at a particular time, it means to be human and what 'is probable'. Some of the confusion and quite justifiable antagonism felt by practitioners such as teachers towards sociologists might be removed, if both realized that they share a common human history, and that often categories such as 'teacher' and

'sociologist', while appearing to protect them as persons, in effect often prevent the possibility of their so being. At the very least, this possibility involves us in recognizing our responsibility to follow through with those whose accounts we call into question, the alternatives that this questioning suggests. How we do this, or what the implications might be for research for anyone concerned, as a sociologist, with the work of teachers, it seems important to leave as I suggested above, as something that only each of us can discover for ourselves. (Bartholomew in a recent paper (1972) has made some important suggestions.) This follows from the main argument of this paper, that it is in the end personal commitments that are the grounds for action, whether that action is deciding what to do in the classroom or the 'adequacy' of a researcher's account. The point then is not to ask whether particular research methods are, of themselves, 'good' or 'bad', but to ask for what and for whom are we providing accounts.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE SECONDARY SCHOOL

by WILLIAM TYLER

Department of Education, University of Keele

I. INTRODUCTION

THE problems associated with school structure at the secondary level are in the unhappy position of being at the same time both compelling and elusive. Although there is an obvious urgency for developing a more comprehensive repertory of organizational responses to changing pupil intake and educational technologies, the organizational patterns of a school, though pervasive in their influence, are not as immediately apprehended as, say, its physical layout or its headmaster's personality.

It is perhaps for the latter reason that organizational studies of the school have been dominated by administrative issues in which the leadership style of the headmaster or principal figures prominently, e.g. Hemphill and Coons (1950), Halpin and Croft (1963). These studies have tended to ignore the 'objective' elements of structure (such as the formal distribution of authority and amount of paperwork) and have depended on teachers' perceptions of their organizational environment, e.g. McKay (1964), Barakat (1966), McKague (1969). Although these studies have been valuable to the formulation of policy, the external validation of their perceptual scales of structural variables has been largely neglected. This is unfortunate since organizational researchers outside the field of education have paid scant attention to the school, even though it presents an interesting 'mélange' of the organizational characteristics of welfare agency, 'people-processing' institution and small-batch factory.

In the British context such a dearth of organizational literature on the school is all the more lamentable since many of the contemporary issues in education (such as comprehensivization) touch on basic structural problems. Unfortunately the term 'organization' with respect to schools has often meant nothing more than streaming and selection practices, e.g. Burt (1970)—a usage which may have tended to obscure the question of control. Although there are signs

of research interest in some of the organizational aspects of the school (Ross *et al*, 1972) a large-sample study of the internal patterns of authority and communication has yet to be carried out.

The pressures of some recent developments have, however, prompted both administrators and researchers to consider the school as something more than an agglomeration of classroom settings. Such developments as the increase in school size, the growing professional awareness of teachers, demands for innovative educational climates and the emergence of doctrinaire pressures for the 'democratization' of decision-making have produced an awareness of the school as a complex organizational entity with a life of its own.

Far-reaching historical developments have led to a fundamental reappraisal of the traditional organization of the secondary school in Western society (Conant 1959). Of prime importance has been the demand for economy in the utilization of resources which has resulted in an increase in average school size. This development has been exacerbated by the raising of the school leaving age which has created a need for a wide variety of courses and options, fanning the demand for new types of equipment and facilities. Growth and a changing pupil intake have led to a proliferation of educational experiments in differentiation—both horizontal, in the multiplication of 'tracks' and 'streams'—and vertical, in the form of linked and tiered systems. The organization of the large comprehensive school is in effect an encapsulation of these trends with its largely specialist staff, numerous hierarchical levels, heavy capital expenditure and non-selective intake.

Specialization in duties and increased expertise in subject matter have been the bases of teachers' demands for professional recognition (Thomas, 1968). Since these demands have been significantly stronger in secondary than in primary schools, it reinforces the case for interpreting them as an outcome of structural changes and longer periods of training rather than of the evolution of a new professional relationship with pupils (cf. Terry N. Clark's models of educational innovation, 1968). Indeed, independent schools have always managed to confer a higher professional status without the necessary advantage of more 'progressive' or 'pupil-oriented' methods. It is possible, however, that methodological innovations such as individualized instruction will give teachers a greater justification to their claims to a 'professional-client' relationship with their pupils (Dreeben, 1970).

Rapid and drastic changes in the demands on schools have led to an interest not only in piece-meal tactical innovation but in general strategies of organizational design. The extreme reluctance of educational systems to adopt innovations is well illustrated in the observation of Paul Mort (1957, p. 181) that the average school lags twenty-five years behind the best practice. Such a fact has provoked interest in the development of organizational settings which will spontaneously generate and sustain innovation. The question here is much more fundamental to the life of a school than, say, the adoption of the Nuffield science programme, since it involves an understanding of the total system of values, communication and authority relationships that constitute school structure. It is in this area that a sociological approach to organizational settings can be of most value.

Finally, there is the problem of the challenge to traditional modes of authority, not unrelated to pressures for innovation, professional awareness and diversity of intake. The challenge which has come in the form of specific demands to democratize and informalize relationships in the school is derived from a much more radical approach to the value of formal education itself (Levine and Havighurst, 1971). The concept of traditional magisterial authority, it is claimed, is losing its legitimacy among British secondary school pupils, particularly in the upper forms (*The Guardian*, 28/11/72). If this threat is to be taken seriously, it should lead one to examine the nature of authority in schools and to search for solutions that appear to be sociologically viable.

All of these developments have implications for the manner in which power and expertise are deployed in schools: size, because it is often given as a prime cause of bureaucratization; professionalization, because it poses a threat to the supremacy of official authority; innovation, since it suggests radical alternatives to existing arrangements and 'pupil power' since it challanges the very legitimacy of the educational institution. A sociological approach to the evolution of the school as an organization would therefore be both profitable and timely.

Two general approaches to organizational structure—one from the bureaucratic model, the other from 'contingency' theory—will be taken as the bases for reviewing the literature on the school. The former approach is derived directly from the Weberian ideal type of 'rational-legal' authority, while the latter has affinities with 'open systems' theory and leads one to examine the environmental

transactions which dispose an organization to employ one structural strategy rather than another. Each of these approaches will be examined in turn and their implications for policy-making in schools will be discussed in the concluding section.

2. THE BUREAUCRATIC MODEL

The bureaucratic model has been the one most frequently applied in organizational literature on the school. Two major reviews of the school as an organization, that of Bidwell (1965) and that of Corwin (1968) have relied on it as a basis for classifying research materials and for generating hypotheses for future study. Historically, this approach has a good deal of validity since the public education system has had parallels with the growth of other bureaucracies. One may, however, scrutinize a little more closely the supposed advantages of bureaucracy in order to explain why it meets with such a general acceptance in school systems. The initial claim by Weber that it embodies both rationality and efficiency to an exceptional degree has been eroded in recent years, particularly by research which has demonstrated the frequent incompatibility of hierarchical authority and technical expertise (see Gouldner, 1954; Blau and Scott, 1962; Thompson, 1964). Yet school systems still evince all the characteristics of the bureaucratic type (Bidwell, 1965) and appear to be particularly subject to a high degree of centralization as shown on a 'concentration of authority' dimension (Pugh *et al*, 1969). It may be instructive to examine the roots of bureaucratic authority in schools in order to explain why it has proved to be so enduring as a structural type.

There are several possible models for explicating the mechanisms by which educational bureaucracy supports itself in schools. The two models discussed here rely on the fundamental importance of the predictive and the instrumental function of formal authority respectively. These attempt to explain only the internal dynamics of the system, and do not rely for their explanation of official legitimacy on the socializing power of an agency which duplicates in microcosm the structure of the major institutions of modern society (cf. Dreeben, 1968; Shipman, 1972, p. 49). They depend rather on the reciprocal advantages that accrue to the members of an educational institution in the course of their daily interaction. The 'predictive' argument is based mainly on relationships between administrators and teachers, and the 'instrumental' case depends on relationships between teachers and pupils.

The claims for the 'predictive' function of bureaucratic authority are based on the high degree of stability that such authority brings to an organization. It allows for the implementation of general and comprehensive policies and for the exploitation of individual talent in the division of labour. Above all, it provides a clear delineation of function and status that gives a sense of purpose to each office. In a highly ordered setting, institutional norms, or what Bertrand de Jouvenel (1967) calls 'structural certainties' allow for predictable action and with it personal security. Although this predictive power is essentially formal and mechanistic, it is generally preferable to the anomic condition of 'under-control' (Barakat, 1969), Moeller and Charter's (1966) findings suggest that a teacher's 'sense of power' in certain schools may be increased rather than decreased by the presence of clear lines of authority and established procedures.

An extension of the 'predictive' value of bureaucratic controls in schools is found in the 'power-redistributionist' arguments of Musgrove (1971). This writer sees such controls as a necessary basis for the general expansion of power that will occur when every role is invested with greater trust.

> The fact that there is a maldistribution of power within schools should not lead us to the conclusion that they have too much. A better distribution of power, can, in some circumstances, put more power into the system. (p. 70)

Such a transformation, it is claimed, cannot come about by the dissolution of controls, which would only open the door to tyranny 'by default', but by expanding power within a well-articulated set of offices.

It is not altogether clear, however, just how far bureaucratic constraints may be extended without conflicting with professional authority. The legitimacy afforded by the enabling function of rules is derived not from the quality of expert performance but from the maintenance of a stable organizational setting. Moreover, it is not always possible to 'totalize' the power within a school (to use Musgrove's term) without changing radically the present public controls on the educational system. In the existing situation, any attempt to enlarge the power of the headmaster is likely to fall foul of teachers' claims to greater autonomy. It is instructive to note in this connection that the greatest number of conflict incidents were found by Corwin (1970) in schools where a professionally-oriented staff saw itself hampered by too many rules. The balance between leadership and domination is a subtle one but unless the case for the 'interfering'

headmaster (Musgrove, 1971, p. 115) is based on the distinction between institutional survival and professional behaviour it may be misconstrued. It would perhaps be more realistic under the increasing collegiate restrictions on the headmaster's authority to adapt to the school situation more sophisticated organizational models than those mentioned in conventional debate. For example the 'mechanisms of segregation' proposed by Litwak (1961)—'role separation', 'physical distance', 'transferral occupations' and 'evaluation procedures'— suggest ways of integrating bureaucratic and professional subsystems while avoiding the debilitating effects of conflict.

The argument based on the predictive function of a bureaucratic system relies more on the convergence of interest between two kinds of career officials than it does on advantages it confers on those whom it was designed to serve. There is a good deal of literature (Bidwell, 1965) that suggests that the pupil body represents an alienated 'client society' within a rather rickety formal edifice. This 'society', it may be presumed, has little vested interest in an alliance between teachers and bureaucrats who may both appear as agents of the same manipulative authority. In order to explain the acceptance by pupils of bureaucratic norms, we must look for alternative models. Although there is not a great deal of research literature in this area, there appears to be an emerging body of thought which explains this acceptance by the instrumental value which pupils place on educational achievements.

In the 'instrumentalist' model of the contemporary non-selective secondary school, pupils are not seen to be motivated primarily by a love of learning, but rather by a desire for the social and material rewards that follow formal success at school. This dominance of instrumental over normative values has been identified by Mizruchi (1964) as a component of 'lower-class anomie', though it would appear to have made inroads into the middle classes with the spread of hedonistic and consumer-oriented life styles (Riesman, 1950; Leonard, 1968). If this model has any validity, then the school does not fit the pure (or 'congruent') 'normative' type of organization characterized by Etzioni (1961) by its reliance on symbolic sanctions and the high commitment of its 'lower-level participants'. Despite the fact that rewards may still be symbolic (in the form of grades and certificates), the fact that their worth is determined by some future market value would typify the mode of involvement as 'calculative'.

The process by which instrumental values are channelled into conformity with bureaucratic norms deserves fuller explanation. It

has been proposed by King and Ripton (1970), in a study of the mechanisms of reciprocity in a sample of Canadian high schools, that the pupils' widely held instrumental values converge with the career aspirations of teachers who are willing to comply with the bureaucratic rather than the liberal definition of 'good' teaching in order to escape from the classroom into administration, counselling or some non-teaching specialism. The compatibility between students' utilarian values and teachers' career aspirations produces a tacit acceptance of formal methods of teaching and evaluation.

The notion of rather cynically involved pupils supporting a highly structured formal edifice finds support in several other observations of modern educational systems. Testanière (1967) found the same phenomenon underlying the patterns of misbehaviour ('le chahut anomique') in newer state secondary schools in France. The description he gives of ritualism and random misconduct are attributed to the anomic (or rather 'atonic') conditions of the organizational setting. These phenomena may be explained by Barakat's (1969) 'processual' model of alienation in which the effects of objective states of control may be traced through subjective conditions to a variety of deviant behaviours. A recent debate on the incidence of so-called 'anti-institutional neurosis' (see *Times Higher Educational Supplement*, Sept-October, 1972) in the new English universities points to the ambiguities that are produced when a calculative form of involvement becomes general in a traditionally normative organization. It is significant, too, that the recent 'pupil' and 'student' power movements do not discriminate between vocational and bureaucratic aspects of the educational system in their search for 'alternative' organizational types that require an abnormally high degree of commitment.

In summary, it appears that the bureaucratic type of organization in schools finds its legitimacy in functions that are only indirectly related to teaching-learning situations. Rather than being a demonstrably rational method for achieving stated liberal goals of educational policy it finds its *raison d'etre* in functions that are extrinsic to the educational process. On the one hand it provides an administrative and legalistic framework that merely stabilizes the political environment of teaching, though even here it may be a source of conflict itself; on the other, it acts as a guarantor of the sectionalist and even collusive interests of teachers and pupils. Since both of these functions tend to be far removed from the type of legitimacy that springs from the free play of charisma and expertise associated with good

teaching, it may be profitable to examine alternative structural models that have similar claims to 'rationality'.

3. THE 'CONTINGENCY' THEORY APPROACH

The claim of the unique rationality of the Weberian 'ideal type' of bureaucracy is challenged by the 'contingency' school of organizational theory which adopts a more flexible context-dependent definition of structure. Instead of accepting the historical and ideological assumptions underlying the 'ideal type', theorists of this school begin with an examination of the present environmental contingencies and technological constraints and attempt to derive rational systems of control to meet them. In this approach, the historical legacy, including the vested interests of incumbents and clients may act as nothing more than an additional barrier to rational organization. Although this theory has been developed explicitly by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) it draws on a dominant theme in contemporary organizational theory and research (cf. Leavitt, 1951; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Perrow, 1970).

The 'continency' theory of organizations may be briefly stated as follows: different task environments demand different types of structure. Where the task environment is stable and predictable then each task may be broken down into repeatable specialized routines or 'programs' which allow for clear and rigid lines of command and centralized networks of communication. Where the task environment is highly variable and unpredictable then it is impossible to define the task of each worker with any degree of precision. The best that can be done in these circumstances is to allow specialisms to develop where program specification is left to each worker. Under these conditions the lines of authority are likely to be diffuse and communication channels will tend to be 'open'.

These polar types of organization are found in a wide variety of modern organizational theory—in Burns and Stalker's (1961) 'mechanistic' and 'organic' types of management system, in Litwak's (1961) 'rationalistic' and 'human relations' models, in Fouraker's (see Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) 'T' and 'L' types of task structure and in Bennis's (1970) 'bureaucratic' and 'organic-adaptive' forms of organization. It would appear that the Weberian 'ideal type' of bureaucratic authority, which has greatest affinity with the routinized and centralized end of the continuum is simply one of a range of available organizational models and does not have a *de facto* claim to rationality.

The problem in applying the 'contingency' theory to the structure of schools—in the prescriptive sense—lies in deciding which of the two types best fits their task environments. All schools are not equally affected by environmental turbulence and task uncertainty. A suburban grammar school may not experience very much of either while the 'inner-ring' secondary modern typically experiences a good deal of both, in terms of changing pupil intake, ambiguity of goals and absence of well-proven techniques. A large comprehensive school may show similarities with both types (cf. Perrow, 1970, p. 73) ranging from a careers course for fourth-year leavers to 'A'-level French. Schools, like most other large organizations, must learn to develop selective organizational responses to varying degrees of task uncertainty.

The dangers in adopting a segmental approach to the task environment are inherent in the fact that it represents a 'mechanistic' response to what is often an 'organic' problem. A school does not necessarily solve a large truancy problem simply by setting up a special position on the staff to deal with it. Burns and Stalker's study demonstrates that firms with 'mechanistic' management systems failed to innovate successfully, precisely because they treated research and development as a separate department with little influence over, or communication with, the rest of the organization. Differentiation is however inevitable in large schools where enough courses must be provided to engage a wide variety of pupil tastes and interests. The solution to the structural problem entailed has been hinted at in organizational studies of cases of successful integration of widely diverse environments and technologies in manufacturing organizations (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Some of the techniques suggested are the use of cross-functional teams, of integrative roles between departments and the continual rotation of management personnel.

It may be argued, however, that factories with their closely linked technology and high interdependence, are inappropriate models for school organization. The school, it may be said, is a confederation of autonomous classrooms under the hegemony of a headmaster, rather than a unitary organization with differentiated functions. This case is argued by Bidwell (1965) who claims that traditional school organization is characterized by a 'structural looseness' which distinguishes it from other bureaucracies. From what he sees as the necessary isolation and relative autonomy of the classroom teacher arise the unique organizational problems of the school such as their

difficulties with coordination and standardization—but above all the over-riding tendency of teachers and pupils to subvert the formal goals of the school by trading off academic rewards in return for 'particularistic' favours. Bidwell sees the only solution in the development of professional values ... 'are there elements in the teacher sub-culture which, when reinforced by teacher-professionals, counter the pressures of nurturant values and of the student society?' (p. 1012).

The solution Bidwell proposes is unnecessarily tentative since it ignores the effects of radical changes in school organization that have undermined, in the last decade, the validity of this 'box' or 'egg-crate' model of the school. Some of these changes are: the demands for constant innovation in many areas and consequent necessity of pooling resources (Müller and Thomas, 1968); the differentiation of tasks in terms of function—counselling, curriculum development, audio-visual aids and resource specialisms—as found, for example, in teaching teams and other methods of staff deployment (Lynch and Handy, 1970); the use of media which allow for many patterns of grouping other than that of the traditional classroom (Heathers, 1968); the growing importance of 'integrated studies', and other interdisciplinary approaches which require co-operative planning.

These developments tend to detract from the argument that the 'structural looseness' of the school can only be avoided by the emergence of a collegiate authority which has no new technological inspiration. The connection between methodological innovation and environmental contingencies is made by the observation that the former has largely been prompted by widening pupil intake. It is instructive, for example, to look at the number of 'new approaches' that ROSLA has provoked, or to note the numerous organizational experiments that are occurring in curriculum areas where 'lock-step' and common examinations no longer work. There would appear therefore to be a case not only for rejecting the descriptive validity of the 'box' model of the modern secondary school, but also for finding further connections between task uncertainty and organizational complexity.

In a review of the rather sparse literature in this area, Derr and Gabarro (1972) find evidence to support the general appropriateness of 'organic' devices in schools which are confronted by a high degree of uncertainty. From studies which they themselves carried out on a sample of schools in the U.S. with a large minority group population, they report that the more effective schools (in terms of attendance,

drop-out rates and acts of serious misbehaviour) were characterized by a high degree of structural adaptability. These schools had management structures which 'facilitated joint decision-making' and 'employed more elaborate mechanisms for coordinating effort'. They made use as well of a greater differentiation among subgroups so that specialized functions would not become bogged down in day-to-day coping problems. An account of a multi-racial English school's 'changing response' (Meredith, 1972) indicates the development of similar, though less formal, mechanisms for joint consultation. However, in this country there appears to be a need for greater official support for structural experimentation and a general awareness of the usefulness of more complex organizational responses in implementing innovations in curriculum and methodology.

4. CONCLUSION

The 'contingency' theory of organizations therefore appears to have a great deal more to say about contemporary developments in school structure than does the Weberian 'ideal type' of bureaucratic authority. It is a useful general theory of organization rather than a particular model suited to one historical period. The only difficulty, however, lies in translating this theory into operational terms. How, for example, does one decide whether a school is confronted by a segmental challenge or by one that is more general and diffuse? In either case a different strategy will be called for: in the former, the source of uncertainty may be isolated and dealt with by a separate function—an administrative adjustment, a counselling service, a resource centre; in the latter, the total organization needs to be reappraised and general changes made. The difficulty in choosing lies in the greater honesty and determination that the latter course demands. However, the latter-day reforms of the *ancien régime* and the Ch'ing dynasty point out the moral that change can only be delayed for so long.

One major problem associated with the move from a 'mechanistic' to an 'organic' structure is the amount of time and energy that are absorbed by the more elaborate systems of control. A pessimistic appraisal of schools as organizations today would therefore not necessarily be based on the fact that they are 'underpowered' with relation to their political environment (Musgrove's thesis) but that they do not have the necessary resources of time and energy to support the highly complex structure that is the consequence of

their increased load of uncertainty. To cope effectively, schools must be able to generate and communicate a great deal of information about each pupil, and at the same time have the adequate decision-making machinery to make sure this information is effectively used. In organizational terms this means that class size must be lowered, specialization of staff, both in terms of subject and functional areas, must be increased and sufficient time allotted for the exchange of information and the consideration of appropriate action.

Apart from increased specialization—which is a function of school size rather than of awareness of new organizational contingencies—general structural changes do not appear to be imminent in British secondary schools. This is unfortunate, since as Goodlad (1972, p. 331) points out, alternative methods of utilizing professionals' skills may avoid the overconcern with pupil-teacher ratios imposed by the 'box' model of the school—and at the same time reduce unit cost. It is to be hoped, therefore, that a greater understanding of organizational theory will contribute both in the selection of appropriate strategies under existing constraints and in the development of a rational basis for institutional reform.

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THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU

by JOHN KENNETT
Dartford College of Education

1. INTRODUCTION

PIERRE Bourdieu's work is representative of a return to formal theory and theoretical stringency in French sociology after a generation dominated by a transatlantic positivistic empiricism. Beginning in the early 1950's, and borrowing the methods and techniques of American sociology, a considerable growth of 'studies', purely descriptive in character, and, therefore, as Lucien Goldmann (1969) points out, for that very reason debatable on the theoretical level, indicated the development of an empirical sociology of a positivist kind. Bourdieu's work presents a thorough-going challenge to the validity of the spontaneous theory of knowledge implied in the procedures of such a sociology. His analyses are founded on the structuralist postulate that 'experience is a system' (Ernst Cassirer, 1945) and, consequently, a positivistic examination of substantial 'content' in its factual existence is seen as negation of valid sociology, a blind acceptance of a 'pre-constructed' objective world.

Readers of Bourdieu on this side of the Channel may find much to stimulate them. Increasingly there are signs of a new concern with epistemology arising from a questioning of traditional conceptions of sociology and its practice. We, too, have had our 'empiricist slumbers', have blindly made attempts to attain knowledge of the social leaving aside theoretical problems which we tended to view as the nice concerns of the philosophers. Perhaps Bourdieu's attempts to confront the epistemological obstacles peculiar to the social sciences and not comparable to those faced by the natural sciences will fall appositely, and so, perhaps, too, will the presentation of the social scientist as an inquirer who unites commitment to social reality with a proper concern for the theoretically problematic, thus transcending our traditional distinctions between 'philosopher' and 'sociologist'.

Not much of Bourdieu has been translated as yet, although his major work, *La Reproduction*, is scheduled for publication in English

in the near future. Another problem for English readers is that the abstract nature of the structuralist perspective makes for difficult reading even when the translator has done his job well. Bourdieu is certainly not instantly comprehensible, and, as has been pointed out by Raymond Williams, the English intellectual tradition has stead-fastly resisted the development of a specialised linguistic style; so that, for some, at any rate, who are unfamiliar with French discourse at this level of abstraction, a little help may be welcome. It is in view of this that the present introduction has been written.

2. THE MAIN POSTULATES

Bourdieu's main postulates are: firstly, that society is characterized by repression; secondly, that '. . . there is, diffused within a social space a cultural capital, comparable to economic capital, transmitted by inheritance and invested in order to be cultivated . . .' (Bourdieu: 1970 (2)); thirdly, that the true, as opposed to the apparent, nature of the education system functions to discriminate in favour of those who are the inheritors of this cultural capital; fourthly, that the essentialist view of man implicit in common sense representations of school failure as being due to lack of talents, or of social groups as 'having' certain characteristics which make them fit or unfit for success, is a mystification, an ideology of the dominant group; fifthly, that culture has, despite the theory of art for art's sake, a political function.

Society as a system of illusions is the theme of Bourdieu's work. All is 'pre-constructed'. This is why positivist sociology with its blind acceptance of what Nietzsche calls 'the dogma of the immaculate perception', seeing itself as 'free from preventions and presupposi-tions', is likely to fall into all the traps set by pre-constructed objects (Bourdieu: 1968 (2)). Thus Bourdieu sees in society a particular form of violence, 'different from the violence which is open and palpable, but nonetheless efficacious,' which seeks to impose mean-ings, and to impose them as alone legitimate, disguising the power-relations which are the source of its strength. By this legitimation, the system of power-relations, which in reality imposes 'reality', remains unrevealed and the 'reality' functions to maintain the system of power-relations.

Of course, Bourdieu is a marxist, but we must see how he proceeds from the marxist theory of the ideological function of culture into a deeper awareness of the peculiar efficacy of culture in that culture

is seen as structuring the system of social relations by its own functioning. An elaboration of Marx; but there is also a critique of Durkheim, Bourdieu's other starting point, for education deals in illusion. The reproduction referred to in *La Reproduction* is not the expected, declared aim of all education systems, Durkheim's cultural reproduction, but the hidden and unsuspected social reproduction which the education system promotes beneath its ideology of value-freedom and neutrality. The education system is a piece of machinery to confirm social privilege. The maintenance of the illusion of neutrality is seen as the very condition of its being able to function in this way; there is no conspiracy: no-one, pupils, students, teachers, not even the dominant groups who profit by this double-dealing, suspects the hidden function. Thus, perfect integrity is maintained at the level of consciousness. How could it be otherwise in an age of democratic ideals? In a democratic age subtle means continue, however, to perpetuate the social order, and Bourdieu picks out the education system as being the instrument employed. 'The education system fulfils the function of legitimation which is more and more necessary to the perpetuation of the social order to the extent that the evolution of the 'rapport de forces' tends to exclude more and more intensely the imposition of a hierarchy based upon unrefined and openly callous forms of interaction.' (Bourdieu: 1970 (2)).

Notice some points about this structuralist perspective of social reality. It is asserted that appearance in human affairs is not reality; an underlying relationship is postulated between elements, having primacy over the individual social actor; only a study of the structural interrelationships can give an adequate knowledge of the functions of the structures, that is, their meaning is given by virtue of the function they fulfil within the system of reciprocal relations. What Bourdieu is saying is that we have a hidden structured structure which is structuring unseen the 'reality' of French life.

3. THEORY OF CULTURE

To comprehend more fully what Bourdieu means by a structured and structuring structure, we should turn to his theory of culture. By culture, Bourdieu means literature, science, religion, art, language and all symbolic systems falling within the widest definition of the term. Once again we deal with illusion, for Bourdieu conceives of the apparent freedom in which intelluctuals and artists pursue their

'inspiration' as nothing more than an ideology, a convenient fiction cherished by intellectuals, artists, and their public alike, which in reality hides the social function of culture. As we have indicated, Bourdieu's social theory is centred on his belief that with subtle but effective violence some wield power over others in society. This violence seeks to impose meanings, to structure people's awareness of reality. People become aware of reality through their culture, '. . . (culture) provides both meaning and a consensus on meaning . . .' (Bourdieu: 1971 (2)), but if this culture should itself be structured, through its consecration into the body of official culture, to be taught in the education system, and become funda-mental features of the taken for granted body of knowledge, then 'reality' is in the hands of those who confer such cultural legitimacy. The sole criterion of gaining such cultural legitimacy is apparently the intrinsic merit of the symbolic goods and it is because of the illusion of freedom of production on the one hand and of intrinsic worth on the other that culture can effectively fulfil its political function. The system of power relations, which defines cultural values, because of the differential distribution of power to confer legitimacy, remains unrevealed and culture gives the appearance of being unfettered by worldly considerations.

Bourdieu relates the ideology of artistic and intellectual freedom to the historical process of the progressive autonomization of the system of production, circulation and consumption of cultural goods which created an artistic and intellectual 'field', distinct from econo-mics, politics and religion. This process is seen as dating from the 15th century, when artists were no longer tied to the ethical and aesthetic demands of Church and aristocratic patronage. Taking the example of art, Bourdieu points out that as it freed itself from subjection to external legitimation agencies by gaining economic independence from them, so different groups of artists took on the function of defining, legitimating and generating artistic production. Who these different groups were depended on their position in the artistic field in which producers competed for authority. As the artistic field gained in autonomy, the artist declared more and more firmly his claim to independence, and his indifference to the public. During the 19th century the full flowering of the theory of 'art for art's sake' was seen. Art now was taken to be a 'superior' reality, and critics sprang up to interpret art for the public who were assumed to be aesthetically incompetent. Thus the artist and his work became socially redefined as socially independent.

However, society intervenes at the very heart of the creative act, thrusting in demands, expectations or even, indeed, its indifference. Positional relationships set out on the intellectual and creative field reveal how the social structure defines the acceptability of a work of art in terms of the dominant value system. Even the 'purest' artistic intention depends for its existence on certain particular historical and social conditions; the intrinsic demands of the 'field' and the external context of the social and economic order of the time combine in each 'creative project' (Bourdieu: 1968 (1)). Thus, far from being independent, the artist and his creative project represent a meeting point, as it were, between determination and determinism, and both are accordingly products of the structure.

Since culture is a product of the structure, 'culture classifies—and classifies the classifiers' (Bourdieu: 1971 (2)). Culture sets up an opposition between the thinkable and the unthinkable, between what is a worthy subject and what is unmentionable, what is interesting *per se* and what is uninteresting *per se*. Consequently such a division discriminates between those who are discriminating and those who are not. Thus culture classifies. The discriminating are the inheritors of the cultural capital which Bourdieu sees as differentially distributed among groups. They have been classified and will, according to the model, classify in their turn contemporary culture. In this way culture classifies the classifiers. The significance of this is clear: the mechanism of the reproduction of social structure is located in the culture itself. Culture functions to legitimate an arbitrary social order. It orders the world and establishes agreement about the world; it organizes our representation of the natural and the social by dividing these areas up into antagonistic classes through the logic of inclusion and exclusion. It provides the system of categories of perception and thought which organize reality by directing and organizing thinking about reality, making what is thought thinkable in the form in which it is thought. As a structured structure, culture reproduces 'in a transfigured and therefore in an unrecognizable form' the structure of social relations. In this way the cultural representation of the world, that is 'reality', is immediately adjusted to the structure of social relations, causing these to be perceived as 'natural'. The structured structure by reason of its symbolic efficacy ongoingly structures the structure. Thus we have the symbolic buttressing of the existing balance of forces. Symbolic violence imposes meanings, 'disguises the power-relations which are the source of its strength, by adding its power to the power-relations.'

The link between culture and structure is furnished on the one hand by the education system and on the other by the concept of the 'habitus'. This is defined as 'the system of modes of perception, of thinking, of appreciation and of action'. The 'habitus' then is the intellectual, moral and aesthetic mode of integration of a social group. It is essentially informally produced, being acquired for the most part in primary socialization. In *La Reproduction*, a particular case of the habitus, the habitus of language, is explored as generally illustrative. A sensitive and well-developed manipulation of language is a function of the linguistic tradition of the family and of the social group to which the family belongs. Language is not merely a tool of communication; it furnishes a system of categories; it provides for the operation of complex thought structures; it gives style. With the concept of the power of symbolic goods to form a habitus within a group, we can see clearly how cultural capital equates with social reproduction. Some groups will come into the education system with good taste, insight and sound judgement, a rich stock of relevant information and a command of language; others will not. In no sense is the habitus to be taken as a mere record cabinet: once sufficiently formed, the habitus begins to generate appropriate perspectives and ideas; it 'informs', and reproduces what is 'appro-priate' in new contexts, much as the DNA coding within the physical body. Once again, being structured, it possesses a structuring nature. The 'informed' individual comes to find 'naturally' within him the cognitive and expressive styles that legitimate his eventual place in the social structure. The forming of the habitus may be regarded as the programming of the individual and of the group to which he 'belongs', the handing down of the code which reaps its harvest in the education system leading to 'legitimated' places in the social hierarchy.

The education system functions to perpetuate and transmit the capital of consecrated cultural signs. Scanning the generations, it differentiates the acceptable from the rest. But it functions also to produce a cultural consensus, moulding the public, providing its knowledge and its perspectives through its methodical and systematic teaching of the legitimate culture. In this way the differentiating function of the school is legitimated; all come to see that some, whose social gifts are read as natural gifts, are 'by nature' in a different class from others.

Bourdieu points out how difficult it is to proceed from surface appearances to structural reality. Ideological representations of reality

offer an organized and systematic resistance, being supported by the whole social order which they in turn support. An example of this is the ideology of charisma, which, by bracketing the linkage between education and cultural capital, affirms the theory of 'natural' differences between groups. Such a bracketing is objectively authorized and sustained because it ensures reproduction of privilege to the privileged. Thus it comes about that each pupil accepts his eventual place in the social hierarchy as his personal fate. The bourgeois ideology of charisma is the way in which the dominant can genuinely believe they have the right to be dominant.

Bourdieu's point is that given the close affinity between academic culture and the dominant culture, pupils come to school relatively well or poorly equipped to succeed. Knowledge, savoir-faire, developed tastes, and good taste are socially distributed and function to favour some at the expense of others. Bourdieu spells this out by asserting that a cultural code is necessary to decipher the message systems contained in cultural manifestations. This code is the cognitive style, the habitus. School does not, and cannot, make up for an 'inferior' habitus, it merely continues to reward what the 'well-endowed' habitus produces. 'A purely academic culture is not simply a part of general culture, but an inferior culture, since its elements do not carry the same sense as they do in the wider set' (Bourdieu: 1964 (1)). But of course school is the only link with the dominant culture for some. The fortunate are sensitized; they have a well-interiorized set of models; they can generate requisite thoughts, perceptions and actions. 'Successful academic apprenticeship depends on previous possession of the instruments of appropriation—unless the school system explicitly and deliberately hands over in its pedagogic communication those instruments which are essential to the success of the communication and which, in a society divided into classes, are unequally distributed. An educational system that puts into practice an implicit pedagogic action requiring initial familiarity with the dominant culture, and which proceeds by imperceptible familiarization, offers information and training which can only be received and acquired by subjects supported by the systems of predispositions which is the condition for the success of the transmission and of inculcation of the culture. By doing away with giving explicitly to everyone what it implicitly demands of everyone, the education system expects of everyone alike that they have what it does not give, which consists mainly of linguistic and cultural competence.' (Bourdieu: 1970 (3)).

The point Bourdieu is making is that it is not in the characteristics of social classes, but in the academic culture itself that the mechanism of distributing educational opportunity is to be found. Despite ideologies to the contrary, despite appearances, the system of power-relations and the system of education and its systems of thought are deeply interrelated. According to Panofsky, the same hidden inter-relationship existed between thomistic thought on the one hand and the production of gothic architecture on the other, both emerging in isolation from each other, and yet also from the same cultural unconscious, the same set of pre-dispositions.

The teachers are, in Bourdieu's view, also to be considered pri-marily as programmed products of the structure. They see them-selves, of course, as autonomous, in the same way that the cathedral builders had no notion of their own programming, and this, as we have seen, is essential for the teachers' function of separating sheep from goats in perfect impartiality. In *Les Heritiers* the point is made that the teacher is committed to the essentialist model of man implied in the theory of charisma, because it is only as a man of talents that the teacher shares some of the privileges of the bourgeoisie. 'All are equal before the examination' it appears, but in fact the existing structure in its interrelations with the dominant culture has already picked the winners. The true nature of the education system is revealed as being a process through which occurs the reproduction of social relations by the mediation of the habitus in reproducing and generating the marks of cultural orthodoxy. 'All are equal before the examination' is a 'produced' fact regarded as a fact by dominant and subordinate alike, and its consequence is that order is maintained in the school and on the streets.

4. SUBSTANTIALISM AND STRUCTURALISM

To move now towards a consideration of Bourdieu's work as a whole, we could say that it is characterized by an unusual degree of concern with the problematics of sociological meta-science. A debate stands out on every page of Bourdieu, the debate between substantial-ism and structuralism, between the view that sees the elements of the social world as having a necessary and natural character, an intrinsic meaning, and the view of these as arbitrary constructs, a product of the hidden interrelationships within the social world. The fact is, however, that social and cultural formations resist the application of such a meta-theory, being endowed with an apparently

necessary character which makes them appear to individuals as natural. Hence, Bourdieu wishes us to consider making a radical break with spontaneous ways of thought and perception in order to perceive that apparent elements are in reality products. To ignore the defining power of objective relations in the field, not to perceive that single elements hold their properties only by virtue of the relations linking one with another within a system, that is to say by virtue of the function they fulfil within the system of relations, leads to apprehending all observable characteristics as if they were substantial properties attached by nature to individuals or classes of individuals. As Bourdieu points out, sociologists' use of concepts, at once descriptive and explicatory, such as 'motivations', 'tendencies', 'needs', 'inclinations' or 'aspirations' rests upon a bracketing of the system of objective relations. One of the most stimulating insights Bourdieu provides us with, consequently, is into the implicit assumptions of the sociology of knowledge and what is counted as sociological knowledge. By relating it to its social context, Bourdieu de-reifies knowledge. He shows us how the meaning assigned to objects is always mediated, how explicatory systems are imposed upon us. In other words, common sense reality is to be taken as problematic since we have to ask whose reality it is that has been legitimated to the extent of becoming 'what everyone knows'. Thus, the objectivist view of knowledge in traditional epistemology and analytic philosophy is exposed for criticism.

Power is the lynch pin of Bourdieu's explicatory system. Because of this, Bourdieu meets the durkheimian consensus on values with the concept of the control of values. By so doing, he criticizes the functionalist view that a social system expresses in each of its parts the action of a single principle, and that consequently it is possible to apprehend the peculiar logic of a culture. The currently fashionable schematization of social experience in terms of parsonian variables regarded as properties of a social system results from being misled by a false theory of objectivity, and sociologists caught in this trap of submission to the given as such, using an explicatory system objectively imposed by the pre-constructed object, negate themselves as sociologists. They have refused to build consciously their own distance from reality and the conditions for an adequate knowledge of it, or, as Schutz would put it, they have remained in the natural attitude while purporting to offer a scientifically adequate account of the social world. One recalls Levi-Strauss' statement that the central tenet of marxism is that 'reality is never the most

obvious of realities'. For Bourdieu, all appearances must be disregarded through abstraction to establish an intelligible relation between constructed relations. Reality is built at the price of breaking away from phenomenal appearances.

Owing to our empiricist bias, anglo-saxons will find this anticommonsense model of reality foreign. 'I am sober; you are intoxicated; he is a French philosopher', is, as Alasdair MacIntyre reminded us in a recent review, the irregular verb produced by the English in contact with the unfamiliar atmosphere of French thought. Nevertheless, it may be that we are, as was stated at the outset, increasingly revealing an awareness that all sociology is a sociology of knowledge, and Bourdieu makes the germane point that everyday reality is linked with formalized bodies of knowledge and that these—philosophy, sociology, art, religion, science, literature—are all products of the social situation. We are therefore reminded by Bourdieu that the sociology of knowledge means taking a theoretical stance to the character of social life.

5. SOME VIEWS OF BOURDIEU

All this is not to say that unprejudiced sociologists should uncritically accept Bourdieu lock, stock and barrel. One of the features of his work that causes some concern is that the reader is constantly caught between appreciating its brilliant insights and asking whether Bourdieu succeeds sufficiently in freeing himself from durkheimian epistemological constraints. A rather static view of society characterizes his work to date; there is an inadequate exploration of the ongoing dialectic between consciousness and structure as an historical process. Bourdieu seems at one point to realise his theoretical position. He sees that giving primacy to objective relations leads to a reification of the structure as a system of relations in pre-constructed totalities, outside the history of the individual or group: '. . . one must remember that ultimately objective relations do not exist and do not realize themselves except in and through the system of dispositions of the agents, produced by the internalizing of objective conditions.' (Bourdieu: 1968 (2).) However, one needs to go beyond this realization of the non-existence of objective structures to a consideration of how men through their daily interaction actively shape reality. This persistent absolutist characteristic in Bourdieu can be shown by comparing his work with that of marxists who have sought to transcend the reductionism of matter over mind inherited

from the nineteenth century. The work of Lucien Goldmann on the social function of the writer as a creator of social consciousness reveals the present limitations of Bourdieu's theory. Bourdieu sees the writer as no more than a product of the structure. The cultural product is adapted to fit the nature of social reality. In contrast, Goldmann sees the writer and his work as primarily structuring consciousness itself. Reality for Goldmann is ideal-typical and the writer 'realizes' in his work the potential consciousness of a social group, which is the most coherent formulation of a socially located world-view. Pascal is seen as realizing in his work the ideas, aspirations and feelings of the jansenist world-view, which opposed other socially located ideologies during the seventeenth century in France. Until the appearance of the masterwork the group remains only partially conscious of its own understanding of reality. Reality for Goldmann is less 'structures' than a process of conscious 'structuring' and 'destructuring', and this focusing on 'L'homme structurant' rather than on the structuring structures enables him to analyse the 'becoming given-ness' of social reality, unlike Bourdieu whose analyses appear to remain constrained by the positivistic paradigm of society over self. The structuralism of Goldmann analyses structures which organize the empirical consciousness of the group, class or society with particular reference to their historical formation and process, to the ways in which they change over time according to men's active and changing response to their life situations. The genesis of changing structures is historically accounted for in terms of human consciousness.

More substantively, criticisms of Bourdieu have been raised by the marxist writers, Baudelot and Establet (1971). They accuse Bourdieu of latent bourgeois ideology in his use of reified concepts like School and University, and focus particularly on his explanation of school failure among pupils in terms of the unequal distribution, among different social classes, of linguistic and cultural capital. In viewing the situation as a market, Bourdieu asserts that the value of cultural capital is a function of the distance between the linguistic and cultural norm imposed by the school and the degree of competence derived from pupils' social class backgrounds. Description here exceeds explanation, say the critics. We are given the appearance of a strictly technical account—codes, linguistic competence, function of distance—but these phrases, apparently technical and therefore neutral, only make sense from a certain point of view: that of the function of the school in its imposition of normative

patterns, which are also those of the dominant classes, as Bourdieu is at pains to demonstrate. Thus it is seen that in choosing this point of view, Bourdieu reproduces in his explanations what the school uses in its verdicts and sanctions; he has merely displaced the spontaneous explanation given by the school (inequality of gifts) to re-site it in the family (social inequality). Baudelot and Establet point out that this is, in their view, merely an enlargement of the school explanation; contradictions, struggle within the school, the proper foci of conflict analysis, are entirely replaced in Bourdieu's account by the concept of inequalities before the school and a unified culture within. These criticisms are presented and analysed in a detailed manner and undeniably point to limitations of Bourdieu's explanations. Mention in this respect could also be made of Bourdieu's continuing reliance on statistics as some kind of scientific under-pinning of his theories.

None of these criticisms detracts, however, from the overall brilliance of Bourdieu's work. No-one better than he has articulated a theory of the real world as necessarily produced by the legitimation, consecration and transmission of triumphant ideologies, of reality as the final result of the 'game of images' which eventually are perceived as reality in a universe where 'reflection is the only reality'. Proof, despite the statistics, does not exist either, of course. What is offered in his work is exactly what is given by the common sense view of reality: coherence. Some views of reality seek to benefit more than the powerful few.

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THE RELATIONSHIP OF SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY IN AN EDUCATIONAL CONTEXT: A PSYCHOLOGIST'S VIEWPOINT

by Gerald A. Cortis

School of Education, University of Birmingham

1. INTRODUCTION

ONE of the principal difficulties in estimating the contributions of the social sciences to the general body of knowledge is the principle of accountability. As one articulate critic has recently commented, 'The social sciences appear as an activity without intrinsic mechanisms of retribution; where anybody can get away with anything' (Andreski, 1972, p. 16). When estimating the contributions in the context of a practical activity such as teaching the accountability may be easier to assess since a ready-made yardstick is apparently available. I say 'apparently' because it is not at all clear whether accountability is descriptive or predictive. That is, should the social sciences, and particularly the two with which I am concerned, psychology and sociology, merely *describe* behaviours in the teaching situation or *prescribe* behaviours—such prescription leading to particular courses of action which may or may not be regarded as 'desirable' by the participants?

A ready indicator of usefulness at the popular level is 'the broken desk syndrome'. If the pupils are breaking-up the classrooms and assaulting the teachers, the participants (not to mention the observers) may justifiably analyse the problem in either descriptive or prescriptive terms, from which analysis effective 'remedial' action may or may not spring. Other types of 'deviant' behaviour such as an obsessive desire for academic success at the expense of broader-based personality development or withdrawn behaviour states are not so dramatically highlighted, since they do not result in immediate social disorganisation. The symptoms may be less clear but the consequences for the individual are just as menacing. Their alleviation may lie every bit as much in the realm of the social sciences as does that of the more aggressive behaviours.

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2. PRESCRIPTION AND DESCRIPTION

Morris (1966, pp. 171–172) notes that 'the major contribution of psychological studies ... lies in their potential power to deepen and augment our perception of what we are doing in education, and our understanding of one another as we attempt to carry out together the tasks with which we are faced. It is in terms of such conceptions that we gain an understanding of the relation of theory to practice'. In other words, though he is not prescribing particular behaviours, it follows that one is unlikely to 'augment' one's perception without acquiring forms of behaviour that would have been absent lacking such 'augmentation'. In behavioural terms 'augmentation' would be acquired by acting prescriptively.

Taylor (1966, p. 210) speaks similarly in saying that 'the justification for the inclusion of sociological studies does not rest upon any observable link between the pursuit of such studies and the improvement of classroom technique and practice. Rather it is dependent upon the requirement that the teacher should first of all be capable of thinking logically and rationally about the whole range of social phenomena that he encounters in his professional and private life'. Thinking 'logically and rationally about the whole range of social phenomena' is likely to entail particular consequences in behaviour for the teacher, though by the nature of sociology itself the connection with 'classroom technique and practice' is less clear than in the case of psychology.

The problem raised by 'prediction or description' is not just a semantic quibble. As Andreski (1972, p. 32) says, 'The impact of the word on the formation of character has been recognised by the earliest writers on education, as well as by the latest psychoanalysts, and is enshrined in all kinds of popular sayings and proverbs. Barring congenital deformities, people can be made self-reliant and bold by being repeatedly told they are strong and capable, are doing well and could easily tackle even bigger tasks. Or they may lose self-confidence and hope by hearing often enough that they are awkward, brainless or unlucky'. Even apparently pure methodological conceptions can mould reality. In some degree these conceptions become true (even if they were not true initially) by changing the reality they purport to describe and analyse. Every description of human behaviour becomes to some extent a persuasive description as soon as its objects get to know of it.

Perhaps a brief examination of the developments of the two

areas—psychology and sociology—will help to clarify the relationship between the two. The distinction between prediction and description is in some senses embodied in the basic concepts of each. Psychology has traditionally stressed 'prediction and control' (Allport, 1947) rather than sociology which 'at its ideal best, is a distinctive *perspective*, rather than say any substantive subject-matter or type of human behaviour' (Worsley, 1970, p. 31).

3. PSYCHOLOGY

Psychology grew from man's desire to portray human behaviour in rational terms and to make sense of his own and other's experience by applying the canons of scientific method to such an enterprise. In adopting this model it was inevitable that prediction was likely to be stressed at the expense of understanding. Understanding (namely the establishment of adequate theory) tends to lag behind. As Deutch (1960) has commented, 'Of facts there is already too much in psychology, of evidence too little' (p. 16).

In its quest for scientific status psychology was the first of the social sciences to import the hypothetico-deductive methodology. In the natural sciences the methodology of experimentation and measurement played a crucial part in the solution of problems. There is a danger here which needs stressing. Methodology in the social sciences, and particularly in psychology, is generally taken to mean, not the basic principles of inductive inference but the particular methods of analysing data. Too often methods of induction mean in reality methods of verification. That is, they tell us how to test hypotheses. They do not tell us how to formulate them. The latter entails creative thinking at its highest level and remains as much of a mystery as ever it was.

So in all sciences we have a continuous process of observation, the erection of hypotheses, proof or disproof, more observation, more hypotheses and so on. No final certainty or absolute truth reigns in the natural sciences. A theory is tenable only for the moment. When further facts are discovered we may modify a theory or abandon it for another which in turn will, perhaps at some very distant point in the future, undergo the same process of abandonment or modification. A hallmark of any theory claiming to be scientific is that it can be tested. 'A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of theory (as people often think) but a vice . . .Every genuine *test* of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or to refute it' (Popper, 1963, p. 36).

Psychology then is the application to human behaviour of the experimental or observational techniques of science with a view to accounting for that behaviour in terms of theories which can be verified by experimental methods.

Social psychology has been the label traditionally assigned to a rather arbitrary collection of topics, not necessarily related, such as small groups or crowd behaviour. Whilst a technical definition of it might be concern 'with the behavioural processes, causal factors and results of interaction among persons and groups' (Lindgren, 1969, p. 7) there is a sense in which all non-physiological psychology is in effect 'social' psychology.

For example, while 'non social psychologists' may consider such topics like learning, perception and motivation as separate fields of study the same activity may serve as an illustration of each field. So, as Zajonc (1966) notes, a rat's turning left in a T-shaped maze may be studied in terms of the number of reinforced trials (learning), the physical properties of the maze's left or right arm (perception), or the animal's hunger level (motivation). But if all these variables are held constant and the rat's behaviour (turning left or right) is observed when a second rat is introduced into the right arm of the maze the field becomes that of social psychology.

4. SOCIOLOGY

Sociology, like psychology, grew from a concern with human behaviour but from the beginning it concentrated on the context of group behaviour rather than on individual behaviour. The socio-logist focuses his attention on groups and relationships rather than on individuals because he believes that we cannot understand human relations by studying individuals alone any more than we can under-stand water by studying hydrogen and oxygen separately. A group has characteristics different from, and much more than, the indi-vidual characteristics of its members. It has a nature of its own and needs to be studied in its own right. As something of a different nature occurs when hydrogen and oxygen are combined, so a new order is born when people act together. 'Their behaviour is not the action of A plus the action of B, and so on; it is the *interaction* of A and B which, is difficult or impossible to predict from their separate personalities' (Biesanz and Biesanz, 1969, p. 3).

Perhaps one of the essential differences between psychology and sociology is that of experimental method—the former science em-

bracing it as a necessity, the latter as an option. The 'option' aspect means inevitably that some sociologists indulge in experiments as the psychologist defines them, and this leads to an area of overlap, but for sociologists 'their major contributions have been in the form of theory building' (Lindgren, 1969, p. 13). As Merton (1957) has said, 'a large part of what is now called sociological theory consists of *general orientations towards data, suggesting types of variables which need somehow to be taken into account, rather than clear, verifiable statements of relationships between specified variables*. We have many concepts, but few confirmed theories; many points of view, but few theorems; many "approaches" but few arrivals' (p. 9, author's italics).

Though Merton wrote in such a vein over fifteen years ago a recent work from the new 'ethnomethodological school' (Filmer, 1972, *et al.*) would indicate that some sociologists still feel 'it is better to travel hopefully than to arrive'. This treatise not only theorises to a wide and interesting extent but implies the demise of the conventional experimental approach, seeing it as naive and unrealistic, advancing an inappropriate rhetoric of 'variables' and 'measures' which, it asserts, arises from copying the defective positivistic methods all too common in the natural sciences. I will say more about this below but note it now to emphasise that experimental methods are not the distinguishing mark of sociologists, being to some an adjunct, to others an irrelevance.

5. THE IMPLICATIONS OF POST-POSITIVISTIC THEORIES

On occasions sociologists and psychologists study the same behaviour and often ask similar questions. Perhaps a basic difference is that for the sociologist 'the point of entry' is the society of which the individual is a member, for the psychologist the individual himself. So there is much common ground and at the border lines it becomes arbitrary whether a topic is classed as sociological or psychological. Yet the basic commitment is separable, the psychologist perceiving how the individual's inner 'psyche' or external relations with others are organised so as to constitute 'a personality', the sociologist seeking to identify regularities and patterns of an individual's behaviour which enable him to be viewed as typical of others who have been exposed to similar social-group influences.

However the social sciences in general have recently been going through a period of reappraisal which has been more agonising than

these recurrent events usually are! Joynson (1970), Hudson (1972) for example in psychology, Filmer *et al.* (1972) in sociology are representative of the climate of current questioning and Harré (1972) has recently commented lucidly in advancing a solution to what he sees as a dilemma arising from 'the wider collapse of the more general positivist point of view as a determinant of the ideal forms of science in general' (p. 115). He reviews the way that chemistry has been transformed from a positivistic to a post-positivistic science by its examination of the molecule as a spatial structure of atoms rather than by an emphasis on the atomic nature of materials in general. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the transition of chemistry from a two-tier to a three-tier science.

TWO-TIER CONCEPT	THREE-TIER CONCEPT
Tier 1. The pattern of observed phenomena under the microscope *is explained by*	Tier 1. The pattern of observed phenomena under the microscope *is explained by*
Tier 2. The atomic nature of materials	Tier 2. The inner nature of atoms and by the concepts of 'structure' and 'valency' *which arise from*
	Tier 3. The atomic nature of materials
Figure 1a	Figure 1b

In a similar way, Harré says, a psychological or sociological phenomenon such as 'speech' can be explained either in terms of a two-tier science (as it largely is at present, Figure 2a) or as a three-tier science (as it may develop, Figure 2b).

TWO-TIER CONCEPT	THREE-TIER CONCEPT
Tier 1. Overt behaviour—'speech' *is explained by*	Tier 1. Overt behaviour—'speech' *is explained by*

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Tier 2. Complex physiological mechanisms involving the nervous and endocrine systems.

Tier 2. Monitoring of the utterance, 'inner speech about speech', ideas on the presentation of self, the structure of reality *which arise from*

Tier 3. Complex physiological mechanisms involving the nervous and endocrine systems.

Figure 2a

Figure 2b

So we can conceive of people as not only following rules about their speech utterances but of knowing they follow rules and of often choosing the rules they will follow in accordance with 'rules for choosing rules'. This is an introspective process, not amenable to 'scientific' verification, but providing a new dimension in the social sciences and technically termed 'the account' (Scott and Lyman, 1968). It is language, says Harré, which is the key to this process. Linguistic philosophers have indicated the subtle and precise system which will provide an adequate conceptual scheme for the analysis of accounts.

While I do not share the view of the ethnomethodologists (who are representative of the 'three-tier' viewpoint) that their *credo* represents the death of the experimental approach as conceived to date, there is little doubt that such views are likely to influence, in due course, conventional verification procedures (for 'better or worse' according to your point of view). The 'two-tier' system whereby overt behaviour is connected directly to physiological causation, for example, has not satisfied everyone. On the other hand, it could be held that the 'three-tier' analogy is false for social scientists, because the inner structure of atoms, as in Chemistry, for example, is much more amenable of exact analysis than the inner structure of language. The debate along these lines is only just beginning but both psychology and sociology are likely to be affected by it.

6. DIALOGUE PAST AND PRESENT

I suggested earlier that in the context of teaching, the social sciences here described could be assessed as to accountability since a ready-

made yardstick was available. What is this yardstick? Over sixteen years ago Peel (1956, p. 68) laid down two functions that an educational science should fulfil. 'First it should promote critical thinking in all people concerned with education. Second, it should provide a frame of reference for teachers in order to give meaning, unity and satisfaction to their work'. These precepts seem to me as true today as when they were written. Further, the tremendous developments in psychology and sociology since that time have provided both more detailed matter to aid critical thinking and wider frames of reference. But have these developments worked in the way one might have expected? Is there a level at which knowledge turns in on itself, or rather do the knowledge-bearers, by the intoxication of their commitment to a theory, turn against each other?

The late fifties and early sixties were not as good times for fruitful dialogue between the two wings, psychology and sociology, as they might have been. Though hindsight can induce a priggish sense of superiority, a reading of some of the dialogue seems very strange in the light of present developments. To look upon those days now it seems as if the 'purists' (the psychologists) were defending hard-won psychometric territory from the 'invaders' (the sociologists). Certainly many psychologists were very aware of the importance of the social context (e.g. Peel, *op. cit.*; Burt, 1956) but some viewed sociology as a bogus interloper. Where sociology was espoused (often for the wrong reasons) it led to irrational descriptions, even prescriptions, as to what sociologists ought to be doing. Some psychological schools of thought were even heard to advocate for example, the learning of statistical techniques such as multiple regression as an 'indispensable' element in the training of sociological research workers! The concern with measurement was an over-riding one and there seemed a real danger that in some areas a power-ful statistical apparatus would be substituted for adequate conceptual-isation.

Swift (1965) lowered the temperature and provided a framework for a reasoned debate between the two areas in basically arguing that the research methods developed by the psychologist were those that assisted the individual perspective on human behaviour. For the sociologist to employ such research strategies would commit him to levels of analysis and the use of statistical tools which he would find inappropriate. Basically, Swift says, the sociologist complains that a psychologist's treatment of, for example, the environment 'tends to be a simple extension of his approach to the rat in the labora-

tory maze. That is, the environment is treated principally as if it consisted of physical artifacts. It is something against which an individual barks his shins. On the other hand, the sociologist wishes to suggest that the vital aspect of the environment is its presence in the mind of the individual who imposes meaning upon the world around him through a process of symbolisation. This process is learned, and is carried on in interaction with other people' (p. 341).

At root I see no contradiction between the two areas in regard to this key process. The forms of symbolisation at which we become adept will obviously be the result of both genetic and cultural factors. This view is now, I think, acceptable to both sides, though, in Swift's words 'An argument about it would be whether the process of symbolisation is only a veil between actual and potential skills, or whether we can infer no further than the design of the veil which we may discern in any single person' (p. 343).

A leading psychologist has given an outward indication of how the 'mental measurement' movement in recent years has developed a more 'social' framework by a statement concerning the relation of heredity and environment in IQ terms. 'It is not very meaningful to try to reach any general figure since the genes and the environment are not separate factors. . . . We need to think in terms of an *interacting system* (my italics) rather than of the conventional antithesis between heredity and environment' (Vernon, 1969, pp. 13-14).

7. PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS

While both sociology and psychology 'explain' in varying degrees the 'reality' they purport to analyse, one virtue (ignoring its weaknesses on which I have already dwelt) of the new ethnomethodological school of sociology is its concentration on the meaning behind the 'action' and hence its relation to the philosophy of the language (since 'meaning' is mediated initially by linguistic processes). The avoidance of the philosophical standpoint has seemed to me a weakness in the experimental approach as it presents itself at the moment. All too often, as Andreski (1972, p. 113) says, we 'find meticulously worked-out figures accompanying a slipshod text full of grossly misleading words and phrases and the separation of the social sciences from philosophy is largely to blame. A practitioner of the social sciences needs the skills of analytical philosophy to steer clear of logical and semantic pitfalls'. Wilson (1972) has argued in a similar vein in the case of educational research.

At the practical level with which we are concerned there is a sense in which this lack of precision stemming from philosophical ignorance could be forming its own 'mechanism of retribution' which Andreski said was lacking in the social sciences. I began by suggesting that the 'broken desk syndrome' was a possible yardstick whereby the effectiveness of psychology and sociology in the classroom situation could be assessed in either prescriptive or descriptive terms. That is, pupil behaviour would be a guide as to the utility of pedagogical precepts founded on the two areas. But in a sense this is putting the matter in the wrong perspective. If our thinking has been slipshod the social sciences may have helped to create the very conditions we are now seeking to ameliorate. It is possible, however, that the blame does not rest with the theories themselves but with the theorests, or rather with the lunatic fringe, often of uninformed followers, who attach themselves to the theorists. These followers, spawning false and/or easy-going prescriptions for human behaviour, are the mob—the volubility of whose members is all too often in inverse proportion to their conceptual grasp.

8. PRESENT CONFLICTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH

There is little doubt that certain of the 'mob' elements have attached themselves more easily to sociologists than to psychologists by the very nature of the subject matter of the former, which offers, *in the eyes of the misguided*, an easy panacea for the social ills of the times. In fact it offers no such remedy. Because it is a relatively new and developing study a rather above-average commitment to it is needed to make sense of the current behavioural scene.

Certainly in academic circles generally a number of sociologists have attracted a certain amount of opprobrium to themselves both by their overt identification with political activism and by their 'spurious professionalism and unjustifiable verbal prolixity' (Taylor, 1966, p. 178). But in psychology also conflicts are not unknown, some of which have already been discussed. It is likely that the psychologists feel, and are likely to feel more, the threat of incursions upon what they have long held as cherished preserves. Similarly a 'pure' psychologist embracing the social side may experience a conflict (which may or may not be permanent) between the discipline of his original commitment and that of his adoption. Foss (1972, p. 35) has described the ambivalence of one such

'convert' who discerned (in social psychology) rather a lot of what she once called 'ring-a-ring of roses: and we all know how that ends up'.

I think, however, that social scientists will acquire the greater flexibility that their roles demand not by abandoning the discipline in which they were reared in favour of some 'impure' conglomerate, but by their willingness to place their discipline in a wider framework—a framework not immutable or fixed. So when Vernon (1969), hitherto a 'pure' psychometrist, extended his range to include the cultural aspects of the environment one reviewer could describe it as 'the transition of a distinguished psychologist from one frame of reference to another'.

I have already said that current thinking on research methods in the social sciences is not likely to remain unchanged under the influence of post-positivistic theories. Hudson (1972) has recently discussed the inadequacies in his view of the 'evangelical belief in scientific method' which distinguished the post-war development of British psychology. He suggests that it could be replaced with advantage by the 'hermaneutic' concept (that is by the central skill of subjective interpretation). Research done in this way, he says, will be done primarily to express ourselves and not in the role of 'quasi physicists' or 'pseudo engineers'. One can almost hear the apoplectic reactions of some psychologists to such a 'subjective' thesis! In certain ways, too, it almost smacks of the ethnomethodological school of sociologists and their prophecies of 'the death of conventional research' (Prophecies I happen not to share).

The likely appeal of the 'hermaneutic' school to educational scientists raises peculiar problems. Misunderstood and misapplied (as it may well be by many neophytes without a formal scientific training) its expression in a research format could result in an awful lot of junk. That is not to say that all empirical educational research to date has been of pristine thoroughness or free from error but its motivation has often been sound and its results interesting. As research progresses the Popperian sense of 'refutability' manifests itself so that old theories/ideas are discarded for new ones. Similarly, experimental measures are often 'crude' but certainly better than 'crude' guesses alone, provided that the data is set in wider perspectives and not seen as an end in itself. Without a psychological/experimental basis there is the real danger that by using such concepts as the 'hermaneutic' pure verbalisation will replace thought and pure verbiage will be the outcome.

It seems to me that certain formative experiences (such as 'scientific method') may often be general pre-conditions of a release to a more creative and unstructured mode. In fact the very 'emancipation' from such a method can release enormous reserves of creative energy. If, however, these pre-conditions are missing then I can conceive of the 'hermaneutic' concept (which in itself is a promising idea) as not only resulting in bogus enquiry and report but as being eventually abandoned in favour of return to a more formal, rigid and 'scientific' methodology.

In any case it is likely that research methods in education will perforce be increasingly concerned with 'social' ideas such as programme significance (Chapin, 1947; Suchman, 1967) together with the use of 'quasi experimental' designs (Campbell & Singer, 1963). Such designs (the very use of which takes practitioners further and further away from the 'pure' model) are inevitable because pure randomisation of experimental variables, for example, is often not possible without distorting the data beyond recognition so that 'error' is eliminated along with reality.

9. CONCLUSION

The question of reality is a central one. Berger and Luckmann (1966) discuss the hypothetical case of the individual who does not know what day of the week it is or who readily admits to talking with departed spirits. This apparently aberrant behaviour is unintelligible outside of its social context. If such a person had arrived by jet plane from another continent he may well not know the day of the week because he is still 'on another time'—Calcutta time, say, instead of Greenwich Mean Time. Similarly one would assess a person resident in New York who insists he speaks regularly with the dead rather differently from one living in rural Haiti! (where such behaviour is part of the cultural pattern). The latter individual could be 'on another reality' in the same objective sense as the previous one was 'on another time'. Therefore as Berger and Luckmann (op. cit.) say 'psychological status is itself socially defined' (p. 196) and this dictum applies particularly to the basic act of teaching which occurs in both a psychological and a sociological framework. If the two disciplines are to contribute to a wider and deeper understanding of that act they will do so more effectively in dialetical contact rather than in gladiatorial combat.

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BOOK REVIEWS

James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society*. London: Collier-Macmillan,
(Free Press Paperback Edition), 1971, 368 pp., £1.75.
Julienne Ford, *Social Class and the Comprehensive School*. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul (Paperback), 1972, 174 pp. £1.00.
P. W. Musgrave, *The Sociology of Education*, Second Edition. London:
Methuen (University Paperbacks), 1972, 367 pp. £1.30.

With a Tory administration committed publicly to consumer protection,
it seems desirable that a reviewer should undertake a 'value-for-money'
analysis. It is particularly appropriate when there is an opportunity for
comparison and the books in question are inexpensive editions of books
that have become standard references. They have been prepared with
student consumers in mind. They are attractive, reasonably cheap and
aimed, as Julienne Ford points out, (p. vii), at a real growth market,
which has been stimulated by a massive bandwagon effect. In fact, if
it were not for the presence of an anti-intellectual orientation in student
sub-cultures, all three publishers must be greatly confident about their
success. Regrettably, students buy less books than publishers would
like and this means that the ways students use these books will determine
how many will be bought. All three have merit.

The Adolescent Society describes a major exercise in sociological con-
ceptualization which has greatly influenced the teaching of the sociology
of education. An interesting theoretical account of the emergence of an
adolescent sub-culture in industrial society leads to the key ideas: the
prestige afforded to athletic stars by the American adolescent (p. 30) and
the concept, 'the leading crowd' (pp. 34–43). Popular heroes emerge
from the dominant socio-economic status background of the school's
neighbourhood. Most noteworthy is the over-representation of foot-
ballers in the élites of schools (pp. 132–133), and the comparable import-
ance of social activities for girls (p. 136). Sports provide a safer path to
success than do studies for men, and for girls success with boys is the
best way of gaining respect, (p. 165). The United States clearly respects
physical qualities! These value systems can change (p. 279). It is here
that the study has less to show English sociologists. Studies of English
School peer group sub-cultures identify polarization effects that separate
the academic from the delinquescent. They blur clear cut status systems
for pupils and thus the school's capacity to encourage social change.
The power of peers in socialization and their dislike for 'the passive
dependency that the school imposes upon them' (p. 292) cannot be
ignored, but it is problematic that making scholastic status more visible

will produce social change in Britain. Coleman wants to bring scholarship into the content of rewarded activities, to stress achievement more than ascription and widen the range of prestigious activity. This universal 'Top of the Form' would not only channel effort into socially desirable activities, but also reduce preoccupation with grades, minimize the conflict between teachers and students and offer ways of assessing the effectiveness of teachers and calculating their salaries (pp. 320–327). After the comedy, however, the conclusion deserves attention:

'. . . if secondary education is to be successful, it must successfully compete with cars and sports and social activities for the adolescents' attention, in an open market' (p. 329),

and this point still needs discussing. This book has many uses. As a history of education, it shows how school systems develop and how sociologists of education pioneered empirical studies of schools. Thus B.Ed. students would benefit from studying the research proposals described so carefully, emulating the precise inter-marriage of statistical tables, diagrams and commentary, and trying to relate theory to data so skilfully. Other students would profit from analysing the discussion points, notably the schools' influence on socialization, and the existence of anti-intellectual sub-cultures among pupils. Staff and research students ought to read it. Its techniques permit replication, its design is interesting and it indicates new areas of research activity that deserve exploration.

It has, therefore, considerable appeal, but B.Ed. students also need to study Hargreaves and Lacey; others can find Coleman's argument elsewhere; and research students can borrow library copies. I would, therefore, recommend its inclusion in the Library. I hope that many students will read it to extend their understanding of the sociology of the school and that their tutors will recommend it, but it is not a book to buy.

Social Class and the Comprehensive School describes another influential work, which although it has neither the merit nor the impact of Coleman's study, has made a useful contribution to our thinking about education and life chances. It provides a necessary corrective to the wilder claims made for comprehensive education by politically motivated social engineers. Thereafter, methodological weaknesses and insensitivity to school intentions mar the careful review of the literature and the impressive statistics. The book examines the hypothesis that Comprehensive Schools produce the 'fairer society' by postponing selection and allowing mobility between streams. It concludes:

'There is, in short, no *evidence* that comprehensive education contributes to the breaking down of the barriers of social class . . .' (pp. 129–130).

Yet Dr. Ford admits that further research is necessary; and that the existence of streaming maintains social selection, and comprehensivization merely makes it less visible. Determining children's access to high status

knowledge may well be the most potent form of social divisiveness. It lends poignancy to the final question:

'But *could* a non-selective school system be devised?' (p. 136).

Here then are clear arguments, clear case studies of three schools and clear documentation. The references are excellent and the discussion sound. Yet, the statistics cause worry. The dichotomization of populations on I.Q. scores through the mean score imply a critical overlap on the populations (pp. 35–36), but were the tests strictly comparable? These are flimsy grounds for generalization. We are told little of the institutional variables that shape responses. So, I would not want students to refer to it continuously and I cannot recommend it for purchase. It has value as a polemic, but how can this be used without exposing innocents to its dangers? Group learning presents one way and I would include it in the book box of a syndicate project on Social Class, for it serves to present the relativism of sociological methods and values.

The Sociology of Education is perhaps the most influential British text for teaching the sociology of education. In a survey of Colleges of Education, Musgrave's First Edition was not only selected most frequently (48%) as useful for students, but its chapters were echoed in the syllabi examined.

The book has been extensively rewritten and there is additional material on the sociology of the school, with a cap touching gesture towards the sociology of the curriculum. Here is a parallel with the 1965 edition. Cultural lag operated then in the scanty concern for the school as an organization; here it operates to omit an analysis of phenomenology and the classroom. We needed another book then; we need another now!

What we have is a clearly written text book, which serves to start a student thinking. It begins with a careful description of the ubiquitous processes of socialization and stratification, followed by a splendidly confident Cook's Tour of the family, socialization and education. The confidence grows in the description of social class. Musgrave suggests that, 'The idea of social class is a relatively simple one,' (p. 53) but has difficulty in defining it, and concludes.

'It is, therefore, very difficult to know just what is meant by the term "social class" '. (p. 57). The next section on differential socialization is admirable. It shows the cumulative disadvantages that attend working class children without being too assertive. The description of the school as a socializing agency is comprehensive and thorough, but fails to show the relativism of the studies. The influence of the peer group is described without distortion, but the sources are presented indiscriminately. The chapter on the mass media is new and has combined much recent and relatively inaccessible material. The stress is laid on the use of the media rather than the more problematic aspects of their influence on consumers. There is a sound but rather dull discussion of the nature of professionalism, and the teacher in school is shown to operate within a set

of interlocking social and administrative systems. Entirely new is the discussion of the curriculum. Knowledge may be perceived as a social construct, which he relates to cultural values, social structures and personality types. All this is analysed succinctly, drawing on examinations, organizational forms and interpersonal expectations. It is one of the best chapters in the book; mature Musgrave at its clearest!

On the other hand, the teacher in the classroom is little different from the 1965 edition, and the Social Functions of Education is re-presented with very little change.

Finally, the book ends with a plea for the functional analysis of institutions, and particularly of the 'complex and closely inter-related' functions of education (p. 348), so that political decisions can be made without increasing conflict.

'Consensus shall reign wher'er the sun . . .'

When so much is attempted and presented in what have to be simple and reasonably readable terms, an adequate sociological perspective is difficult to achieve. That Musgrave gets so close is a tribute to his judgement, but even so, tendencies tend to become trends and trends universal laws. Still the book is immeasurably superior to many rivals. The references are reasonably sound and better still accessible. The style is clear, but unfortunately never exciting and the occasional attempts to utter a pithy striking phrase lead to sociological inexactitude. Nevertheless, this is manageable and I recommend this book for purchase by students. It does not deserve the prestige of a library place as it needs commentary and corrective, but as a regular basic text for study with tutors it is the best buy of the three. It provides useful revision for B.Ed. students and a good basis for introducing the key sociological concepts used in education. In my College it is one of the connecting books that support study in the sociology syndicate project. This allows students to follow Musgrave's clear account of any theme and to elaborate or refute it with allied readings, thus providing the security of a firm, familiar base from which to explore the wider possibilities of sociological scholarship.

In terms of use, then, Musgrave is the best buy; Ford will stimulate most discussion; and Coleman makes the best contribution to sociological conceptualization. Nevertheless, if there were a B.S.A. equivalent of the British Standard Institute's safety regulations, none would reach it!

PETER CHAMBERS

FRANCES STEVENS, *A Place for Learning* (Hutchinson Educational, 1972, £6.50).

LET it be said at once that, though this is in many ways an important and thought-provoking study, it is not a fully satisfying one. Moreover, your reviewer is left with the impression that Frances Stevens herself—as likeable and as scrupulously honest an author as one could ever wish to meet—is only too acutely aware of its deficiencies. It is difficult to read, simply because it is presented in thesis rather than in book form. It is cluttered with a number of unnecessary and therefore irritating footnotes and cross-references. Carried away by her own enthusiasm, Miss Stevens can introduce into the text a surprising number of irrelevancies. In short, no clear pattern emerges: it is difficult to see the wood for the trees.

The book is sub-titled 'Aspects of Secondary Education in three English-speaking Countries' and is an attempt at high-lighting the problems to be faced in English comprehensive education by focusing attention on those found in closely parallel institutions in the U.S.A. and Australia. After a careful survey of her chosen territory, Miss Stevens ended up with a number of pupils for interview, aged between 13 and 15, and graded at four ability achievement levels. Questions put at the interviews were designed to enable the pupil to 'reveal' himself/herself as frankly and as fully as possible, Miss Stevens seeking specifically to find out what were the circumstances attendant on success or failure at school at this particular age level. The findings are closely analysed with many references to a formidable array of diagrams and statistical material. All this takes up some 200 pages, the last 70 pages making an attempt to draw the threads together.

Here, Miss Stevens is at her most entertaining and thought-provoking. Entertaining, because like Monsieur Jourdain (whom she cites) she seems somewhat bemused at having proved just what any competent teacher has intuitively known and acted upon all his life. Thought-provoking, because she realistically recognises that nowadays there are not enough such competent teachers to satisfy the still growing demand for secondary education, and that in consequence most of our assumptions as to what we are trying to do and how we are to do it need a thorough re-think. She has some interesting suggestions to make. But must we have sacrificial 'guinea-pigs' amongst the youngsters whose school life she commendably seeks to make fuller and richer? And what about the parents? As attempted reforms in French secondary education have repeatedly shown, and as parental attitudes in Sweden seem now to be shaping, parents will not passively abdicate their role though they may be slow or even neglectful in recollecting what it is in terms of modern complexities of living.

VERNON MALLINSON

EILEEN MACKINLAY, *The Shared Experience*. (Methuen Paperbacks 90p).
GEOFFREY R. ROBERTS. *English in Primary Schools*. (RKP £1.50 cloth
bound. 75p paperback.)

TAKING as her text Coleridge's famous dicta on the imagination from
Biographia Literaria, Eileen MacKinlay sets out an account of exploratory
and imaginative writing done with students and young children. The
starting point for this work was 'sensitive awareness' (what Coleridge
referred to as the primary imagination), poems, stories, poets' notebooks,
diaries, *Haiku*, and discussion. Through a 'sharing' of the natural potency
of these 'experiences' all involved came closer to rediscovering their own
natural sensitivity and something of what, for want of a better term, we
tend to call the creative process. The author offers a large selection of
writing by students and children which is both evocative and illuminating,
linking it with her own insightful comment and establishing her main
thesis, which incorporates a plea for sensitivity to the child's world of
imagination and for the reawakening of it in those who will work with
children.

I found it an absorbing and stimulating book which should be read by
anybody concerned with the teaching of literature or working with
children.

Mr Roberts' book I found less compulsive reading and I suspect that
most 'lecturers, teachers and students of education' to whom it is addressed
would find it less useful. It is a generalised account, didactic in tone, of
English activities in First Schools—activities which by now most people
concerned in the teaching of young children would consider desirable
(though perhaps not all, and this would be a justification for the book).
It updates Cutforth's book—'English in the Primary School'—with which
it may be compared, with an eye on linguistic and sociolinguistic researches,
but while it would convey good sense and a clear enough picture of con-
temporary work in English to the young student or foreign educationalist,
it would be unlikely to enlighten the teacher or the lecturer concerned
with this area. This is a pity because a book with what I take to be Mr
Roberts' aims and intentions is needed.

BARRY MAYBURY

J. BOWEN, *A History of Western Education*, vol. I, *The Ancient World*,
(Methuen, 1972, 395 pp.).
M. L. CLARKE, *Higher Education in the Ancient World*, (Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1971, 188 pp.).

THESE two books are useful additions to the slow but steady output of
publications on the history of ancient education. Professor Bowen has

set himself the kind of awe-inspiring task individual scholars virtually no longer attempt: a full-scale general textbook of the history of education (two further volumes are promised), while Professor Clarke has produced a competent scholarly monograph on an important theme.

Bowen's handsomely produced work is erudite, lucid and up-to-date in its classical scholarship. The thread that runs right through his narrative traces the growth of public literacy and its social significance; altogether, the interrelationship of education and society is paid much attention to, and indeed were it not for overmuch general history and history of learning at large and too many potted outlines of educational thinkers (or indeed any thinkers who gave some thought to education), this manual would bid fair to become a standard work. As it is, there are many good things in it: the full measure of attention given to the often neglected areas of the 'Dark Ages', of Hebrew educational practice, and of the birth of the school in ancient Mesopotamia; some interest in such questions as social mobility through education or Roman imperial education policy; and many illuminating and quotable observations, such as that explaining why in Greece: 'the possibilities of literacy in creating and holding constant an intellectual environment and in providing a literature whereby each individual could explore it privately, were yet to come', p. 74, or how, in the post-Roman Empire West, 'the decline in universal literacy threatened the maintenance of historical consciousness', p. 320.

For a work of so vast a scope, the slips the present reviewer noticed were impressively few: Diocletian did not 'follow the example of earlier emperors' on teachers' salaries and his pertinent Edict came in 301, p. 213 (coincidentally, Professor Clarke misinterprets the intention of the Edict in stating that it: 'lays down that the grammarian should receive 200 denarii a month per pupil etc.', p. 9), and at p. 262 ff. it should be Gregory *of* Nazianzus. But there are some inexplicable omissions from Bowen's bibliography, e.g. Cochrane's *Christianity and Classical Culture* or Marrou's incomparable *A History of Education in Antiquity*, and while one can just about see why the author decided on 1054 as the terminal date of his vol. I, the absence of any discussion of the so-called Carolingian Renaissance is all the more unfortunate.

Clarke's book, after carefully defining its scope (though his statement that: 'the general education of the ancients corresponded more or less to the Ordinary Level work of a modern English schoolboy' seems to strike an odd chord), proceeds to cover a period of nearly a thousand years from the 4th century B.C. He is most at home among the philosophers of ancient Greece, the relevant chapter constituting more than a third of the book, and containing numerous valuable insights ('no two teachers could be more unlike in their methods than Pythagoras and Socrates') and assessments (e.g. on the influence of the various schools under the Roman empire, p. 81 ff). However, it is the briefest of his chapters, on professional education of physicians, architects and lawyers, while the ancients assumed

that 'teaching required no specific training . . . other than a knowledge of one's subject', that strikes one as the most original and interesting.

Both authors rely very heavily on primary written sources. This is their strength—and also their weakness. Strength, because the works are soundly researched, both authors presenting solid evidence for their assertions and avoiding uncritical repetition of other writers' errors. Weakness, because since ancient writers had little interest in educational institutions and their workings, and since, of course, their writings have come down to us in unrepresentative assortments, both books are over-concerned with the development of learning and 'high culture' in general, and give at least as much attention to educational thought as to practice—which tends to invest the two books with a normative rather than a positive flavour, even if Professor Clarke disavows any such intention in his Preface ('. . . to describe what was taught and how . . . what Plato advocated in the *Republic* is not what the ordinary student experienced in the schoolroom') and, realising the temptation, did the better in containing it. If, therefore, in the last analysis the two works are less than wholly satisfying, they will yet be of much value to students of the subject at several levels.

R. Szreter

SOCIOLOGY AND TEACHING

EDITED BY R. MEIGHAN

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